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A bstract
This dissertation investigates how specific design choices or procedural rules that govern 
the contracting environment between government and non-governmental organizations 
affect organizational behaviour and contractual outcomes. Chapter 1 studies government 
procurement of a public good or service when only nonprofits compete. Theoretically, 
I find that the intensity of the ideological divide between government and nonprofits 
jointly impact the degree to which compromises are made in terms of both the public’s 
and nonprofit’s missions, as well as the ability on the part of government to reap double 
(cost-saving and strategic) financial gains. Chapter 2 analyses government procurement 
of specific development aid services via competitive scoring auctions, open to nonprofits 
and for-profits alike. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, I find robust empirical 
evidence that ex post renegotiation costs as well as initial price offers will tend to be 
higher when the agent is a for-profit compared to when the agent is a nonprofit; at the 
same time, the initial offers of for-profits will on average adhere better to the government’s 
service delivery instructions compared to those of nonprofits. Furthermore, because non­
profits intrinsically value project outcomes, they will at times be able to offer government 
a better deal; at the same time, this distinct feature of nonprofits also gives them a com­
petitive disadvantage when government holds strong views about how the services should 
be provided and finds it important that the agent does what it says. Finally, Chapter 3 
shifts attention to the actual grant contracting procedures used by government (and other 
grant-making institutions) to finance nonprofits’ initiatives to provide a public good or 
service. I focus on how asymmetric information impacts nonprofits’ behaviour in markets 
for individual grant contracts. Theoretically, I make explicit the argument that hidden 
types may be associated with excessive grant requesting, and demonstrate how a collec­
tive contracting mechanism can essentially alleviate grant market failures due to adverse 
selection.
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Introduction
This dissertation considers the intriguing -  and growing- use of competitive market forces 
by government to involve non-governmental organizations in the delivery of public goods 
and services. Governments are increasingly moving to delegate the delivery of a wide 
array of vital services, previously provided in-house, to non-governmental organizations 
through competitive (scoring) auctions (procurement contracts) and competitive requests 
for grant proposals (grant contracts). The adoption of these two ‘market design’ formats 
has proceeded apace in the real world, however, with surprisingly little systematic un­
derstanding of how their specific design choices or procedural rules affect the contending 
organizations’ behaviour and contractual outcomes.
Chapter 1 studies government procurement of a public good or service when only non­
profits compete. Such a setting typically arises when the contracted-for good or service is 
purely public or collective (like regional economic development programmes), excludable 
but the intended recipients cannot afford to pay for the good or service (like food aid or 
health care for the poor), when the risks for ex post expropriation are high (like mental 
health care), or when nonprofits enjoy a competitive advantage over for-profits, often 
mediated through a series of preferential legal and public policy measures (see e.g. Hans- 
mann, 1980; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Tuckman, 1998; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001; Francois, 
2003; Yang, 2006). Recent evidence in the UK suggests government procurement from 
nonprofits is fastly gaining favour: grants represented 52% of government funding to non­
profits in 2001/02, but only 38% in 2004/05. Contracts, on the other hand, have increased 
from 48% in 2001/02 to 62% in 2004/05 (UK Voluntary Sector Almanac, 2007). Like­
wise in the US, government contracting is today the most important form of government 
partnering with nonprofits (Millstein, O’Regan and Oster, 2000).
The rising trend of government contracting with nonprofits poses interesting challenges. 
One central issue revolves around the question whether government’s gains from “buying” 
(versus “making”) justify her loss of control over the contracted-out service, possibly
4
5jeopardizing key public interest values.1 The more difficult it is to effectively stipulate, 
manage and monitor contractor’s behaviour and the larger the value differences between 
government and nonprofit contractor, the more pertinent this agency problem becomes.2 
Much of the existing literature focusses on providing a public framework of accountability 
when government ‘privatizes’ functions or activities that have been public (see e.g. Minow, 
2003). Here in Chapter 1, I instead analyse how public and nonprofit value compromises 
actually emerge and which factors, including those related to contract design, determine 
their size.
I provide a simple model of competitive tendering for a single, lumpy public service con­
tract with two types of competing nonprofits, that is two competing nonprofits with 
distinct missions. Whereas the baseline model assumes complete information, perfect 
contract enforcement and service lumpiness, extensions of the model relax each of these 
assumptions. Theoretically, I establish three important results. First, the stylized compet­
itive procurement procedure under study3 allows government to reap not only cost-saving 
gains (as conventionally assumed), but also strategic financial gains. The more the two 
competing nonprofits differ in ideology, mission or identity, the greater these strategic 
financial gains. Intuitively, the prospect of losing a service contract to a more ideolog­
ically far-away nonprofit is much less appealing (that is, a lower valued outcome) and 
thus motivates competing nonprofits to compromise even further on their own (nonprofit) 
mission and accept transfer payments far below true costs.4
Second, the problem of imperfect contract enforcement imposes extra pressure on gov­
ernment to undermine public values, precisely because the risks of contract repudiation 
ultimately rest on how far the public-private contract requires a nonprofit to go back on 
her ideals. When there is asymmetric information about nonprofits’ true costs of provi­
sion, a nonprofit’s bid signals this true cost, but more than that, the bid also reflects the 
level of the ex ante fixed transfer payment, the degree to which the nonprofit’s mission 
differs from its competitor and the extent to which the two rivaling nonprofits are close 
cost competitors.5 Interestingly, when the two rivaling nonprofits are close cost competi­
'T h is is arguably the most controversial and least understood challenge. Lack of com petition by 
geographic market and service type or lack of adm instrative capacity in government agencies also challenge 
the efficiency of government contracting, albeit in a much more straightforward manner.
2Let me illustrate what I mean by ‘value differences’ w ith the following examples. A m ission-motivated  
nonprofit may wish to  provide services of higher quality but lower quantity than may a government 
concerned w ith cutting costs or broadening eligibility.
-1I provide a stylised model of the standard procurement procedure that is m ost widely by governments 
across the globe.
4 Perhaps not surprisingly, under com petitive tendering with com plete information, the equilibrium  
contractual outcom e deviates from the Pareto frontier. If instead the three parties (government and 
nonprofits) collectively bargained w ith (costly) transfers over the optim al service contract (al)location, 
then the contracting outcom e would be (by definition) Pareto efficient.
’Now, I essentially adapt the conventional first-price sealed-bid auction setup to  consider bids for a
6tors and have outspoken and opposing identities, then government can set the minimum 
transfer payment relatively lower without disincentivizing nonprofits to bid.
Finally, none of these results rely on the assumption that the public goods project is 
lumpy. However, when we consider the possibility of contracting a divisible project to 
multiple nonprofits, the justification for government to demand ideological compromises 
from the nonprofits may in fact be lessened if not eliminated outright.
The analysis in Chapter 1 can explain why it might be efficient for government to under­
mine public sector values when contracting with nonprofits. That is, the analysis provides 
an efficiency rationale for a government who restricts transfer payments to the nonprofit 
contractor at the expense of public value compromise. Furthermore, it can explain why 
“government contracts with nonprofits often include as a standard feature pricing be­
low cost (Miller, 2006).” The results also suggests that certain institutional factors like 
improved contract enforcement and improved government information about nonprofits’ 
true cost of service delivery have desirable features because they act to limit the size of 
public value compromise.
Identity considerations, notably ideological differences with government and rivaling non­
profits, can evidently have implications for a nonprofit’s optimal bidding strategy, and 
consequently the public-private partnership outcome (see e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 
So far, my focus has been on procurement settings where nonprofits only compete. In­
creasingly, however, for-profit and nonprofit organizations compete for the same govern­
ment contracts.6 Since the identity of nonprofits and for-profits differ by definition or 
by law, it is pertinent and intriguing to ask how this difference plays out in an open, 
mixed competitive contracting environment with government. I study this issue in the 
next Chapter.
Chapter 2 analyses government procurement of foreign aid services via competitive scoring 
auctions, open to nonprofits and for-profits alike. In foreign aid procurement,7 it is not 
uncommon for nonprofits and for-profits to bid on the same “requests for proposals,” 
stipulated by bilateral or multilateral aid agencies like USAID or EuropeAid. Based 
on tabulations of the USAID (2001) Yellowbook, a description of USAID contracts with
public goods project, in which the nonprofits’ optima] bidding strategies are distinct from bids in the more 
familiar private  good s’ auction setting.
6In many markets, nonprofit providers of services function alongside for-profit providers. A s an ex­
ample, in the US, child day-care centers ar roughly 60% nonprofit and 40% for-profit, w ith the nonprofit 
numbers containing a small number of publicly run centers (Morris and Helburn, 2000). T he encroach­
ment of for-profits in social service industries that had traditionally been nonprofit domains increases the 
level of com petition for government service contracts.
7 Government procurement in markets where nonprofits function alongside and for-profits is of course 
not lim ited to foreign aid. Exam ples abound in other sectors such as local government contracting for 
public health services as well (see e.g. Yang, 2006).
7outside actors, Werker and Ahmed (2007) find that of nearly $20 billion in open USAID 
contracts, $10 billion had been awarded to for-profits and $7 billion to nonprofits, with the 
remainder to an assortment of governmental and other nonprofit actors. Despite the fact 
that it is a vast and thriving business, aid procurement is often perceived as an obscure 
topic when it comes to reducing poverty. But, in the mundane details of how and with 
whom government contracts to build schools, drill water wells or support a national anti­
corruption strategy, Chapter 2 shows, can be found important opportunities for saving 
public resources and promoting a more dynamic private sector involvement in developing 
countries.
When aid procurement makes headline news, it mostly does so airing concerns about too 
much of official aid money allegedly being swallowed in fees and administrative costs with 
profit-seeking contractors. To illustrate, consider this recent quote from the Financial 
Times (2008): “The international aid effort in Afghanistan is in large part “wasteful and 
ineffective” , with as much as 40 percent of funds spent going back to donor countries in 
corporate profits and consultant salaries, Kabul-based charities only recently announced.” 
Despite such worries (placing especially for-profit contractors in a grim spotlight), no­
body, to the best of my knowledge, has so far sought to systematically establish whether 
for-profit contractors behave any differently from nonprofit contractors. Do for-profit 
contractors effectively demand relatively higher fees, and if yes, in exchange for what? In 
other words, what’s in it for government? How is it that for-profit contractors might be 
able to charge bilateral or multilateral aid agencies relatively higher prices? These are the 
sorts of questions I examine first theoretically, and then empirically using a novel dataset 
that I constructed myself with detailed information about forprofits’ and nonprofits’ bid­
ding and contracting decisions for over 450 competitively awarded aid service contracts let 
by the UK’s Department for International Development, one of the most highly regarded 
bilateral aid agencies worldwide (The Economist, 2002; Barder, 2005).
In Chapter 2, I first develop a simple model of competitive bidding for inherently in­
complete aid service contracts with two types of contestants -now, for-profits who simply 
maximize profits and nonprofits with a distinct mission, who care about the project’s 
outcomes and the ways these outcomes came about.8 I show that nonprofits will typically 
compete for aid service contracts where there exist high returns to non-contractible qual­
ity innovations (as is often the case in projects with a strong public goods component), 
government finds strict adherence to the initial “Terms of Reference” (TOR) relatively 
less important and/or nonprofits reap substantial intrinsic gains from project realiza­
tion. Yet these strengths of nonprofit status also produce corresponding weaknesses in
8Like in Chapter 1, nonprofits explicitly value the project’s outcom es. B ut now in contrast to the 
m odelling assum ptions in Chapter 1 , nonprofits reap no project benefits unless they are in effect the 
project contractors.
agenda-setting: the initial offers made by nonprofits will, on average, adhere less to the 
project’s TOR than the initial bids submitted by for-profits. Finally, the government’s 
ex post transaction costs when contracting with a for-profit will on average be substan­
tially higher than when contracting with a nonprofit. Intuitively, a for-profit will exploit 
any renegotiation opportunity to increase its profits, whereas a nonprofit will use the 
opportunity to take control over the project’s design and implementation approach.
I test these three main empirical predictions of the model using a unique data set con­
taining detailed information on 458 competitive aid service contracts awarded by the UK 
government (the UK’s Department of International Development, to be precise) to 225 
distinct aid implementing firms. I find support for all three predictions. E.g. nonprofit 
bids effectively adhered less to the projects’ TOR than did those made by for-profit, and 
for-profits were significantly more likely to request additional funds to complete their 
projects (due to cost overruns and the like) after the contract had been signed. The 
average total cost overrun (as a share of the initially agreed price offer) with a for-profit 
contractor was nearly twice as high as its counterpart with a nonprofit contractor.The 
analysis in Chapter 2 thus provides a rationale for why for-profits can charge substantially 
larger fees (both ex ante and ex post) than nonprofit rivals, and still win the contract; 
and why nonprofit mission can help to win an aid contract, but can at times9 also be a 
liability.
In Chapters 1 and 2, I analyse how precisely nongovernmental organizations, be it for- 
profits or nonprofits, respond to the competitive market structures that are most widely 
used by government to procure specific, well-defined services from these third parties. 
What is their optimal bidding and contracting strategy, and how do the procedural rules 
that govern these procurement settings affect these choices? Both Chapters reveal that 
the identity of the contractor and his competitors matters a lot, that is, has far-reaching 
consequences for the nature of the contractual deal that government and nongovernmental 
organization strike. The next and final Chapter of the Dissertation turns to yet another 
widely used method by government (but also by other grant-making institutions) to en­
gage with nonprofits for the delivery of public services: competitive requests for individual 
grant proposals. Here, however, I not only briefly analyse how nonprofits respond to the 
standard grant-making mechanism, I also advance a new alternative mechanism, spe­
cially designed to help the grant-maker more effectively deal with the growing and costly 
problem of adverse selection.
So Chapter 3 shifts attention ‘back’ to the actual grant contracting procedures used by
9For instance, when government knows what she wants (how the project should be im plem ented), then  
a for-profit’s greater w illingness to  do what government wants (that is, dance to the piper) is a source of 
com petitive advantage.
9government (and notably also other grant-making institutions) to finance nonprofits’ ini­
tiatives to provide a public good or service. Over the past few years, markets for grant 
finance have in effect proliferated and become increasingly thick, with an ever larger 
number of potential grant recipients interacting with a growing number of grant-making 
institutions, largely due to a historic rise in philanthropy.10 Despite this, remarkably 
few, practical mechanisms have at the same time evolved to help grant-making institu­
tions overcome both the congestion that thickness can bring and the inherent screening 
difficulties that thickness can aggravate. These markets are virtually all organized via 
competitive calls for individual project proposals. Chapter 3 presents, to the best of my 
knowledge, the first scholarly effort to rethink the way grant-making agencies screen grant 
proposals and allocate grant funds.
I study a new grant contracting method, a so-called collective grant contracting mech­
anism, that departs from the status quo grant-making practices in two material ways. 
The new method requires candidate grantees11 to form a group of a prespecified size and 
submit one collective grant proposal, which pools together individual grant requests. The 
collective grant contract also specifies a series of distinct and critical individual achieve­
ments, i.e. significant stages in each project’s development process, and conditions an 
individual’s future stage grant payments not only on defined individual results but also 
on the achievements of the other group partners. Assuming that grant applicants effec­
tively have some valuable information about each other’s projects which the grant-making 
agency does not (readily) have, I show that this joint liability transfer will induce positive 
assortative matching, and raise the average quality of the organizations or projects who 
apply. Indeed, the collective grant contracting can be viewed as a simple mechanism 
that exploits local information to alleviate grant market failures caused by asymmet­
ric information. Furthermore, the collective grant contracting mechanism, I argue, can 
significantly reduce transactions costs, that is, the administrative burden of allocating 
grants.
The collective grant contracting mechanism offers a number of important, additional 
benefits to grant-makers. For instance, it presents a way for grant-makers to reconcile 
competitive pressures with incentives to collaborate, enabling grant-makers to capture 
efficiency gains from both competition ex ante and mutual assistance ex post. 12 Also,
10Nonprofits today increasingly finance their activities not only through government partnering (grants 
and contracts) but also with private sector means. T he growing success of Corporate (Social) Responsi­
bility and the remarkable rise in the number of big, private foundations (see e.g. G ates Foundation and 
Soros Foundation) by and large account for this im portant trend.
11 1 assume that grant applicants in the analysis are nonprofits - that is, organizations who explicitly  
value the outcom es o f the projects they im plement. Since the overwhelming majority o f private and public 
grant schemes are open to nonprofits only, this is a natural assum ption to  make.
12This relates back to the common worry raised earlier (in Chapter 1 ) that by p itting nonprofits in 
com petition w ith one another, com petitive market structures will destroy networks of m utuality and their
10
compared with the standard individual grant contracting procedure, it can more effectively 
benefit from reputational concerns as a disciplinary mechanism. At the same time, certain 
factors also raise difficulties with its implementation. For instance, the role of social ties 
is a priori ambigous. On the one hand, social ties can readily facilitate the flow of 
information about each others’ true talent or ability. On the other hand, strong personal 
relationships can also stand in the way of the effective usage of such information during 
the group formation process. I conclude the Chapter with a discussion of two concrete 
grant-making settings as compelling testing grounds for the collective grant contracting 
mechanism: international development grant-making and grant-making targeted at new, 
innnovative nonprofit initiatives.
contribution to welfare (G oodin, 2003).
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Chapter 1
N onprofits and Public G ood  
Provision: A  C ontest Based on  
Com prom ises
1.1 In trod u ction
Government agencies are increasingly moving to delegate a wide array of vital services, 
previously provided in-house, to private (both nonprofit and for-profit) organizations. 
Efficiency and effectiveness concerns similar to those that have driven the wave of pri­
vatization initiatives over the last two decades have motivated the formation of these 
‘‘public-private partnerships” (Anheier, 2005; Morris, 2000). Furthermore, the procure­
ment of these social and other services is commonly performed utilizing competitive ten­
dering systems. Like other production contracts (Hart, 1983), competition for public 
sector contracts is expected to lead to innovation, flexibility, superior productivity and 
cost reductions (Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Weisbrod, 1998; Stein, 2001; Salamon, 2002; Mi- 
now, 2003). In this chapter, I ask how competitive tendering for public sector contracts 
in nonprofit marketplaces affects the goals of nonprofits, their financial condition, their 
behavior in the marketplace, and their ability to carry out their goals. These questions 
are especially important as they touch on the viability and desirability of competitive 
procurement schemes targeted at nonprofit organizations to ensure improved, effective 
service delivery outcomes.
Raising funds to achieve an organization’s mission and objectives has in recent years be­
come an intensified competitive venture (Brown and Slivinski, 2006). A dramatic rise
15
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in the number of nonprofit agencies contending over finite, limited amounts of exter­
nal support, the novel presence of for-profit firms in social service industries that had 
traditionally been nonprofit domains, and the shifting of government funding have also 
prompted organizations to diversify their revenue sources (Anheier, 2005). A recent litera­
ture attempts to understand the details of fundraising strategies that arise in competitions 
for private donations (Andreoni, 1998, 2006; Vesterlund, 2003; Frumkin and Kim, 2000), 
differences in firm behavior within mixed industries (Ballou and Weisbrod, 2003; Kapur 
and Weisbrod, 2000; Weisbrod, 2004) and how these differences are impacted by the level 
of competitiveness (Duggan, 2002; Bertrand et ah, 2005). This chapter shifts focus in 
two important ways: First, I question the rationale of bidding strategies that arise in 
competitions for public funds.1 Second, I consider the scantily studied competitions for 
public sector contracts in settings where only nonprofits compete.2 This focus helps us 
formally draw out the implications of incongruent missions between public and private 
agencies and among private agencies for the contractual arrangements between public and 
private nonprofit entities.
The actual procurement procedures followed by public agencies at local, regional, national 
and international levels entail a fairly uniform set of practices. Typically, the relevant 
public agent publicizes a contract or grant notice, which indicates the desired outputs or 
services and the amount of available funds. Private organizations, possibly short-listed 
candidates, respond to the announcement with a formal bid, which details amongst other 
things the proposed strategy, methodology and costs. Finally, an external committee 
evaluates the submissions and allocates the contract or grant to the winning tenderer. 
Examples abound: City councils increasingly delegate, for instance, the design of a local 
economic development program to a private expert agency on a competitive basis. Also, 
international development agencies award gradually more aid grants and specific project 
contracts after a similar tendering process.3 The oft lumpiness of the public goods service
’ in  the US, UK, Canada, Japan, Germany and many other countries, the nonprofit sector significantly 
relies on government for funding (Salamon et al., 2003). T he great majority of nonprofit revenue is either 
through earned income or government grants and contracts (Anheier, 2005). In recent decades, private 
donations have accounted for roughly one fifth of the revenues of the nonprofit sector in the US (W eitzman  
et al., 2 0 0 2 ).
2 Typically, such exclusively nonprofit markets occur when the goods or services produced are purely 
public or collective, such as regional economic developm ent programs; when the goods or services are 
excludable but the intended recipients cannot afford to pay, like food aid and health care to  the poor; 
or when the nonprofits enjoy a com petitive advantage over for-profits, often mediated through a series of 
preferential legal and public policy measures (Hansmann, 1980; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Tuckman, 1998; 
Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001; Francois, 2003; Yang, 2006). Cooperative relations between governments and 
nonprofits in welfare provision have becom e a prominent feature in countries such as the US, Germany, 
France and the UK (Anheier, 2005).
^Agencies such as USAID, the U K ’s Department for International D evelopm ent, EuropeAid and the 
World Bank’s Internationa] Developm ent A ssociation apply com petitive procurement procedures very 
similar to the one outlined here. Though for the majority of the com petitively let aid service contracts at 
least one for-profit bids, a significant share of com petitions for aid involve nonprofits only (H uysentruyt,
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and limited public monies command the fair selection of one candidate only.
Critics of the state-nonprofit contractual relations forward three distinct concerns. First, 
many fear that private, and especially religious, nonprofit providers can be co-opted or 
their motivational and organizational distinctiveness undermined if they embrace and 
compete for ties with government. It is a common worry, among nonprofits, that simply 
taking public money makes them susceptible to political control, censure or influence that 
diminishes their autonomy, dismantles their flexibility and responsiveness and interferes 
with their self-determination. It is also a common worry that simply delivering the ser­
vices of government’s choosing subtly changes the organization’s priorities and distorts 
the nonprofit’s fundamental ethos or original social mission. There is evidence of both of 
these worries (Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Wallace et al., 1997; Pipes 
and Ebaugh, 2002; Young and Salamon, 2002; Goodin, 2003; Smith and Gronbjerg, 2006; 
Minkoff and Powell, 2006). Second, the flip side of this concern for protecting the private 
realm is the crucial importance of articulating and maintaining public values (Minow, 
2002). It is feared that increased government contracting of services to nonprofits can 
jeopardize public purposes and public commitments to equality (of treatment), freedom, 
fairness and democracy. The third concern relates to the distinctive accountability regime 
of the nonprofit sector as a whole (Goodin, 2003). By pitting nonprofits in competition 
with other nonprofits, the competitive tendering process can destroy the networks of 
mutuality, and their contributions to social welfare. In so doing, the competition under­
mines cooperation, the distinctive element of the nonprofits’ accountability regime, and 
the contribution that can make toward democratic accountability of social institutions 
overall.
Despite widespread use of grosso modo a single, simple procurement procedure and a 
strident ideological debate about public-private partnerships and whose compromise is at 
stake, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of how contract design 
choices might affect rivaling nonprofits’ bidding behaviour, the value compromises, and 
the contractual outcomes. In this chapter, therefore, I provide a simple model of compet­
itive bidding with two types of nonprofits (that is, two nonprofits with distinct missions) 
that elucidates which factors importantly shape/determine any contractual agreement 
between government and nonprofit. First, I provide a basic model of public-private part­
nership under perfect information. I show that the competitive procurement procedure 
readily allows government to reap not only (conventional) cost-savings gains, but also 
strategic financial gains. The more the two competing nonprofits differ in ideology, mis­
sion or identity, the greater those strategic financial gains. The intuition is that the
2007). In other words, we find that certain segm ents of the aid marketplace (particularly, in the fields of 
social services and health care) are dom inated by nonprofits only, for reasons summarized in the previous 
footnote. Also, a large number of grant schemes explicitly target nonprofits only.
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possibility of losing the contract to a radically different nonprofit is so unattractive (that 
is, reservation utility is so much reduced) that it leads a nonprofit to go through extra 
lengths (specifically, further compromise its own mission and accept a lower transfer pay­
ment) solely to preempt this. I also show that under perfect information, cooperative 
bargaining with (costly) transfers actually presents a more efficient contract allocation 
procedure than the competitive prcocurement format under focus.
Next, I extend the benchmark model in two material ways. First, I incorporate the possi­
bility of imperfect contract enforcement. I argue that so long as the ideological preferences 
of the nonprofits and the public agency continue to diverge, any public service contract 
that deviates too much from a nonprofit’s own mission runs the risk of contract repudi­
ation. Here, it may in fact make sense for public values to be further undermined and 
nonprofit ideologies resurrected/accepted, precisely because the risks of contract repudi­
ation ultimately rest on how far the public-private contract requires a nonprofit to go 
back on her ideals. Second, I allow for the possibility that government contracts multiple 
projects to multiple nonprofits. I demonstrate that our key insights are not an artifact 
of the fact that the public good in question is lumpy. Furthermore, I show that in alter­
native circumstances where the public agency can gainfully contract out multiple public 
goods to multiple nonprofits, the justification for the public agency to demand ideological 
compromises by nonprofits may in fact be lessened if not eliminated outright.
Finally, I derive the nonprofits’ optimal bid when there is asymmetry in information 
about their true costs of service provision. I show that any compromise in (nonprofit) 
mission is now proportionally (but not one-to-one) decreasing with true delivery costs 
and monotonically increasing with the extent that the two rivaling nonprofits are close 
cost competitors and radically differ in mission, and the size of the transfer payment. As 
in the previous cases, government can effectively impact/manage the size of public value 
compromise through her decision over the level of ex ante specified transfer payment. My 
analysis also shows why competing for a public service contract can be harmful from the 
winning nonprofit’s viewpoint: Indeed, under certain conditions, the winning nonprofit 
would actually have been better off under pure public service provision.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I examine the 
public project’s outcome under pure public provision, that is, the benchmark case where 
the public agency delivers the public service on her own without nonprofit collaboration. 
Section three lays out the basic model of a public-private partnership under perfect infor­
mation; nonprofits’ production costs are common knowledge. Section four scrutinizes the 
welfare implication of competitive tendering. Section five extends the basic model and 
relaxes assumptions with respect to (i) imperfect contract enforcement, (ii) the lumpiness 
of the public good and finally, (iii) information asymmetry. These findings uncover how
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the degree of ideological compromise in a public-private contract is systematically related 
to the public agency’s ability to enforce contracts, to provide the public good on her own, 
and to discern the cost-efficiency of the nonprofits. Section six concludes.
1.2 T h e  M od el
1 .2 .1  C it iz e n s ’ P r e feren ces
Let the size of the population of citizens be normalized to one. Citizens have heterogeneous 
preferences over the location of an indivisible public good.4 Specifically, our analysis 
builds on a spatial-differentiation model (Hotelling, 1929) in which citizens are uniformly 
distributed along a “linear city" of unit length (Figure 1). Let xc denote a citizen’s 
distance from the left, where xc also gives the citizen-specific preference of where an 
indivisible public good should ideally be located along the [0 , 1] interval.
The citizens’ utility from the project is given by a common factor 9. The utility cost asso­
ciated with not consuming one’s most preferred project depends on a unit transportation 
cost, t > 0.5 Taken together, the utility of a citizen located at distance xc, when the 
public good is located at distance is given by:
W  (xc, Xi) = 9 — t\xc — Xi\ — k (1)
where k denotes a lump-sum tax paid by each citizen to finance the public good.
1 .2 .2  T h e  P u b lic  A g e n c y
We consider a benevolent public agency, whose objective is to maximize net social welfare, 
consisting of the sum of each citizen’s utility, net of the cost of financing the project. Since 
the social (actual plus transaction) costs associated with raising a pound can be greater 
than a pound, we introduce a marginal cost of public funds, A > l .6
4The line segm ent can also be viewed as physical distance, an individual’s political and/or religious 
beliefs or ideology.
l>The notion of voting w ith one’s feet (T iebout, 1956) is likewise applicable. Here, the transportation  
cost t should accordingly be interpreted as the cost of moving away from one’s ideal location in order to  
adapt to  the realized location o f the public good.
6T his characterization of governm ent’s preferences is consistent w ith the views (i) that a government 
may be forced to act according to the ideological views of the citizens in order to preserve voter loyalty 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Or (ii) that decision over the optim al delivery of the public goods is based  
on the preferences of the policy maker in power. This representation of the government has been coined
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1 .2 .3  N o n p r o fits
Two nonprofits, labeled i = 1,2, constitute the third set of stakeholders. Each nonprofit 
is capable of providing the public good at cost c*. In terms of the location of the public 
good, each nonprofit has an exogenously given ideological preference, located at the far 
left (0 ) and right (1) endpoints of the [0 , 1] interval respectively for nonprofits 1 and 2 .
The difference between the nonprofit’s equilibrium choice of the location of the public 
good and his ideal location will be interpreted as a measure of “ideological compromise” 
generated by the competitive process. The cost of such locational deviation from the ideal 
will be denoted by the common unit transportation cost r , and r x  (distance away from 
its initial ideological position) reflects a nonprofit’s utility cost whenever the public good 
is positioned at a location distinct from its ideal.7
The utility functions of the two nonprofits, when the public agency contracts with non­
profit 1 for the public good to be provided at location x, are thus given by
W i(x , B\) = Q\ — rx  + T\ — ci, W2(x, 0) =  6 2  — r  (1 — x)
Bi denotes the nonprofit-specific valuation of the project’s benefits. B\ = T\ — c\ denotes 
nonprofit l ’s net monetary benefits of collaborating with the public agency, as given by 
public agency to nonprofit transfers T\ over and above the costs of the public good ci. 
When partnership is struck with nonprofit 2 at the same location, however, the utilities 
of the two nonprofits are
Wi(x,0) =  0i -  t x , W2(:c, B 2 ) = 02 -  r  (1 — x) +  T2 -  c2.
To clarify, these utilities are simply derived from the underlying preferences of the orga­
nization’s managers (and employees and volunteers) .8
1 .2 .4  T h e  E co n o m y
Finally, I embed the three-entity model (beneficiaries, financier and provider) in a more 
complete description of the economy. A constitution provides for the election of a citizen 
with the power to tax. The resources to finance the public goods project are raised
the citizen-candidate model (Besley and Coate, 1997). Both models lead to  the same results if it is the 
case that the politician’s preferences are reflective of the median voter’s preferences, and when median 
and mean coincide.
'For exam ple, faith-based organizations arguably face relatively high unit costs r.
8Because of the non-distribution constraint (Hansmann, 1980), a nonprofit organization is able to  
attract and recruit altruistic employees working towards ideological, rather than financial, ends.
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through a lump-sum income tax. The tax burden is borne by citizens only. The nonprofit 
is not taxed and, consequently, does not take the tax burden into account when making 
decisions.9 For the government budget to be in balance, total tax revenue T must equal 
total investment costs of the public goods project, plus the transaction costs of raising 
public funds.
1 .2 .5  P u r e  P u b lic  P r o v is io n
I begin with an examination of the public project’s outcome under pure public provision, 
that is, without nonprofit-collaboration. In this benchmark case, the public agency faces 
a two-stage problem: (i) whether the public goods project should be provided at all, and 
conditional upon providing the public good, (ii) its optimal location.
Starting from the second stage, the public agency chooses a project location, x g , that 
maximizes net social welfare under pure public provision W g (xg), with
X g  1
Wg {Xg) =  J  6 — t  (Xg — x)  d x  +  J  6 — t ( x  — Xg) d x  — XCg
0 X g
=  e - t ( x g - ^ \  - J - X C g  (2)
The first two terms on the right-hand side of equation (2) respectively measure the 
project’s benefits accruing to those citizens to the left and to the right of the project 
location. The last term denotes the government’s costs of providing the public good. By 
inspection, W g ( x g) is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable, and the pub­
lic agency’s unique ideal project location is simply x9 =  1/ 2. Indeed, the term t  [ x g — 
expresses the welfare cost of locating the public good either to the right or the left of 
x°g =  1/ 2 .10
Implementing the public project at x9 =  1/2  is socially desirable if and only if
w f y > 0 < * 6 -  j - A c 9 > 0 ......(3)
9In the US, for instance, nonprofits com m itted to  community benefit and charitable purpose enjoy a 
tax-exem pt status. Nonprofit organizations do, however, engage in a range of incom e-producing activities. 
To the extent that such activities are “substantially related" to  the organization’s tax-exem pt purpose, 
the income is tax-free (and the associated expenses are essentially non-deductible). B y contrast, net 
incom e from “unrelated business activities" is subject to  the Unrelated Business Income Tax (U B IT ), 
which generally taxes such incom e at ordinary corporate (or trust) tax rates (Brody and Cordes, 1999).
10We have im plicitly lim ited the public agency’s optim ization problem to the identification of one 
optima] location. T he case wherein m ultiple public goods may be provided in m ultiple locations will be 
discussed in Section 5.
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As may be expected, the public agency’s welfare W g(xg) rises as the magnitude of common 
benefits, captured by 0 , increases; and decreases as a result of increased production costs 
(cg), costs of funding (A), and citizens’ transportation costs (t).
1.3 P u b lic -P r iv a te  P a rtn ersh ip  u n d er P erfect In form ation
I now turn to public-private partnership, in which the task of public service delivery is 
contracted out to one of the two nonprofits. Partnership opens up the opportunity for the 
public agency to exploit any cost advantages that nonprofits may enjoy in providing the 
public good. In exchange, the public agency is faced with the possibility of losing control 
over the project’s ideological design.
Consider therefore a game with perfect information, staging three players: the public 
agency, and the two nonprofits. The public agency announces her plan to contract out 
public service delivery to a nonprofit. Assume without loss of generality that nonprofit 1 
exhibits lower provision costs. The following sequence of events ensues:
1. The public agency offers a contract, consisting of a public good location and lump­
sum transfer pair {a i^, T\} targeting nonprofit 1. The game ends if nonprofit 1 
accepts the contract offer. If nonprofit 1 rejects, the game proceeds to the next 
stage.
2. The public agency offers another contract {2:2, T2 } targeting nonprofit 2. The game 
ends if nonprofit 2 accepts. Otherwise, the game proceeds to the next stage.
3. The public agency decides whether or not to provide the public good on its own.
The extensive form game is thus finite and dynamic, and consists of three subgames, each 
of which, as established by Selten (1965) satisfies the hypotheses of Nash’s Theorem. In 
Appendix A, I check that (i) the public agency is indeed better off contracting with the 
least cost nonprofit and (ii) staging the lower cost nonprofit in the first stage dominates the 
alternative where the higher cost nonprofit is staged first. I now proceed to characterize 
the form of the optimal contracts, reasoning by backward induction.
The smallest subgame contains the public agency’s decision node. The outcome has 
already been worked out in Section 1.2.1, and depends in particular on whether 0 >  4 ^ cg
is satisfied. Since my main goal is to uncover the rationale for public-private partnership,
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as opposed to pure public provision, I shall assume henceforth that the social desirability 
condition (0 > |  — Xcg) is satisfied. The associated payoffs of the three parties are
w ? = e i - T- , i  = 1 , 2 , w 9° =  0 - j - A c 9
Working backwards to the second stage, nonprofit 2 accepts the offer of the public agency 
if and only if pure public service delivery proves to be an inferior option:
W2 (x2, T2 -  c2) > W2 (x°, 0) <^> T2 > c2 +  r  (x° -  x2) =  T2* (x2, x“)
Evidently, the two types of compromises that a nonprofit can be called on to make, 
respectively locational (x2) and monetary (T2), are substitutes. In particular, if equation 
(5) is just binding, the public agency can save on transfers by designating the location of 
the public good to be closer to nonprofit 2’s ideal at =  1. Importantly, the extent to 
which such savings can be achieved depends on the nonprofit’s attachment to her ideology, 
with | dT% (x2 ,Xg) / 8 x 2 \ = r .
The optimal contract offered to nonprofit 2 solves the public agency’s decision problem:
maxW* (x2 ,T2) = max# -  £ f x 2 -  -  7  -  7 ^ 2,
t 2 ,x  2 9  t 2 ,x  2 \  2 J  4
s.t.T2 > TZ(x 2 ,x 0g)
Like A, the parameter 7  > A > 1 represents the marginal social cost of raising public 
funds, and includes additionally the costs of negotiation, and the designing and signing 
of contracts.11
Assuming henceforth that 7 T2 < 1 , the optimal contract has an interior solution, with
*   1 . 7T — /-• In -i\ /t-i*   1T ,
X<2~  2  ~2 t ~  ° 2  ° 2
Thus, as long as the transportation cost of citizens relative to that of nonprofits (t / r ) 
is no less than the marginal social cost of public funds 7 , the contract stipulates that 
compromises are to be made by both the public agency and the nonprofit, as x\  is greater 
than 1 /2  =  but nevertheless to the left-hand side of nonprofit 2 ’s ideal location x2 =  1.
Note that the associated transfer payment to nonprofit 2, , falls short of the nonprofit’s
2
total investment costs, c2. The size of this monetary compromise is given by and
11 We introduce this distinction between A and 7  to  reflect the circum stantial evidence that the precise 
institutional design of public services delivery affects the public agency’s per unit investm ent costs. The 
logic of our results goes through unscathed if both parameters are taken to  be equal, and /or equal to  one.
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represents payment by nonprofit 2 in exchange for the public agency’s granting of a 
locational compromise, from x® = 1/ 2 , to x 2 = \  +  at unit transportation cost t .12
For nonprofit 1, a failure to strike a contract with the public agency in the first stage 
necessarily spells a loss in control over the public project’s location to nonprofit 2 if and 
only if the credibility criterion in equation (8 ) is satisfied:
2 2
w ;  (* 2, T2) >  W ag (1/ 2) <;=*- \ c g -  7 c2 >  - I S .
Equation (8 ) requires simply that the public agency’s net benefit from contracting with 
nonprofit 2 is non-negative.13
I proceed to the final subgame, featuring nonprofit l ’s decision problem. If both the social 
desirability and the credibility conditions are satisfied,14 nonprofit 1 will rationally agree 
to close a public-private partnership with the public agency if and only if
W i  (a*, 7i - c l ) > W l  ( x *2 j 0) T \ > c i + t  (an -  x*2) = T t (xl ,x *2) .
Thus, the public agency once again has leverage over the amount nonprofit 1 may be 
underpaid (r(x 2 — £1)). The size of the underpayment can be increased by raising the 
difference between the locations specified in the two contracts (xi and x?!), and by a strong 
sense of mission and/or ideology on the part of the nonprofit (an increase in r), whenever 
x\ < x2. In stage 1, the public agency solves:
maxiy* (aq, Ti) =  max 9 - t ( x i - ^ \  Ti,
1 i,xi 1 1 ,xi \  z /  4
s.t.Ti > T {(x  \,x*2).
The welfare maximizing contract with nonprofit 1 stipulates:
assuming once again that 7 r / t  < 1. Thus, the extent to which the project’s location
12If 7 r / t  >  1 , we have =  1 and the optima] amount of transfer accordingly adjusts so that T£ =  
C2 — t / 2 . Once again, the total transfer falls short of C2 .
13As special cases, note that if r / t  =  0  so that nonprofit 2  is in fact indifferent to  the location of 
the public good, or that citizens’ cost of transportation is extrem ely high, the public agency will never 
make any locational compromise and set =  1 /2 . A necessary and sufficient condition for public-private 
partnership is accordingly that it be fiscally sound \ c g >  7 C2 . A t the other extrem e, w ith r / t  sufficiently 
large, the credibility criterion can be m et even when cg is in fact strictly less than C2 .
14If equation (8 ) is not satisfied, however, the public agency will refrain from contracting w ith nonprofit 
2, and chooses instead to  provide the public good at cost Acg. The optim al contract struck between 
nonprofit 1 and the public agency is given by x \  =  1 / 2  +  7 r / 2 t and TI  =  c 1 — 7 r 2 / 2 t if  and only if 
A cg — 7 C1 >  —7 2 r 2 / 4 t.
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is removed from the public agency’s ideal location (halfway along the [0 , 1] interval) is 
determined by the ratio of transportation costs for nonprofits over those for citizens 
as well as the costs of funding ( 7 r /t) .  Only in the event of infinitely high citizens’ 
transportation costs (£) or zero nonprofit’s transportation costs (t), will the project be 
implemented halfway along the line segment (x | =  1/2). Meanwhile, if in contrast 7 r  > t, 
the nonprofit’s ideological attachment to her mission is strong enough that the public 
agency will demand no locational compromise, or equivalently, x \ =■ 0 , and nonprofit l ’s 
right to provide the public good is won over based only on monetary concessions, with 
T {  =  t ( x  1 -  X%) +  Cl =  ~ T  +  C l . 15
In all cases, the level of transfers T ^  that the public agency offers (and is accepted by 
nonprofit 1) falls short of nonprofit l ’s provision cost c\. This discrepancy between the 
transfer payment and provision costs increases with the costs of funding, 7 ,  the nonprofit’s 
transportation costs, r , and diminishes as the citizens’ transportation cost t rises. From 
the government’s perspective, higher transactions costs ( 7 )  are to be compensated via 
a lowering in the amount of transfers. Meanwhile, higher transportation costs t on the 
part of citizens motivate an increase in the level of transfers so as to secure a project 
location not too far from the midway point. Finally, higher transportation costs r  on 
the part of nonprofits lower the size of transfers, as each nonprofit’s motivations to pre­
empt the rivaling nonprofit from participating in public good provision are effectively 
strengthened.16
Interestingly, X£ is strictly greater than Tj* by more than the difference in costs C2 — c\. 
Assuming henceforth an interior equilibrium in which both the public agency and the 
nonprofits make some degree of locational compromise, with 7 /T < £, we have
7 ?  =  Cl -  7 T2/ t  < c 2 -  7 t 2 / 2 t =  r 2* .
By creating an environment of competitive tendering for the public good project, the
15This follows from equation (7) since =  1 whenever 7 r  >  t.
1(5 Our finding that under perfect information, the equilbrium transfer paym ent in fact w ill fall short of 
the actual cost of provision suggests that the winning nonprofit will need to  rely on other m eans (such 
as, volunteering or donations) to close this gap. A related, noteworthy point is that in my m odel, I 
im plicitly assume that the nonprofit cannot provide the contracted-for service on its own, w ithout the 
transfer payment. This im plies that the other resources, which the nonprofit might be able to draw on to 
close the financing gap will not be enough for the nonprofit to be able to  provide the service on its own. 
O f course, the lum piness of the service often rules the feasibility of such a scenario out.
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public agency can achieve financial gains on two levels. To see this, note that
Wg Wg (1 /2 )  =  [Ao9 - 7 ci] +  [7 t  -  x \)\ - 1
3 j 2r 2=  \c g — 7 C1 H — ,
as such, a purely cost saving motive drives the public agency to contract with the lowest 
cost nonprofit, nonprofit 1, leading to savings amounting to Acg — 7 C1. In addition, so 
long as both the social desirability and the credibility conditions are satisfied, the public 
agency underpays nonprofit 1 in the first stage (second term in square brackets). This 
second source of savings in transfers can be decomposed further into two parts, with
7 T (x \  ~  Xj) =  7 T (x \  ~  X°g) +  7 T{x°g ~  tfj).
First, 7 r  (^2 — reflects a payment on the part of nonprofit 1 to preempt nonprofit 2 
from striking a public-private partnership with the public agency. Meanwhile, 'yr(xg — Xj) 
reflects a payment made by nonprofit 1 to be granted the locational compromise, from 
x® to x\ < x®. Of course, the latter deviation fromx® to x\ comes at a cost to the 
public agency, in terms of an efficiency loss amounting to t {x\ — 1/ 2 )2 — (xg — I / ? ) 2 . 
Henceforth, I shall refer to the net change in the welfare of the public agency (amounting 
to 3 7 3r 2/ 4 i) as the strategic gains from public-private contracting, as it is made possible 
thanks only to the strategic manipulation of the location of the contracted public good 
elaborated above. In summary (see figure 2) ,17
P roposition  1 .1  In a subgame perfect equilibrium with c\ < C2 and j r / t  < 1, the public 
agency is better off contracting out public good provision to nonprofit 1 , and nonprofit 1 
accepts the contract in the first stage if and only i f
2 2 7 TAc9 -  7 c2 > ----
Though not on the equilibrium path, nonprofit 2 also accepts the contract of the public 
agency in the second stage, while the public agency provides the public good in stage 
three midway along the [0,1] interval. The equilibrium contractual terms stipulate both
irN ote that the social desirability condition stated here requires only that Acg be greater than 7 C2 — 
7 2 r 2 / 4 t rather than 7 C1 — 3 7 2 r 2 / 4 t as c\ <  C2 by definition and 7 2 t 2/At  is of course less than 3 j 2 r 2 /4t .  
In other words, so long as the threat to  contract with nonprofit 2 is credible, the public agency will always 
be better off contracting w ith the lower cost nonprofit 1 .
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locational and monetary concessions by the two nonprofits:
.2
Equilibrium welfare levels of the three parties are
w* — $ .  _ L — i= i 2 w* = o — -  + —LZ -yC,
* ’ 2 2i ’ ’ ’ 9 4 At 7  l ’
The intuition is as follows. Assuming the unit ‘travel cost’ to each nonprofit of ‘locating’ 
away from his ideal point lies below a certain threshold value ( t /7 ), the public agency is 
able to strategically pit the two rivaling nonprofits against one another. The bigger the 
mission divergence between the two nonprofits, the larger the public agency’s strategic 
financial gains but also the lower the nonprofits’ welfare. Evidently, when competing 
against one another, nonprofits must pay up for their mission conflict: They bear the full 
cost of the efficiency losses.
1.4  W elfare and P a reto  E fficiency
The two main themes under scrutiny so far have been: (i) the degrees of locational com­
promise made respectively by the public agency and the nonprofits and (ii) the size of 
the financial gains that the public agency can expect to reap from the public-private con­
tract, over and above that which is made possible purely based on the cost advantages 
that the nonprofits may have. My analysis of competitive tendering so far also assigns 
all bargaining power to the public agency. In this section, I scrutinize the welfare conse­
quences of such a competitive tendering outcome in comparison to an alternative scenario 
(e.g. cooperative Nash bargaining with (costly) transfers), in which all parties concerned 
operate along the Pareto frontier.18 My objective is to ascertain whether, and if so to 
what extent, the competitive tendering outcome leads to a deviation from the frontier.
I assume once again that the social desirability condition and the credibility conditions 
hold. Accordingly, I can set the disagreement point as naturally corresponding to the case 
of pure public provision of the public good at x® = 1/2. The welfare levels of the three 
parties at the disagreement point are exactly as they are displayed in equation (4).
18 One may of course also compare the com petitive tendering outcom e with other bargaining setups, 
such as one w ithout transfers to one of the nonprofits, or one involving only nonprofit 1 and the public 
agency, for example. Our objective in this discussion is mainly to provide a benchmark, in which all three 
affected parties in th is m odel of public good provision can have equal bargaining power, w ith otherwise 
no barriers to  trade between the three parties.
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Turning now to the Pareto frontier, I first assign the role of the provider of the public 
good to the lowest cost party, namely, nonprofit 1. The welfare of the three parties with 
costly transfers are given by:
W i(x ,T i— C l )  = 0 1 — T X  +  T i —Ci, W2 {x,T2 ) = 0 2  — T ( 1  -  x) +  T2
w 9 ( x , t 1 +  t 2 )  =  - ^ - 7 m  +  r 2) .
where 7  once again denotes the transaction costs of transfers.19 Rearranging terms, I 
obtain an expression that can be used to determine the Pareto frontier:
Wg(x,T i + T 2) -\-'yWi(x1 Ti -  ci) +  7 W2(x,T2).
t (  1 \ 2 t
= e - 2 \ x ~ 2 J - 4 + ^ ( ^ +(92 - c i - r )
At any point along the Pareto frontier, the location xp which maximizes the right hand 
side of equation (14) above applies. It can be readily confirmed that such an xp  is in fact 
uniquely determined at the midway point 1/2. Figure 3 illustrates the Pareto frontier, 
along which movements are made possible by varying the level of transfers T\ and T2.
Plainly, Nash bargaining between the three parties necessarily yields a location of the 
public good that is midway along the [0,1] interval. In addition, no party will be strictly 
worse off than the disagreement point with pure public provision whenever there exists 
strictly positive gains from public-private partnership, or, Acg > 7 C1. Finally, the maximal 
attainable welfare levels of each party (when the other two are relegated to their respective 
welfare levels at the disagreement point) are respectively,20
w r “  = ei _ I - Cl +  ^ , i  =  l , 2 , w™ * =  0 - \ - 7 dI  7  3 4
In sharp contrast, I know from Proposition 1 that when the public agency pits the opposing 
ideological interests of the two nonprofits against each other in the competitive tendering 
process,
2
w * =  $i ~ \  ~  K 6i ~ \  = w ° K w ^ ’i = x ’ 2  
Thus, both nonprofits are always strictly worse off than the disagreement point. Mean­
19The transfers T,, i =  1 ,2  can thus serve to  com pensate for changes in the location x , w hile T\  take 
on the additional role of reimbursing the cost of public good provision.
20N ote that by relegating the location o f the public good to the midway point, to be provided by the 
least cost nonprofit, the maximal welfare gain (over and above the disagreement point) for the public 
agency is simply the difference in costs Xcg — 7 C1 . Thus, VK™ax — W g =  Acg — M eanwhile, since
transfer paym ents to nonprofits entail leakage, W™ax — W f  — Xcg/'y — c.
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while,
w ° = 6  +  - ™ >WT “  > e - \ -  a *  = w ?,
and the public agency does better than all of the attainable outcomes along the Pareto 
frontier. Perhaps more importantly, since x \ = 1/2 — ^ r /2 t  < 1/2,
W* +  W i  +  W i  <  Wg (xp , Ti +  T2) +  'yWi(xp ,T i -  Cl) +  7 W2(xp ,T2)
b y  definition of the Pareto efficient location x  . From my discussion in Section 1.2.1, 
this deviation from the Pareto frontier is perhaps not all that surprising. In particular, 
the strategic gains of the public agency are achieved by (i) distorting the location of the 
public goods project away from the midway point in the first stage, and (ii) introducing 
a credible threat that the location of the public good will be even farther away from the 
least cost nonprofit’s ideal than the midway point in the second stage. It is by so doing 
that the public agency is able to provide a level of transfers that is strictly less than the 
nonprofits’ own costs c\. In the end, these represent efficiency losses to be borne by the 
two nonprofits.
1.5 D iscu ss io n  and  E x ten sio n s
My findings up to this point single out savings in transfers as one reason why public values 
-  in terms of the location of the public good -  can be expected to be undermined in a 
public-private contract. The size of such savings, and accordingly the extent of equilib­
rium locational compromise depends, among other things, on the substitutability between 
monetary reimbursements and ideology on the part of nonprofits (r), and the mode of 
contract negotiation (e.g. through competitive tendering as in Section 1.3, or cooperative 
bargaining as in Section 1.4). In particular, the larger r  is, the more likely it is that 
nonprofits’ ideological mission remain intact under competitive tendering. Meanwhile, 
the location of the public good is independent of r  in the presence of Nash bargaining 
with transfers.
In what follows, I will attempt to get at a deeper understanding of the determination of 
the size of ideological compromise, and will do so in a number of different settings. The 
first incorporates the possibility of imperfect enforcement. Specifically, so long as the 
locational preferences of the nonprofits and the public agency continue to diverge, any 
public good contract that deviates too much from a nonprofit’s own mission runs the risk 
of contract repudiation. Here, it may in fact make sense for public values to be further 
undermined and nonprofit ideologies resurrected, precisely because the risks of contract
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repudiation ultimately rest on how far the public-private contract requires a nonprofit to 
go back on her ideals.
Second, my finding that nonprofits do make locational/ideological compromises may well 
be an artifact of a special case wherein the public good in question is lumpy. In alter­
native circumstances where the public agency can gainfully contract out multiple public 
goods to multiple nonprofits, the justification for the public agency to demand ideological 
compromises by nonprofits may be lessened if not eliminated outright.21
Finally, I will show that voluntary locational compromise can take on an informational 
role as well. This is particularly true in an asymmetric information context, in which the 
public agency is imperfectly informed about the true cost of public good provision c* on 
the part of the nonprofits. Here, the size of a nonprofit’s voluntary locational compromise 
can serve as a useful signal for the public agency.
In what follows, Sections 1.5.1 - 1.5.3 illustrate how my basic model can be readily ex­
tended to accommodate each of the aforementioned possibilities: imperfect enforcement, 
multiple public goods, and asymmetric information.
1 .5 .1  Im p e r fec t E n fo rcem en t
With imperfect contract enforcement, the location of the public good stipulated by the 
public-private contract serves two important purposes. First, it dictates the degree of 
locational welfare losses (t (x  — 1/ 2)2) facing the public agency (equations (6 ) and (10)) 
associated with the public good project. Second, it also dictates the degree to which a 
nonprofit can expect to benefit from reneging, by choosing a location different from that 
which is stipulated by contract.22
I focus on how imperfect enforcement impacts the choice of location and the size of trans­
fers in a public-private contract. I do so by introducing a simple reputational tradeoff 
that nonprofits face when contracting with the public agency. Consider an infinite hori­
zon extension of the basic model, in which the two nonprofits share a common discount 
rate r > 0. Accordingly, let t = 0,1,..., oo denote time periods, x(t) as the location of 
the public good at time £, and Bi (t ) as the net revenue (any transfers net of cost in­
curred) of nonprofit i . The discounted utilities of the nonprofits and the public agency
oo oo
are respectively ^  Wi (x(£), B(t)) /  (1 + r ) 1 , i =  1, 2 and Wg (x(t), T(t)) /  (1 +  r) .
t — 0  t = 0
21 A s rightfully pointed out by a referee, President B ush’s plan of public services provision through  
religious organizations does not rule out provision by non-religious organizations.
22 We consider only locational deviations. Implicitly, whether the public good has been provided is taken 
to be costlessly observable, but the precise location o f the public good is not.
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As before, the public agency begins by soliciting the participation of nonprofit 1 . If 
nonprofit 1 deviates from the agreed upon location, detection occurs after a one period 
lag. The public agency commits to rewards and punishments in the form of a grim 
strategy: at the start of each time period, a contract is renewed for one more period if 
no previous violations have been detected. A violation, on the other hand, leads to a 
permanent discontinuation of the contract starting the very next period.
In keeping with the timing assumptions of the basic model, the public agency turns to 
solicit participation by nonprofit 2 , armed once again with a grim strategy, if either (i) 
a violation by nonprofit 1 had taken place during the time period prior or (ii) nonprofit 
1 refuses the offer. Finally, if either a violation by nonprofit 2 has been observed, or if 
nonprofit 2 refuses the offer, the public agency shoulders the responsibility of public good 
provision.
Examples of the projects that I have in mind are the provision of aid services, like citizens’ 
advice and information and agricultural extension programs in developing countries. The 
sheer distance between the aid-financing body and the actual service delivery agency 
and opportunity costs of generating evaluation reports can further prohibit the public 
agency’s scrupulous monitoring. The financial contractual arrangements with nonprofit 
service providers in effect typically comprise staged financing or short funding cycles 
(Anheier, 2005). The capital infusion over time thereby implies that project execution is 
periodically revaluated and further finance essentially depends on successful completion 
of earlier phases. My timing of events, focusing on the issue of delay, thus closely captures 
the key ingredients of a typical financial relationship between a public procurement agency 
and a nonprofit service provider.23
The mechanics of the solution of the problem is similar to that of the basic model and the 
proofs of the assertions below are available upon request. I note here the main messages 
that emerge from imperfect enforcement considerations.
Specifically, let x[ and x 2 be the first and second stage locations contracted by the public 
agency targeting nonprofits 1 and 2 respectively. As part of the goal of contract design, the 
locations x 2 in stage 2 and x[ in stage 1 are chosen so that the two nonprofits voluntarily 
refrain from deviation. For nonprofit 2, the following incentive compatibility condition
2 3 Simultaneously, delay in detecting a violation of the contractual terms can also be understood as the  
consequence of (i) inefficiencies w ithin the judicial system  or (ii) the longer-term nature of the project’s 
central objectives. For instance, environmental or H IV /A ID S awareness programs, which seek to institu te  
behavioural changes demand more tim e before their performance can be effectively measured. These two 
alternative scenarios are thus also consistent with the form of im perfect enforcement analysed here.
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takes the place of equation (5) in the basic model:24
^ W 2( 4 , T i - c 2) > W2( l , ? 2 - c 2) +  i w 2(xO,0)
T i  > c2 +  (1 +  r) t ( 1  -  x{) -  r  (l -  x°) =  T27 (x2, x°g)
Thus, transfersT2 and the designated location x2 are once again substitutable, although 
the rate of substitution |dTi / dx2| =  r  (1 + r) is strictly greater than its static
analogue t in equation (5). In other words, with a one period detection lag, the designation 
of a public good location that is far from a nonprofits’ ideal is costly to sustain, as the 
required amount of transfers to guarantee incentive compatibility is strictly larger than 
its static counterpart in equation (5).
With this in mind, maximizing per period welfare of the public agency by choice of x2 
gives rise to two observations. First, incentive compatibility requires that in stage 2, 
x2 =  1/2 +  7t(1 -f r)/2 t Thus, x2 > x2 whenever r > 0. In other words, in order to 
meet the now two-fold objectives of the public-private contract (cost-saving and incentive 
compatibility), the location of the public good is distorted even further away from the 
midway point compared to x2. Indeed, the larger the discount rate r, and potentially 
more acute the incentives to renege, the larger will be the required deviation from x2.
Second, precisely since the alternative location facing nonprofit 1, x2, will be even farther 
away from its ideal compared to when enforcement is perfect, x2, the per period reservation 
utility of nonprofit 1 is reduced. This suggests that nonprofit 1 may voluntarily strike 
a compromise with the public agency, which entails an even lower level of per period 
transfer T / compared to T-j*. To this end, note that the incentive compatibility condition 
applicable to nonprofit 1 is:
— W i i x i t f - o )  > Wi(o,r/-ci) + Ivvi(4o)r r
<=> T{ > Cl +  (1 + r) tx[ -  rx 2 =  T{ ( x { ,  x°g)
Assuming as I did in Section 1.3 that the threat of a public-private contract with nonprofit 
2 is credible, it can be readily verified that the public agency’s welfare maximizing contract 
with nonprofit 1 in the presence of imperfect enforcement requires
x { = l _ 2 I ( l + I ) < x, i T , = _ 1^ ± I l { 2  + r) + r_r+ c i < _ j S + ci = T ,  
if and only if r ^ r / t  > 1 — 3 7 r / t .  Thus, the size of the transfer from the public agency to
24It can be verified that at an interior optim um , the participation constraint is also satisfied as soon as 
equation (15) is m et.
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the least cost nonprofit is in fact smaller than the perfect enforcement benchmark when 
the discount rate is sufficiently large.
Taken together, granting the winning nonprofit the liberty to adhere more closely to its 
ideological benchmark, and a corresponding reduction in public to nonprofit transfers, 
are both indicative of a public agency equipped with a less than perfect ability to enforce 
the terms of the public-private contract, and when the threat of contract repudiation, as 
parameterized by the discount rate, is sufficiently large.
1 .5 .2  M u lt ip le  P u b lic  G o o d s
Up to this point, I have considered public procurement of indivisible public goods projects, 
like drilling tube wells or coordinating a regional economic development plan, only. There 
are, however, many publicly funded service programs that are provided by diverse non­
profits simultaneously.25
For simplicity, consider the case of two otherwise identical public goods, located respec­
tively at xgi and xg 2 as shown in Figure 4. Since citizens’ preferences are distance sensi­
tive, citizens located along the segment [0 , {xg\ + xg2 ) / 2 )) naturally prefer to consume the 
services provided at xg\ , while citizens located along the segment [(ar9i + xg2 ) / 2 ), 1] prefer 
xg2 . On the cost side, if both public goods are to be provided by the public agency, the 
public agency incurs 2Xcg with two public goods to be paid for via taxes on citizens. These 
observations allow us to sum up the post-tax utilities of all citizens (u g (xgi ,x g2 ) — 2 \c g), 
now characterized also by the choice that they have individually made between the two 
public goods located respectively at xg\ and xg\ :
A number of observations are in order. First, the public agency once again faces a con­
cave problem. By inspection, the two locations that maximize ujg (xgi ,x g2 ) are uniquely 
determined at xg\ =  1/4 amd xg 2 =  3/4, so that the two public goods each serves exactly
2,1 Exam ples of such projects include childcare centres or AIDS hospices, teaching self-employment skills 
to beneficiaries of antipoverty programs and lending to targeted low-income individuals for their credit 
needs. In effect, various social policy reforms, such as the Personal R esponsibility and Work Opportunity  
Reconciliation A ct of 1996, have explicitly sought to  encourage diverse nonprofit providers to cooperate 
with public welfare programs (Minow, 2002; Anheier, 2005).
CHAPTER 1. COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING W ITH NONPROFITS 34
half of the population along the linear city. Thus,
u 9 (1 /4 ,3 /4 )  — 2Xcg = e - t- - 2 \ c g < e -  i - A c s =  W9°
if and only if Acg >
8
As may be expected, if the cost Acg is sufficiently large, relative to the transportation 
costs of the citizens t , the public agency optimally supplies a single public good. In what 
follows, I assume more generally that cg is large enough so that the public agency never 
finds it optimal to provide on its own a second public good, regardless of whether the first 
public good is provided by the public agency, or one of the two nonprofits.26
Turning now to public-private partnership, the public agency’s decision problem involves 
the determination of an optimal location pair, xmi and xm2 , and associated transfers Tj71 
and T™, as components of two simultaneous public-private contracts.27
Like the citizens, the welfare of the nonprofits with two public goods depends on the 
location of the public good closest to her ideal location. Accordingly, a nonprofit can now 
be strictly indifferent to another nonprofit’s location choice, so long as a more proximate 
public good exists. Even so, I shall demonstrate in what follows that public-private 
contracting can continue to entail locational compromises made both by the public agency 
and the two nonprofits.
To see this, note that for a pair of contracts {x™, Tj71} and {x™, T f7} to be simultaneously 
acceptable to the two nonprofits, it must be the case that
W\ (x j7, ? ?  — c-i) > W\ ( 4 \  0) T f7 > cj +  r  (x?  - x % ) = T T  (x?, x j7)
and
W2 ( x ? , 7 T -  c2) > W2 (x j\  0) «=> 73" > c2 +  r  (x j7 - x ? )  = l ?  (x j1, x j7)
These follow since refusal on the part of either nonprofit to accept the contract will result 
in only one public good to be provided by the competing nonprofit. Importantly, note that 
aggregate transfers T^ 77d-T™ and location, say, x^7, continue to be substitutes as in equa-
26We will return to the role of a sufficiently cost ineffective public agency towards the end of this 
subsection.
27 There are a number of other potential possibilities that can be considered even with only two public 
goods: (i) nonprofit 1 providing both  public goods, (ii) nonprofit 2  providing both public goods, (iii) 
nonprofit i and the public agency each providing one public good, i =  1 ,2 . A com plete categorical account 
of each one of these cases is beyond the scope of this paper. We choose instead to  illustrate here the 
case wherein the two public goods are likely to  be the farthest apart (or closest to  each nonprofit’s ideal 
location), when each nonprofit is delegated the task of providing one of the two public goods.
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tion (5). The rate of substitution differs, however, with \d (T™ (x™, x™) +  T™ (x<p, X ™ ) )  fd x  
2r. Compared to the case of a single public good (equation (5)), demands on the part 
of the public agency urging nonprofit 2 to make ideological concessions are now costlier. 
Put differently, it is now more sensible for the public agency to allow nonprofit 2 to main­
tain her ideological position. The underlying rationale, however, has still to do with the 
rivalry between the two nonprofits. Specifically, the larger x™ is set and thus the farther 
away nonprofit l ’s ideal location is relative to nonprofit 2 ’s designated location, the more 
monetary concession will nonprofit 1 be willing to make since the alternative is one in 
which a single public good will be provided by her rival nonprofit 2 .
With these participation constraints in place, the public agency maximizes ujg (a;™, x™) —
7  (Tf1 , x%) + T™ (arj1, x f ) )  by choice of {x™, T™} and {x£\ T2m), subject to the two 
constraints. As may be anticipated, the condition that guarantees an interior equilibrium 
with two public goods is now stricter than before, requiring that 7 r / t  < 1/4 instead of 
7 r / t  < 1 , and the optimal interior solution to the public agency’s problem is:
where the optimal public-private partnership continues to entail ideological compromises 
made by all parties. In contrast, for 7r / t  6  [1/4,1), even though x\ >  0 and x \ < 1 
when there is only one public good to be provided, the intensity of ideological difference 
between the two nonprofits is strong enough so that the resulting savings in transfers 
is a sufficient justification for the public agency to demand no ideological compromise 
from the two nonprofits when there are two public goods, with x™ =  0 and x™ =  1. 
The corresponding transfers to the two nonprofits are accordingly smaller, however, with 
T™ = c\ — r  < c\ — t  (1/2 -|- 2 7 r 2 /t)  and T™ = c<i — r  < C2 — r  ( l/2  -t- 2'yr2 ft) .
Before I draw this subsection to a close, I need to confirm that two public goods indeed 
dominate one, or W* {x™, T™) < ujq (a:^, x™) — 7  (Tf1 +  T ^ ) . It can be readily verified 
that this is equivalent to requiring that nonprofit 2 be a sufficiently cost effective provider 
of the public good,
t 5q2r 2
7 C2 < g + 7  T + ^ r -
Along with my earlier maintained hypothesis (equation (17)) that the cost facing the 
public agency cg is sufficiently high, the lesson that can be drawn here is that the degree 
of observed/equilibrium ideological compromise in fact depends on the cost effectiveness 
of the public agency relative to nonprofits, cg and c*, 2 =  1,2, in an interesting way. In 
particular, if cg is high enough, and C2 (and hence cj) is sufficiently low, the provision of
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multiple public goods is desirable from the public agency’s standpoint only if both public 
goods are provided by nonprofits.28 In addition, the public agency can maximize her 
savings in transfers by granting a smaller degree of ideological compromise by the two 
rival nonprofits.
Taken together, (i) the provision of multiple public goods by multiple nonprofits, (ii) the 
allowance given to each of them to adhere more closely to their ideological benchmarks, 
and (iii) a correspondingly lower public to nonprofit transfer, can jointly be symptomatic 
of cost asymmetry between the public agency and the nonprofits. Specifically, cost asym­
metry here simply refers to a situation wherein the public agency is sufficiently cost 
ineffective in providing the public good and the two nonprofits are equipped with costs Ci 
that are sufficiently low.
1 .5 .3  A sy m m e tr ic  In fo rm a tio n
As discussed in Section 3, the nonprofit with the least cost is always selected if the public 
agency is endowed with perfect information with respect to costs C{. Of course, this would 
also mean that if the cost of public good provision is in fact private information, nonprofit 
1 can always overstate her true cost of public good provision, by just enough to continue 
to secure the right to provide the public good. This can be achieved, for example, by 
reporting a cost of 02 — £, where e is a small positive number. The corresponding increase 
in transfers if the public agency ignores this possibility of cost overstatement, is exactly 
equal to C2 — £ — ci, as implied by Proposition 1.1.
The case of asymmetric information is an interesting extension at this point of my analy­
sis, as it pinpoints how ideological compromises can in fact serve the additional role of 
a signalling device. Indeed, the cost of project delivery is oft inextricably linked with 
measures of organizational efficiency or quality of personnel. Importantly, such organiza­
tional characteristics are not publicly observable. In what follows, I establish the optimal 
contractual terms under asymmetric information when C{ is now private information to 
nonprofit i, and unknown both to the public agency, and to the rivaling nonprofit j  ^  i. 
Common beliefs about the costs of the each nonprofit are iid, and characterized by a 
uniform distribution on the [0 , C+\ interval.
Since the principal is unable to tailor the requisite transfers to the nonprofit-specific 
investment costs, and the two nonprofits are otherwise identical ex ante, I consider a
28We leave it to  the interested reader to  work out the case where the public agency is cost effective 
enough to  step in and provide a second public good in place of one of the nonprofits, and to  confirm that 
indeed the equilibrium degree of ideological compromise made by the nonprofits will be strictly larger 
here.
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game of simultaneous competitive tendering over a fixed sized fund, T, to be endogenously 
determined. The question is therefore whether or not the public agency can continue to 
elicit participation by the nonprofit with the lowest cost.29 Explicit competition between 
the two nonprofits is carried out via sealed bids -  ideological concessions each nonprofit 
is prepared to undertake -  to determine the winning nonprofit.30
I analyze the following sequence of events:
1. The public agency announces the public goods project for which she seeks nonprofit 
collaboration. The public agency also defines the level of transfers, T, to be paid to 
the partner nonprofit in exchange for his cooperation in the project implementation.
2. The two nonprofits are asked to simultaneously submit individual proposals, to be 
referred to as bids, 6j, which indicate the location of the public good that they are 
individually willing to provide, or equivalently, the ideological concessions that they 
are willing to undertake.
3. The public agency selects the most preferred partner nonprofit. Since the two 
nonprofits are identical ex ante, the same grant/lump-sum transfer of T  is offered 
to both. The proposal that deviates the least from the midway point of the linear 
city wins.
The utility cost of the bids corresponds to the cost of ideological compromise that each 
nonprofit is prepared to undertake, with b\ = t x \  and 62 =  t  — X2 ) respectively. A 
strategy for nonprofit i is a function bi (q) specifying the bid each nonprofit would choose. 
In a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, nonprofit l ’s strategy &i (ci) is a best response to non­
profit 2 ’s strategy 62 (C2), and vice versa.
I simplify the exposition by looking for a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies:
h  (q) < b (Ci) =  a  -  (3ci
29 A natural alternative to  our auction setup is a menu o f contracts {x i  (c) ,T t(c )} , i  =  1 ,2 , consisting  
of a location (decision) function Xi (c) and an associated transfer Ti(c)  for the nonprofit at each o f the 
two stages based on reported cost c, and solve the mechanism design problem of the public agency. W ith  
Ci E [0, C + ] as the type space, however, it turns out that the single-crossing condition is not satisfied. To 
see this, simply note that the slopes of the indifference curve for the two nonprofits in (x , T ) space are 
1/ t  and — 1 /r  respectively for nonprofits 1 and 2. As such, wrongful reporting of cost types cannot be 
strictly ruled out, because incentive com patibility for nonprofit i  in fact calls for 6 1 — r x  1 (c) +  Ti (c) to  
be type independent and thus constant for all reported c and 6 2  — r ( l  — X2  (c)) +  T2 (c) to be likewise 
type independent and constant for all reported c for nonprofit 2. W hile beyond the scope of this paper, 
the question of optim al contract design in the context of our m odel is an interesting question, which we 
leave for future research.
30The nonprofit’s strategic decision over the optimal concession is analogous to  a special interest group’s 
choice of contributions or endorsem ents paid to influence political outcom es.
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with P > 0. Equation (19) posits that the size of a nonprofit’s bid is inversely related to 
her costs of providing the public good. Assume in addition that the bids are non-negative 
and lie in the interval between 0 and r /2 .31 In other words, bi > 0 for all c E [0, C+], 
while at the maximum, the extent of ideological sacrifice that a nonprofit could submit is 
bounded upwards by the public agency’s ideal location at 1/ 2 .
Given the linear strategy of nonprofit 2, nonprofit 1 loses, or equivalently b\ is less than 
62 if and only
» ,0 a - b ibi < a  -  pc2 c2 < —- —
Thus, the likelihood that nonprofit 1 loses is given by Prob(c2 < {a — b\) / ft) = {a — 
bi)/({3C+). Furthermore, and by definition of the bid b2 = t  ( 1  — x2) of nonprofit 2, 
t x 2 =  r  — a  +  Pc2 ~ Thus, in the event that nonprofit 1 loses and nonprofit 2 provides 
the public good, nonprofit l ’s utility from losing will depend on the size of nonprofit 2 ’s 
ideological concession: 6 \ — t x 2 = 9\ — r  -F a — fic2 - This distinguishes the nonprofits’ 
problem here from the bidders’ problem in standard first price sealed bid auctions. In 
particular, the utility of losing is not simply “going home with nothing” , as the location of 
the public good, or equivalently the size of the winning bid, matters for both the winner 
and the loser. Taken together, nonprofit 1’s expected utility maximization problem can 
be expressed as32
Ca - b - i ) / P  C +
max J  (0 ! -  T +  a -  pc2) ^  +  J  {9\ -  h  +  T -  a )  ^
0 {CL~bl)fP
s.t.0 < 61 < ^
At this stage, and in the absence of additional information on the size of the transfer, T, 
we have the following result.
The optimal bid nonprofit i submits takes the following form:
bi(c) =  b(c) = max jo ,m in  | r  +  T -  \ C+ j^ ~  ^ j }  =  1>2
31 We will return to  these assum ptions in Proposition 3.
32To clarify, the first term represents nonprofit l ’s subjective probability that nonprofit 2 subm its the 
highest bid, m ultiplied by his corresponding utility. The second term denotes nonprofit 1’s subjective 
probability that he outbids nonprofit 2, multiplied by his associated utility. The constraint can be un­
derstood as a consistency constraint in term s of ideology: nonprofit 1 will never concede to  a com plete 
reversal of strategy or ideology. Nonprofit l ’s bid 61 =  t x  1 is proportional to his concession, x \  , but the  
value of x\  is expected  to lie in the interval 0 ,1 / 2 ].
CHAPTER L COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING W ITH NONPROFITS 39
Barring comer solutions, my earlier assumptions that bi is linear and decreasing in c are 
indeed borne out, with /3 = 1/3. Thus, the size of the location compromise signals the 
true cost of each competing nonprofits in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Meanwhile, the 
constant a = a(r, C+,T) is made up of the nonprofits’ transportation cost r , the density 
of the cost distribution 1/C +, and the size of the transfer T. In particular, a higher r  
renders the alternative of having one’s opponent provide the project more costly, and 
hence strengthens one’s urge to win.
Recall also that the likelihood that nonprofit 1 wins given &i, is simply 1 — (a — b\) /  (j3C+). 
The marginal impact of an increase in nonprofit l ’s bid on the winning probability depends 
critically on the density of the cost distribution 1 /C +. Naturally, as the density 1 /C + 
rises, this marginal impact strengthens since a rivaling nonprofit is more likely a close 
cost competitor. The optimal bid in proposition 2 accordingly reflects these observations, 
and requires that bi (c*) monotonically decreases with C+.
Finally, the optimal bid is strictly increasing in the fixed sum, T  promised by the public 
agency. It follows naturally that an increase T  shifts the distribution of the winning bid in 
the sense of first order stochastic dominance: the higher the level of transfers, the closer 
will the average winning bid be to the center of the linear city. Two points are noteworthy 
here. First, since each nonprofit is well aware that an increase in T  impacts the incentives 
on the part of both nonprofits to offer ideological compromises, a one-dollar increment 
in the size of transfers promised to the partner gives rise to an increase in concession of 
strictly less than equal value (dbi/dT = 1/2).
Meanwhile, the monotonicity of the winning bid with respect to T once again draws out 
the dilemma the public agency faces when contracting out public services to nonprofits, 
as additional savings in transfers can be obtained only by undermining public values. 
Specifically, the decision problem of the public agency entails the choice of an optimal 
level of transfers T  in order to maximize the expected sum of citizens’ welfare, depending 
in particular on the location of the public good provided by the winning nonprofit.
To this end, note that the extent to which the winning nonprofits’ proposal deviate from
the midway point of the linear city is
n r \  1 1 Sh( \ h( n  1 (  <*(t ,C +,T )  -  pcV (c>T ) =  o “  ~ m ax \ b (cV>b (c2)} =  o
since 1 /2  — b \/r  =  1 /2  — x\ > 0 and 1 /2  — 62/ r  =  — 1 /2  > 0 . c denotes the random
variable mm{ci,C2}. From equation (6), the expected sum of the citizens’ welfare, given
CHAPTER L COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING WITH NONPROFITS 40
the locational deviation (from 1/2) of the winning bid, net of the cost of transfers 7 T, is
c+
EW g = J ( 0 - L ty ( c ) - y T ) d F ( c }
where E  is the expectation operator and F(c) = 1 — (1 — (c/C + ) ) 2 denotes the probability 
distribution function of the cost of the winning nonprofit c =  rmn{ci,C2}. Maximizing 
EW g, subject to the definition of y (c) in equation (27) gives33
P roposition  1.2 In a public-private partnership that maximizes the expected welfare of 
the public agency, b(c) < r / 2  if and only if C+ /9  < 7 t 2 / £ ,  while b(c) > 0 if in addition 
7  T < 1/6, for all c € [0, C+\ .
At an interior optimum, with 0 < b(c) < r / 2  for all c€ c € [0, C+}, the size of the optimal 
transfers TA is
T a =  Ec +  2 ( F -  — F f  ^  <  Ec.
The expected deviation from the midway point of the linear city in this public-private 
partnership, E y(c ,T A), and the corresponding expected bid of the winning nonprofit, 
Eb(c) are
Eb(c)/r =
1 T 1 *
=  T  2 ~  X l ’
The first part of Proposition 1.2 pins down the conditions under which an interior solution 
can be found. In particular, it requires that the intensity of nonprofits’ commitment as 
measured by r  be not too low, for otherwise the optimal bid be settled at its upper bound 
at t /2 . Meanwhile, r  should not be too large either, for otherwise with 7 r / t  > 1/6, the 
public agency’s optimal contract will demand no locational compromise and opt instead to 
lower transfers, much as was already discussed in Section 3 when information asymmetry 
was not an issue.
Recall also that under perfect information, nonprofits are underpaid, as transfer payment 
in a public-private partnership falls short of the nonprofits’ costs. A key message of
33The details of the proof of Proposition 3 are relegated to Appendix B.
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Proposition 1.2 is that an analogous observation holds in the asymmetric information 
case, and transfer payment T A is strictly less than the expected cost of the winning 
nonprofit.
Note that T A is unambiguously lower when the competing nonprofits pursue strong, 
divergent missions (an increase in r) . In addition, Proposition 1.2 highlights the density 
of the cost distribution as an additional determinant: a unit reduction in C+ leads to 
a reduction in T A that exceeds the corresponding change in the expected cost of the 
winning nonprofit (dTA/ dC+ > dEcfdC +). Intuitively, as the degree of cost competition 
between the two nonprofits rises, the need for the public agency to use transfers as a 
means to compensate for the nonprofits’ ideological compromise falls. Finally, substituting 
the optimal contractual terms into the objective functions of the public agency and the 
nonprofits, assuming once again an interior solution, we have
P roposition  1.3 The expected welfare of the public agency under a public-private part­
nership is higher than under pure public provision of the public good if  and only if
(7 1")2 t f C +\ 2 2jC+\cn — 7 EjC. - f- — ( —— ) -(- ——— .
9 1 ~  t 2 \ 9 t  J 9
The expected welfare of the winning nonprofit is strictly less under public-private part­
nership,
relative to pure public provision if and only if
C+ 7 T 2 
9 < 21 '
Our final proposition is concerned with the welfare level of the three parties in the auction 
set-up, compared to pure public provision. To this end, each of the following serves 
to motivate the public agency to form a public-private partnership under asymmetric 
information: a high cost of provision Acg on the part of the public agency, a low unit 
transportation costs on the part of citizens t , together with a dense cost distribution on the 
part of nonprofits, (1/C +). Comparing this result with Proposition 1 .1 , where Acg > jc \  
is sufficient for a public-private partnership to strictly benefit the public agency, we find 
that asymmetric information indeed impedes public-private partnership. In particular, 
even when Acg exceeds the expected cost of the winning nonprofit, accounting for any 
required additional transaction costs, 7 Ec, the public agency may still refrain from closing 
a partnership agreement with nonprofits when the expected locational deviation Ety(c )2 
is higher than the savings in transfers T A.
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It may also be of interest to note that while severe competitive tendering triggered by 
a dense cost distribution is desirable from the public agency’s point of view, the same 
factor spells potential welfare losses for the two nonprofits. In concert with Proposition 
1 , the average winning nonprofit can indeed be worse off in the process of competitive 
tendering, compared to the pure public provision scenario, particularly when the cost 
distribution is dense enough, or when both nonprofits share strong adherence to their 
respective ideological missions.
In summary, I have extended the model to incorporate private information where com­
petitive tendering takes the form of a sealed bid auction. Consistent with my previous 
discussions, the transportation costs r  and t, the cost of provision Xcg and 7 C{, impact 
equilibrium contract terms and welfare in a predictable fashion. More importantly, this 
extension unveils an additional determinant -  whether the two nonprofits are close cost 
competitors (1 /C +) -  as another important determinant of the ideological compromise 
that each nonprofit willingly undertakes, as well as the size of equilibrium transfers be­
tween the public agency and the winning nonprofit.
1.6 C onclu sion
I have provided a tractable model of competitive bidding for a single, lumpy public service 
contract with two ideologically distinct nonprofits. I have shown that government can 
exploit the ideological divide between to competing nonprofits to maximise her gains 
from partnering with a nonprofit. The contract for the less cost efficient nonprofit thus 
serves as a credible threat against the more cost efficient counterpart. The cost involved 
in achieving these savings in financial commitments, as it turns out, shows up in the 
form of a public compromise in the dedicated location of the public good. Next, I have 
revealed that the problem of imperfect enforcement imposes extra pressure on government 
to undermine public values, precisely because the risk of contract repudiation ultimately 
rests on how far the public-private service contract requires a nonprofit to back on her 
ideals. Finally, I have established that when there is asymmetric information about the 
nonprofits’ true cost of service provision, a nonprofit’s bid signals this true cost, but more 
than that, it also reflects the level of ex ante fixed government transfer, the degree to which 
the competing nonprofits’ mission differ, and the extent to which the rivaling nonprofits 
are close cost competitors. At one extreme, the public agency can effectively engage 
close cost competitors with strong, divergent missions in a competitive tendering process, 
committing as little as zero government transfers. Of course, under such a scenario, the 
public agency has also committed to fully relying on market competitive forces between 
the two ideologically distinct nonprofits to determine the size of the public compromise
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at stake. Finally, when we allow for the possibility of contracting a divisible project to 
multiple nonprofits, then the justification to demand ideological compromises from the 
nonprofits may in fact be lessened if not eliminated outright.
My analysis can explain why it might be efficient for government to undermine public sec­
tor values when contracting with nonprofits. That is, the analysis provides an efficiency 
rationale for a government who restricts transfer payments to the nonprofit contractor 
at the expense of public value compromise. Furthermore, it can explain why “govern- 
ment contracts with nonprofits often include as a standard feature pricing below cost 
(Miller, 2006).” I have also suggested that certain institutional factors like improved con­
tract enforcement and improved government information about nonprofits’ true cost of 
service delivery have desirable features because they act to limit the size of public value 
compromise.
Finally, my analysis also raises the nature of bargaining between nonprofits and donors as 
an important issue that deserves further understanding. For example, instead of the role 
of a principal played by the public agency (donor) in the bulk of our analysis, a cooperative 
bargaining agreement between the parties (public and nonprofits) concerned, as shown in 
Section 1.4, can have real efficiency, in addition to distributional consequences. Precisely 
how these would play out in a setting with asymmetric information, for example, are 
interesting questions though beyond the scope of this chapter.
A ppendix A
I check that it makes sense for the public agency to contract with the least cost nonprofit. 
One way of doing so involves the deliberate violation of the participation constraint for 
nonprofit 1 in the first stage by offering a level of transfers that is less than c\ + t {x \ — rr^). 
The public agency’s welfare in this case ( )  relative to W* is:
2 2
w 9 l -  w 3  =  7 (ci -  c2) -  2^ -  < o
Clearly, by selecting the higher cost nonprofit, the public agency is worse off on the 
grounds of cost-inefficiency c\ — C2 < 0. The second term arises due directly to equation 
(12), wherein T£ — T2* (<  c\ — c-i) < 0 represents the public agency’s savings in transfer 
upon adding one more nonprofit into the competitive tendering process.
A second option involves switching the order in which nonprofits 1 and 2 enter into the 
extensive form game. The rest of the game remains the same as before. A similar backward 
induction exercise, guaranteeing participation by both nonprofits, and social desirability
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of the public good project with public-private partnership (\c g — 702 > —7 2t 2/ 4£), yields 
contract terms {a:]*,Ti*} = {1/ 2 —7 r / 2t, c \— 'yr2 / 2 i} and =  {1 / 2 -h77"/2i, C2 —
7 t 2/£}. Also let the equilibrium welfare levels of the three parties be denoted by a double 
asterisk, we have
W * * -W *  = 0, t =  1 ,2  w ^ - w ; = 1 (c1 - c 2) < 0
Sequencing the entry of the two nonprofits in the reverse order thus still allows the public 
agency to reap strategic financial gains, but nevertheless loses sight of the cost savings 
that are specific to contracting with nonprofit 1 .
A ppend ix  B
P ro o f o f  P roposition  3: The expected welfare of the government, EW g.
c+
EWg =  J  6 -  ty(c) -yT)dF(c)
0
It can be readily confirmed that EW g is strictly concave in T  and twice continuously 
differentiable. The (unique) optimal government transfers can be had by maximizing 
EW g with respect to T, which yields
r *  = ^  +  2 ( £ - ? £ )
as the optimal level of transfers. The expression in Proposition 3 can be had by observing 
that (3C+ = Ec. Substituting T A into the definition of the bid functions 6(c) =  a — (3c, 
we have, 6(c) < r /2  if and only if C+ /9  < 7 t 2 / t  for any c G [0, C+]. In addition, 6(c) > 0 
if (7 r ) / t - |- 2C,+/ ( 9r) < 1 /2 , for all c G [0, C+]. Thus, if C+/9 < 7 r 1 f t  is already satisfied, 
{ lT)/ t  +  <2C+/( 9 t ) < 1/2 if (7 r ) / t  < 1/6 as displayed in Proposition 3.
Also, since y(c ,T A) = 1/2 — 6(c)/r,
y(o, T A) = \ - \ ( a  (r, C+, T A) -  pc) ^  Ey  (c, T A) = ( t, C+, T a ) -  (lEc)
Likewise,
Eb{c) = a  (r, C+,T A) -  (3Ec
Substituting T A and Ec = (3C+ into the above equations, we obtain the result displayed 
in Proposition 3.
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P ro o f o f  P rop osition  4: Recall that under pure public provision with perfect informa­
tion, the public agency’s welfare is W® = 9 — t/4  — Xcg. Meanwhile, the maximal expected 
welfare of the public agency with asymmetric information, assuming once again that an 
interior solution applies, is equal to EW g =  9 — t/A  — tE y  (c, T A) — 7 T A. In particular,
E y (c ,T A ) 2 = J  ( l - a ( r , C+, T A) - ^ y  d F ( o } = { ^ ) \ U ^ - \
0
Evaluation the difference EW g — Wg upon substituting the expressions for Ey  (c, T^ ) 2 
and T a yields the expression displayed in Proposition 4.
The ex post welfare of the winning nonprofit under asymmetric information is given by: 
Wi (c, T a ) =  Oi -  bi +  T a -  c =  8i -  T-  + - 2 c +  T a .
Taking expectations and substituting for T A,
EW i (c,TA) = ei - T- - ^  + ? ^ .
The last result in Proposition 4 follows upon recalling that the welfare of the same non­
profit if the government provides the public good herself is: 9i — r / 2 .
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Chapter 2
C ontracting for Aid: D oes 
O rganizational Form M atter?
2.1 In trod u ction
We often think of international aid as a function directly performed by government; 
however, a great deal of aid is actually contracted out by government to private nonprofit 
and for-profit enterprises (see e.g. Dickinson, 2005; Berrios, 2000; Taupiac, 2001, Werker 
and Ahmed, 2007). Major aid agencies, like the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), spend 
at least one third of their budgets on aid procurement. They typically allocate these aid 
contracts using competitive scoring auctions, open to nonprofit and for-profit firms alike. 
This presents an ideal setting to examine empirically whether bidding and contracting 
behaviour systematically differ across nonprofit and for-profit firms. In other words, does 
organizational form -by organizational form, I mean whether the tenderer is a nonprofit 
or a for-profit- matter for the nature of contracts? This is an interesting, unexplored 
topic, with potentially far-reaching consequences for the architecture and quality of aid 
service delivery and, more broadly, public sector organization.
The critical characteristic of a nonprofit firm is that it is barred from distributing any 
profits it earns to those who have invested in it or manage it (see e.g. Hansmann, 1996). 
Since distribution of value (profit) is central to the incentives that allow a for-profit busi­
ness to function, an organizational form that lacks these incentives must rely on another 
motivational mechanism. For nonprofits this is mission. First and foremost, nonprofits 
are dedicated to creating social value -be it spiritual, moral, societal, aesthetic, intellec­
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tual or environmental (see e.g. Phills, 2005; Brown and Slivinski, 2006; Frumkin, 2002; 
Frumkin and Andre-Clark, 2000; Anheier, 2005). This logic gives rise to a nonprofit’s 
distinct culture and routines. Therefore, the distinct identity of nonprofits and for-profits 
could have important implications for the way these organizations behave in an open, 
mixed competitive contracting environment with government, particulary given the in­
herent incompleteness of aid service contracts. Intuitively, organizational form might 
affect not only the choice of aid service activities to bid for and the nature of competitive 
advantage, but also behaviours ex post like the propensity to cut quality in the process of 
cutting costs, to take control over project design1 or to take advantage of any renegoti­
ation opportunity to hold-up government. This paper is the first to examine evidence of 
the role that organizational form plays in shaping contracting outcomes with government.
The Chapter first presents a simple model of competitive bidding for aid contracts with 
two types of contestants -for-profit firms who simply maximize profits and nonprofit 
firms who essentially only care about the project’s outcomes and the way this is achieved, 
provided they break even.2 I consider a situation where aid contracts are incomplete. 
Intuitively, they can be incomplete because of non-contractible aid service quality, non- 
contractible project design, and/or simply because the “Terms of Reference” -i.e., the 
scope of the work, tasks, expected outputs and deliverables- are imprecise or ill-defined.3 
The basic idea is that these three dimensions of contractual incompleteness play a promi­
nent role in determining a nonprofit’s and for-profit’s competitive strategy, and hence 
contracting behaviour. I show that if the agent is a for-profit, then she will only value 
aid service quality to the extent that this affects the size of her anticipated renegotiation 
surplus. Further, in the event of a contract renegotiation opportunity, she will simply 
demand the largest transfer, which makes government still willing to continue with the
*It is often feared that increased government contracting of services to  nonprofits can jeopardize public 
purposes and public com m itm ents to  say equality, freedom, fairness and democracy (see e.g. Minow, 
2002 and 2003). For example, a religious nonprofit m ight seek to  imbue the aid service delivery process 
w ith its religious values. To the extent that a nonprofit promoting these values goes against the grain of 
government’s ideal plan of execution, this creates an obvious loss to government.
2This characterization captures the widely held view that a developm ent nonprofit is largely staffed  
by altruistic employees and volunteers working towards ideological, rather than financial, ends. Their 
founders are often intense, creative individuals who som etim es come up w ith a new product to deliver or 
a better way to deliver existing goods and services (Werker and Ahm ad, 2007). Typically, people w ith  
very strong views about developm ent, its im portance and how it should be done, will prefer to work for a 
nonprofit precisely because the organization overall is similarly (and credibly) com m itted to  these views. 
There is no risk for compromise at the expense of quality or vision to  further say shareholder value. This 
characterization also reflects the widely felt fear that increased government contracting o f aid services 
to  nonprofits can jeopardize public purposes and public com m itm ents to  equality, freedom, fairness and 
democracy.
3In other words, the assumption of contractual incom pleteness is not hard to m otivate once it is 
recognized that the (i) quality of service and (ii) style of service delivery government wants often cannot 
be fully specified, and the (iii) contracted-for services can be described w ith various degrees o f precision. 
To understand the trade-offs government faces when contracting with nonprofits and for-profits, we need 
to  consider each organization type’s incentives where contracts are incom plete.
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project. And, since she lacks a genuine concern for the project outcomes,4 she will always 
copy or apply the preferred project design of government. In contrast, if the agent is 
a nonprofit, she will have a relatively stronger incentive to improve aid service quality 
compared to a for-profit, but also strive to promote her own ideal project design (which 
is not necessarily the same as the government’s ideal design) -if not right from the start 
of the project delivery process, as soon as the opportunity to renegotatiate the contract 
arises.5
The Chapter then tests this theory using a unique panel data set that I gathered on all 
1,222 bids submitted for a total of 457 contracts competitively let by the UK’s Department 
for International Development, widely regarded as a leading aid agency. Nearly 75% of 
these bids hailed from for-profits ranging from large consultancy firms like KPMG to 
very small business enterprises. Furthermore, for-profits represent 60% of the 225 distinct 
firms who also won at least one contract. The data set is essentially the universe of 
competitively procured contracts issued by DFID between 1999 and 2003 that had also 
been completed by August 2004. The data includes bidder identities, proposed cost 
estimates and project duration, bid’s scores on a series of both price and quality related 
dimensions, and the weights ex ante assigned by DFID to each individual evaluation 
criterion. The data also contains detailed information on the initially agreed contract, 
and the entire profile of contractual amendments. Finally, it includes the ratings by two 
independent judges of each project’s description (also called the “Terms of Reference”) 
on half a dozen dimensions, ranging from precision with which the tasks are specified to 
the public goods nature of the project to the relative significance of labour inputs to the 
project’s realization. This data set is the first to provide systematic, empirical evidence 
of how nonprofits and for-profits actually behave in a competitive marketplace for aid 
contracts.6 Furthermore, the data is remarkably detailed compared to what is normally 
available in studies of procurement (see e.g. Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis, 2006; Levin 
and Tadelis, 2005; Marion, 2005; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Chakraverty and MacLeod,
4In the m odel, I assume that a for-profit does not directly value the project outcom es as such. T his is 
nothing but a simplifying assumption. All that is needed for the theory’s results to hold is that a for-profit 
cares less about the project’s outcom es than a nonprofit.
5 To illustrate, consider a post-doc candidate who is often prepared to  earn a lower salary in exchange 
for greater freedom to research w hat he or she wants. This argument is distinct from the fact that, in 
this exam ple, academic institutions incur lower labour costs, because they rely say on voluntary labour. 
I thank Marcel Fafchamps for pointing this out.
6 Previous work on contracting for aid includes Andersson and Auer (2005), who examine private 
contractors’ incentives in the com petitive bidding process, and present some empirical evidence based on 
21 qualititative interviews with consultants working at the 10 Swedish consulting firms w ith the largest 
Sida contracts in 1999. They find, consistent w ith the way I’ve modeled a for-profit’s preferences, that 
“consultants are often more preoccupied w ith what they perceive are Sida’s concerns than with what 
they perceive are the recipients’ needs.” Berrios (2000) investigates how USAID awards aid contracts, and 
illustrates his arguments for why the process is flawed with selective, empirical evidence. Dickinson (2005) 
approaches the topic of “privatized foreign aid” from an international law perspective, and proposes a set 
of accountability mechanisms that could help retain crucial public values in the private aid service delivery.
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2004).
The model yields three key empirical predictions. First, we expect to find nonprofits 
compete for aid projects where (i) there exist high returns to non-contractible quality 
innovations (e.g. projects with a strong public goods component), and (ii) government 
finds strict adherence to the initial “Terms of Reference” relatively less important (e.g. 
projects where government holds weak views about how the project should be provided 
or disagreement with government about project design is minor), and (iii) nonprofits reap 
substantial intrinsic gains from project realization (e.g. projects where labour input is 
the main input in the service delivery process). Second, the initial offers made by non­
profits will, on average, adhere less to the project’s “Terms of Reference” than the initial 
bids submitted by for-profits. Intuitively, when nonprofits are able to achieve a strong 
cost and/or differentiation advantage, they will exploit such a competitive advantage to 
impose their preferred design right from the start of project implementation. Finally, 
the government’s ex post transaction costs when contracting with a for-profit will be 
substantially higher than when contracting with a nonprofit. The intuition here is that 
because nonprofits first and foremost intrinsically value the project outcomes, they will 
use any contractual renegotiation opportunity simply to seize control over project design, 
and not to capture the whole renegotiation surplus. The data is consistent with all three 
predictions.
Aid procurement is a vast and thriving business. Preliminary figures for 2005 show 
a record rise in overseas development worldwide of 31.4 per cent to a total of $106.5 
billion, a historic high. Private sector involvement in the aid industry will most certainly 
continue to rise. Understanding and quantifying the risks from contracting out aid services 
provision to private suppliers is therefore of immediate interest to today’s policy debate 
on aid. In the concluding section, I suggest several policy changes that could help redress 
some of the weaknesses in the standard design of aid procurement auctions and contracts 
that my analysis has revealed.
This Chapter makes a contribution to the economic literature on organization and strategy 
(see e.g. Roberts, 2004; Besanko et ah, 2004; Williamson, 1975; Gibbons, 2001). It 
advances one simple, yet intuitively appealing, representation of nonprofit and for-profit 
preferences, and investigates the implications of the competitive interactions between 
these two organizational types for contractual arrangements with government. Most aid 
contracts leave the buyer to substantial ex post risks, and diverge in terms of how closely 
the actual agreed and implemented contract rhymes with the buyer’s original project 
specifications. The Chapter provides an explanation for this variety in initial contracts 
and ex post renegotiation costs, linking them to heterogeneity in agents’ organzational 
form and contractual incompleteness. More importantly, given this variety, the model
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generates novel testable predictions about the cross section of contracts and contractual 
amendments.
The Chapter also contributes to a growing literature on incentives and public sector orga­
nization (see e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2001; Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Huysentruyt 
and Chau, 2006) that tries to identify the impacts of alternative institutional designs (like, 
public-private partnerships) on public goods provision. The novelty here is that I use the 
lens of contract to examine nonprofit and for-profit organization and their respective role 
(value added) in public sector procurement. Also, comparing the bids of nonprofits and 
for-profits for a single contract enables me to estimate more directly the influence of 
organizational form on firm behaviour compared to previous empirical work on mixed in­
dustries (see e.g. Ballou and Weisbrod, 2003; Malani and Choi, 2004; Bertrand, Hallcock 
and Arnould, 2005).
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple 
formal model of aid contract competition that identifies how organizational form affects 
the nature and risks of contractual arrangements with official donor agencies. Section 3 
describes the contracts and the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents 
the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
2.2  A  M od el o f  C on tractin g  for A id
The model illustrates how an organization’s nonprofit status may affect its optimal bidding 
and contracting ‘policy’. Consider a setting in which a single agency wishes to contract-out 
the delivery of a discrete public project. To select the public service provider, the buyer 
holds an auction with contenders of two possible observable types, denoted by a € {n, /} , 
where n stands for nonprofit and /  for for-profit. The agents differ solely in terms of their 
payoffs. For-profits simply maximize profit. That is to say, they behave so as to maximize 
the difference between the transfers they receive and the costs they incur. Nonprofits, by 
contrast, maximize non-pecuniary project benefits subject to at least breaking even. In 
other words, like the buyer, nonprofits intrinsically value the project outcomes; they care 
about project design and service quality.
Project design affects one’s valuation of a project if completed, yet is non-contractible. Let 
S 6  {<?, n} denote two possible project designs -  each associated with the preferred design 
of the buyer (i.e., government) and the nonprofit. For instance, in the case of an HIV/  AIDS 
prevention training programme, the buyer and nonprofit might differ considerably in their
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preferred strategy, i.e., disagree over how best to provide the service.7 Let Qg$ be the 
buyer’s valuation if the project design is 8  with:
@gn — Qgg ~  Mg •
Thus, ng is the loss to the buyer from having the “wrong” project design. Similarly, let 
0 m5 be the nonprofit’s valuation if the project design is 8  with
@ng =  @nn Mn'
The parameter /zn captures the loss to the nonprofit from failing to imbue the project’s 
outcome with her preferred design. Intuitively, the greater the preference incongruence 
between the contracting agents, the higher the disutilities fig and fin. Also, the more 
intense each agent’s preference for a specific approach, the higher the losses fig and (in. 
Conversely, the more equivalent the available approaches or the less certainty there is 
about which approach the contractor should implement, arguably the smaller y,g.
The payoff from the project also depends on costly and non-contractible effort committed 
by the agent, denoted by e > 0. Effort adds value to the project denoted by b(e), where 
&(.) is smooth, increasing and concave.
Henceforth, I represent the cost of delivering the public service to a for-profit and a 
nonprofit as, respectively, Cf and cn.
Suppose that the project involves a transfer of T from the buyer to the agent. Then, the 
buyer’s payoff is:
V s (T, e, 8 ) =  0gs +  6(e) — T.
The payoff to a for-profit contractor is simply:
(T, e , 5 )  = T  — Cf — e,
and to a nonprofit contractor is:
Vn (T, e, 8) -  9nS +  b(e) + T - c n - e .
Again, the buyer and nonprofit directly value the project’s outcome, which varies with 
the choice of 8  and e. On the other hand, the for-profit derives no intrinsic utility from 
the project’s realization, instead only values the net profit.8
7P ut differently, 5 captures to  the qualitative aspects of project design that are too  costly or simply  
im possible to  specify in a contract so that they can be monitored and verified by a third party.
8Like in Chapter 1, I assume that a nonprofit explicitly values the project’s outcom es. B ut now, in
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2 .2 .1  T h e  F ir s t-B e st
Suppose as a benchmark that (e, 5, T) can be specified by the government. Then, we have 
the following result:9
P ro position  2.1 In the first-best, i f  cn < cj +  0ng +  b(e*), then
2 b'(e*) =  1 ,
§* =  fff
\ n  if < f i j
and government strictly prefers contracting with a nonprofit. I f cn > Cf + 6 ns + b(e*), then
b'(e*) =  1 ,
<5* = 9,
and government strictly prefers contracting with a for-profit.
Proposition 2.1 reveals three important insights. First, in the absence of any contracting 
problems, government and the contractor will simply choose e to maximize the total net 
surplus from their trading/contracting relationship, and divide the surplus between them 
using lump-sum transfers. The optimal e is thus determined based on considerations 
about the private marginal benefits b'(e) to the two contracting parties. At the social 
optimum, the marginal social benefit of spending extra effort to improve output quality 
must equal the marginal cost of that effort, which equals one. The proposition shows that 
even in a “first best world,” contracting with a for-profit would involve a lower level of 
service quality than contracting with a nonprofit. One interpretation of this result is that 
even when e is observable and verifiable, it is simply too costly for government to require 
a for-profit contractor to invest more effort than the level that equates bf{e*) to 1. The 
proposition thus provides an efficiency rationale for a government who “compromises” e 
when contracting with a for-profit.
Second, in a “first best world,” a nonprofit would have a competitive advantage vis-a-vis 
a for-profit. The competitive advantage derives from the fact that a nonprofit, in contrast 
to a for-profit, intrinsically values project outcomes. Evidently, even if the nonprofit was
contrast to the modelling assum ptions in Chapter 1, I assume that a nonprofit does not reap project 
benefits unless it is itself im plem enting the project, that is, project contractor.
9It is worthwhile pointing out here that I am lim iting the space of possible contracts to  joint surplus 
m aximizing contracts only, simply for purposes of clarity and practicality. Strictly speaking, focussing on 
this subset o f contractual arrangements is already a deviation away from the first best.
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less cost efficient (i.e., Cn < Cf), she may still be awarded the contract provided the returns 
to effort and her valuation of the project were sufficiently high.
Finally, the “first best” project design would not always coincide with government’s ideal. 
It would be the design preferred by the party who experiences the greatest loss from the 
“wrong design.” When government were to contract with a for-profit, government would 
also dictate S. When government were to contract with a nonprofit, ownership over project 
design would go to the party whose disutility from losing control over project design is 
the greatest -from government’s point of view, a pragmatic compromise.10
2 .2 .2  S e c o n d -B e s t  C o n tr a c tin g
For the remainder of the analysis, I study a second-best contracting game with the fol­
lowing timing and features:
1. First, government and contractor agree on the lump-sum transfer T  and up-front 
project design 5.
2. Second, effort e is chosen and is assumed to be non-contractible.
3. Third, after effort e is sunk, nature determines whether the contract can be renego­
tiated. Specifically, there is an exogenously given precision r  € [0,1] denoting the 
probability that the project can be renegotiated. In other words, with probability r  
the parties will be confronted with the need to adapt to unanticipated disturbances 
that arise by reason of gaps, errors and/or omissions in the original contract. In the 
event of renegotiation, I assume that all of the bargaining power resides with the 
contractort: she makes a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation offer (£, A) to the govern­
ment, where £ is a payment from the government to the contractor if the project is 
to continue and A is the continuation project design.
The contractor can thus seize on the renegotiation opportunity to demand a higher price 
and/or change the project design. Let us now proceed to characterize the nature of the
10Thus, even when there are no lim its on contracting between the two parties, we expect the party 
w ith the highest // to  determine the project’s design. Thus, the buyer will only press ahead with his 
own preferred project design if doing so helps him achieve the joint surplus maxim izing outcom e. This 
insight is reminiscent of Besley and G hatak’s main proposition (2001), where they state that in a “public- 
private partnership” , ownership of the public good should reside w ith the party who cares m ost about the 
project. Here, ownership of the project’s design should similarly reside w ith the party who values control 
over project design the most, i.e., who experiences th e greatest loss from relinquishing control over project 
design.
CHAPTER 2. CONTRACTING FOR AID 58
contractual relationship, including the form of contract with a nonprofit versus a for-profit, 
reasoning by backward induction.
I begin with the renegotiation game. I will show that the outcome of this depends on 
whether the contractor is a for-profit or a nonprofit. Consider first the case of a for-profit. 
Under the assumptions of the model, she will demand the largest transfer, which makes 
the funder still willing to continue with the project. This is
t f  = 6 g/± 4- b{e.f).
It is clear from this that renegotiation will always result in the project design preferred 
by government, i.e. in A f  — g.
In the case of a nonprofit, the agent cares only about breaking even. Opportunism takes 
the form of changing the project design. To make life simple, suppose that 6 gg — fig > 
—K, where K  > 0 denotes the buyer’s anticipated costs of prematurely terminating 
the contract and having to procure the remainder of the project to someone else. This 
assumption simply says that governmnet always wishes to proceed with the project when 
the nonprofit picks 8 n = n. In this case, we have tn = 0 and An =  n as the outcome of 
the renegotiation game.
P ro position  2.2 The renegotiation offer made by a nonprofit contractor will ceteris 
paribus be cheaper than the offer made by a for-profit, but will involve a change in project 
design away from government’s ideal project design.
Proposition 2.2 reveals that effectively there are always undesirable outcomes that arise 
when renegotiations occur in a context of imperfect contract enforcement and opportunis­
tic behaviour by the contracting parties; this holds true irrespective of the organizational 
type of the contractor. The novelty of this Proposition is also that it clearly shows that 
the impasses that a nonprofit versus a for-profit contractor poses to government are costly 
in different ways -that is, the renegotiation costs are of a different order.
I now turn to the contractor’s effort decision. Observe that after substituting for the 
renegotiation payment, the payoff of a for-profit is:
r (egg + b(ef )) -  Cf -  ef  + T.
Thus, the first order condition for effort solves:
b'(ef ) =  i  (2a)
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A nonprofit’s payoff is then:
(1 t )  Qn5 “I- “1“ b(en) ^n “I" T.
Effort solves:
b'(en) = 1 (2 b)
Notice that the equilibrium level of effort chosen by a nonprofit or for-profit contractor 
now lies below its first best level. Evidently under imperfect contract enforcement, the 
contractor, nonprofit and for-profit alike, underinvests in quality improvements.
P ro p o sitio n  2.3 A for-profit will ceteris paribus exert less effort to improve output qual­
ity than a nonprofit. Only i f  renegotiation is certain to occur, then the efforts chosen by 
the two agent types are the same. In addition, a for-profit’s effort level increases with 
the likelihood of renegotiation. A nonprofit’s effort level, in contrast, is unaffected by the 
likelihood of renegotiation.
Proposition 2.3 confirms our intuition that a nonprofit will invest relatively more in qual­
ity innovations (compared to a for-profit). Furthermore, the Proposition provides an 
explanation for why a for-profit would voluntarily invest in costly quality innovations, 
given that she strives to maximize profits. From a for-profit’s perspective, the rationale 
for choosing a positive level of e j is that ef  effectively impacts the size of her anticipated 
renegotiation rent (i.e. rt f ) .  As r  falls, she takes less account of the positive consequences 
of e, and consequently expends relatively less effort in any quality enhancing activities. A 
nonprofit, by contrast, fully internalizes the positive consequences of e, and thus given r  
strictly less than unity, always sets her effort to improve output quality at a comparatively 
higher level. Finally, the insight that the level of e can be influenced by the likelihood of 
ex post renegotiation is novel. Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) have previously suggested that 
a for-profit’s incentives to invest in non-verifiable quality improvements can be influenced 
by factors such as the non-cash cost of shirking on quality (like guilt) and the marginal 
cost of increasing service quality. Proposition 2.3 adds to this that a for-profit’s quality 
investment increases with the likelihood of contractual renegotiation.
When contracting with a for-profit, government is faced with a trade-off between providing 
incentives to improve output quality and reducing ex post transaction costs due to costly 
renegotiation. To see why this is true, observe that the level of contractual incompleteness 
(t ) impacts both government’s expected renegotiation costs and his anticipated loss due 
to the under-investment in socially desirable quality improvements. When contracting 
with a nonprofit instead, government ensures a relatively higher level of non-contractible
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quality investment, but risks losing control over the project’s design. To illustrate this 
latter point, consider the case where both agent types submitted the exact same initial 
bid, {S,T). Let A £ {n, /}  denote the contractor’s type and v (X,5,T)  be government’s 
interim payoff. Then,
v ( f , S , T )  = ( l - r )  (6 g S +b ( e } ) ) - T
and
v (n, 6 , T) = (1 -  r) 0g6 +  t0 9TI +  b(e*n) -  T.
Thus, for a fixed (S:T),  a nonprofit is preferred if
T i999 ~ Vg) +  [bien) ~  (* “  T) K tf)] > 0- (3)
This condition underlines that a nonprofit is ceteris paribus better for effort, but worse 
for opportunism in project design. As long as government’s valuation Qgg exceeds his 
loss pg, (3) always holds. The fact that pg outweighs Qgg, however, is only a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for government to prefer a for-profit candidate. Then, the 
lower the buyer’s valuation of non-contractible quality (i.e., the smaller the returns to 
the non-contractible quality-enhancing investments) and/or the greater the discrepancy 
between pg and 9gg, the more likely it is that the for-profit type becomes government’s 
preferred candidate.
Finally, I turn to the initial stage of the contracting game, and discuss the determinants 
of (5n,Tn) and (5f ,Tf)  in the competitive bidding process. I will show that nonprofits 
and for-profits pursue a different bidding strategy, and consequently dominate distinct aid 
market segments. Consider a bidding process, which proceeds in two steps. First, agents 
simultaneously and noncooperatively submit their bids. Second, government selects the 
bid that maximizes his expected utility. That is, he picks £ £ {n, /}  , using the following 
decision rule:
f n if v (n, 5n, Tn) > v ( /, £/, Tf ) , and w/prob. \  if v (n, 6 n, Tn) =  v ( /, <5/, 7 »
\  f  if v(n ,5n,Tn) < v ( f , 6 f tTf ) ,  and w/prob. \  if v (n ,Sn,Tn) = v ( f t 6 f ,Tf )
A  nonprofit can either compromise and align herself with government (6 n = g)', or stand 
by her own mission and propose her own preferred design (5n = n ).
First, suppose that both agent types initially propose government’s preferred project de­
sign; that is 6 f  = 8 n — g. Both nonprofits and for-profits then make their most competitive
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price offers.11 Government will prefer the for-profit bid over the nonprofit bid if and only 
if:
+  (1 -  T)p,n > 6 9 9  +  (c/ -  Cn) +  (2b(e*n) -  b{e})) +  (e*f  -  e^) (4)
Thus, the for-profit types benefit from more disagreement over project design between 
government and nonprofit (see LHS of (4)). Expression (4) also links auctions wherein 
only for-profit contractors compete (henceforth, pure for-profit auctions) with service con­
tracts from which nonprofits derive very little intrinsic value, where nonprofits are at a 
comparative cost disadvantage, where the losses to government and nonprofit from the 
“wrong project design” are large, and where the returns to non-contractible effort are rel­
atively small. Inversely, auctions with only nonprofit bidders (henceforth, pure nonprofit 
auctions) are associated with services where the intrinsic benefits to the nonprofits from 
project realization are large, where nonprofits are at a comparative cost advantage, where 
the losses due to disagreement over the ideal project design to government and nonprofit 
are respectively small, and where the returns to quality improvements are high.
Second, suppose that the nonprofit agent proposes a bid with Sn = n. Like before, the 
agents make their most competitive price offers.12 Government will then prefer the for- 
profit bid if and only if:
> 6 nn + (c, -  cn) + (2b(e*) -  b(e})) + (e) -  < )  (5)
A comparison of (4) and (5) shows that when fin > figl a nonprofit can actually raise her 
chances of outbidding a for-profit tenderer by setting 6 n =  n. Conversely, when fin < Pg’ 
a nonprofit, if she competes, is ceteris paribus less likely to propose 5n = n. For the rest, 
since the RHS of (4) and (5) are identical, the same comparative static results, implied by 
the determinants of the agents’ bidding strategies drawn out in the previous paragraph, 
apply here as well.
To summarize:
P roposition  2.4 A nonprofit’s and for-profit’s optimal bidding strategy and consequent 
contracting behaviour can be summarized as follows:
1. I f  Min{rfig +  (1 — r)/in, pbg) > D, then only for-profits compete, with T f — Cf +  —
T{6 gg +  &(ep) and 5f = g. With probability r , the for-profit contractor will make a 
renegotiation offer (9gg +  b(e^),g).
11 The values of these minimum price offers subm itted by a non-profit and a for-profit equal, respectively, 
C n  -f  e* +  (1 -  r ) n n -  6(e*) -  6nn and c / + e } - T  (9gg +  6 (e})) .
12 The values of these minimum price offers subm itted by a nonprofit and a for-profit equal, respectively, 
C n  +  e* -  b(e*) -  Q n n  and c /  +  e )  -  r  (6gg +  b(e*f )) .
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2. I f  either Max(rfxg +  (1 — r)fin,pg) < or r\ig -f (1 — r)pn > O. > f i g , then only 
nonprofits compete, with Tn = Cn +  e* — £>(e*) — Onn and 6 n = n. With probability 
t ,  the nonprofit contractor will make a renegotiation offer ( 0 , n ) .
3. I f  rp g +  (1 -  r)iin ^  H ^  f-Lg} then only nonprofits coinpete, 'wxth 'I ^  I 6^ I
(1 — r ) / i n — fr(e*) — 0 nn and set 8 n — g. With probability t ,  the nonprofit contractor 
will make a renegotiation offer (0, n).
where Q = 6 nn +  (c/ -  cn) +  (2&(e*) -  fc(ep) +  (ej -  e*)
Proposition. 2.4 reveals three key insights. First, the Proposition shows that under im­
perfect contract enforcement, there essentially exist three mutually exclusive contracting 
outcomes. The first possibility is that only for-profits compete. This occurs e.g. when 
the ideological divide between government and nonprofit is sufficiently high (costly). The 
second possibility is that only nonprofits compete and are able to take control over project 
design straight through the project’s implementation. The third possibility is that non­
profits again are at a competitive advantage relative to for-profits, but that the relative 
benefits to government from contracting with a nonprofit are not sufficiently high for 
nonprofits to be able to take control over the project’s design right from the beginning. 
Second, the Proposition also reveals that not only the pattern of nonprofit and for-profit 
specialization, but also the nature of the ‘deal’ a nonprofit or for-profit proposes critically 
hinges on the relative size of each agent type’s comparative advantage. For instance, the 
stronger (weaker) a nonprofit’s comparative (dis)advantage, the more leverage she has 
to push through her own preferred project design at the initial contracting stage. At 
the same time, when Sn — n, the threat to the buyer of costly renegotiation essentially 
disappears: the buyer then neither gains nor loses from ex post renegotiation. Finally, 
the Proposition exposes that a for-profit will always dance to the government’s piping. 
To see why, observe that at the bidding stage, to adhere to the government’s demands 
straightforwardly raises the for-profit’s chances of winning the contract, notably at no 
cost to the for-profit. Once the contract is under way and the opportunity to renegotiate 
the contract arises, then continuing to adhere to the government’s demands is again in 
the for-profit’s best interest: By doing so, she maximizes the size of the renegotiation 
surplus.
In reality, we observe that both for-profits and nonprofits sometimes compete against 
each other. By relaxing the perfect information assumption, the baseline model is readily 
modified to account for such instances. Suppose that the agents are imperfectly informed 
about some of the parameter values, like their rival’s costs of service delivery (c/ or Cn),
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that affect their optimal bidding decisions. Then, straighforwardly, it is conceivable that 
a ‘mixed auction’ takes place.
Also, I point out the effects of r  on (4) and (5), and consequently on the likelihood that 
for-profits and nonprofits will compete. If /in > fig, then a marginal rise in contractual 
imprecision (r) unambiguously diminishes the likelihood that a pure for-profit auction 
occurs. Else, the net effect is ambiguous (For proofs, see Appendix A: Mathematical 
Appendix).
Finally, the model yields three main (readily) testable predictions. First, nonprofits will 
tend to compete for aid projects where there exists high returns to non-contractible qual­
ity innovations, government finds strict adherence to the initial “Terms of Reference” 
relatively less important and/or nonprofits reap substantial intrinsic gains from project 
realization (b(e) and 0//x—Prediction). Second, the initial offers of for-profits will on aver­
age adhere better to the government’s service delivery instructions compared to those of 
nonprofits (£—Prediction). Finally, government’s ex post transaction costs will tend to be 
substantially higher when the agent is a for-profit compared to when the agent is a non­
profit (^-Prediction). Each prediction emphasizes the important role that organizational 
form -identity or mission- plays in shaping a candidate contractor’s bidding and contract­
ing decisions. The model thus suggests that organizational form has implications well 
beyond patterns of specialization; organizational form also shapes the actual contracting 
relationship.
2.3  C on tracts and D a ta
I want to use the predictions of the model to investigate the relationship between a firm’s 
organizational form and its competitive bidding and contracting strategy specifically in 
the context of aid. As alluded to in this Chapter’s Introduction, the special procurement 
setting that I exploit is that of the competitive scoring auction, a widely and ever more 
used auction format by governments to allocate public service contracts (see e.g. Asker 
and Cantillon, 2006). This section describes the data, but also gives some contextual 
background. The purpose of the latter is twofold: (i) to show that the assumptions in the 
theoretical model fit well with the structure of the market for aid contracts and DFID’s 
procurement practices, and (ii) to describe in some detail the way these scoring auctions 
work.
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2 .3 .1  C o n tr a c ts
The UK’s aid procurement market is essentially segmented in competitive, non-competitive 
and call-down contract awards.13 I focus on the market for competitive aid service con­
tracts for two reasons. First, the data on bids for competitively awarded contracts is 
remarkably detailed. They include information about DFID’s assessment of each bid on 
a host of ex ante fixed selection criteria, as well as details of each bid’s proposed out­
line of costs. This allowes us to readily compare bids (for a same aid service contract) 
along both price- and quality-related dimensions. Similar data is non-existent for the 
other two contract types. Second, competitive aid service contracts currently represent 
the overwhelming majority of all newly issued aid service contracts.14
All competitive contracts are let through a competitive bidding process. These auctions 
work as follows: Initially, DFID drafts the “Terms of Reference” (TOR), and selects the 
scoring rule. Then, DFID publicly announces the consultancy opportunity, the selection 
criteria and decision weights, and asks contractors in the market to submit bids -entry to 
the auction is open (since April 2001 not just UK based organizations but effectively any 
firm across the globe) and free of charge. Each bid consists of a “Commercial Tender,” 
which is essentially the proposed outline of costs, and a “Technical Tender,” which ex­
plains how the contractor intends to execute the project. For each incoming offer, DFID 
computes a final score using the ex ante specified scoring rule. Finally, the firm with 
the highest score wins the contract, which means that this firm implements the project 
-notably, by and large as stipulated in her initial bid, at a not-to-exceed, contractually 
agreed price. Thus, DFID is obliged to reimburse the costs of inputs (specifically, person­
nel fees and project expenses) up to a maximum sum or ceiling. Any requests for extra 
payments must be renegotiated first, and if accepted, cast as a contractual amendment. 
Figure 1 presents a general overview of the initial steps in DFID’s procurement process.
In the theoretical model, I assume that the auction of an aid service contract is effectively 
competitive. Evidence in support of this assumption is that the 25-firm concentration 
ratio for my sample is only 0.61, i.e., the value of all contracts awarded to the top 25 
firms accounted for 61 percent of the total (see Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, on average 
2.7 tenderers competed for each contract included in the sample, and nearly 70 percent
13 An example of non-com petitive contracts are negotiated agreements w ith single-suppliers. Call-down  
contracts are similarly non-com petitive; however, they draw on Framework Agreements or Resource Cen­
tres, which are typically com petitively awarded contracts. These contracts simply state that the contractor 
promises to provide certain types of services at contractually agreed rates whenever D FID  finds a need  
for them.
14 The value of com petitive contracts has increased substantially over the last two decades, and now
accounts for nearly 90% of the total (own calculations based on D F ID ’s Procurement Departm ent own 
statistics for fiscal years 1997/98 through 2004/05).
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of all contestants bidded only once. The Herfindahl index based on initial contract value 
and number of contracts (again, for my sample only) equaled, respectively 0.051 and 
0.023, thus suggestive of a market that is unconcentrated, where competition intensity is 
typically high.
The theoretical analysis also treats contract precision as an exogenous variable. This 
rhymes well with my own observation that DFID’s procurement agents do not actively 
decide over the TOR’s precision. But also, it fits with the data: specifically, I cannot 
reject the hypothesis that average “TOR’s precision” (a variable on which I collected 
data) is the same irrespective of who -i.e., which type of agents- competes.15
Finally, there are several additional reasons why DFID in particular presents an important 
case study for testing our ideas. Firstly, DFID is widely regarded as a global leader in 
development thinking and practice (Barder, 2005), a model for other rich countries. Also, 
DFID has been contracting-out aid projects much like today since the early eighties.16 
And importantly, both nonprofits and for-profits have been tendering for these contracts 
-of all bids put forward between 1999 and 2003, nonprofits accounted for approximately 
30 percent.
2 .3 .2  D a ta
My unit of observation in some parts of the analysis is the bid for DFID’s aid service 
contract, and in other parts the actual contractual relationship between DFID and the 
winning contractor. I index the projects or contracts by i = 1, ...,1V; I will also let 
a subscript i index the value of any variables for project/contract i. For instance, n2- 
denotes the number of contractors who compete for contract i. The sample17 includes N 
= 458 projects with an aggregate value of £130 million, awarded to 225 distinct firms.18 
There were a total of 1,222 bids submittted by 459 distinct firms based primarily in the 
UK.
Of the 459 distinct contestants, slightly over 60 percent were by legal status for-profit
1 JWe cannot reject the null hypthesis that the m eans of TO R  precision for contracts let in pure nonprofit 
auctions, pure for-profit auctions and mixed nonprofit-for-profit auctions are equal.
,6 Before then, consultants were employed when needed, more in an ad hoc fashion. B ut throughout 
our period of study, D FID has consistently applied the same mandatory procurement and contracting  
procedures. For a more detailed description of these procedures, please refer to A ppendix C: Details 
about D FID ’s Contracting Process.
17For a more detailed discussion of the sample and the sample selection process, please refer to A ppendix  
B: D ata A ppendix.
18This measure of market size captures the total value o f all initial contracts only. Since paym ents 
from ex post adaptations can be considerable, as the data reveals, the value of contracts including all 
contractual am endm ents is substantially higher.
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firms. Not only larger in number, for-profits also bidded on average more frequently 
than nonprofits. Indeed, about 70 percent of all bids hailed from for-profit organizations. 
The nonprofit group comprises all public or private organizations that cannot lawfully 
distribute their financial surplus to those in control of the organization; that is to say, 
charities, academic institutions, government bodies as well as membership based and 
network organizations. Within this group, academic institutions were most numerous 
(representing 38 percent of all nonprofit organizations), yet together did not account for 
the largest fraction of nonprofit bids. Instead, the charities competed more vigorously, 
submitting on average 2.54 bids, and thus representing the largest share of nonprofit bids.
For my purposes, it is useful to differentiate three possible auction categories based on 
which type of agents competes: in 47 percent of the auctions in our sample, only for- 
profits competed, in 17 percent only nonprofits competed and in the remaining 36 percent 
at least one nonprofit and one for-profit competed. Summary statistics for each of these 
three auction categories are provided in Table 3. There is noticeable heterogeneity in 
the size of projects awarded, both within and between auction categories. The overall 
mean value of the winning bid is £295,829 with a standard deviation of £501,467. On 
average, the projects require just over twenty months to complete. The final price paid 
for the work exceeds the winning bid by an average of £88,771, or about 32 percent of 
the estimate. This discrepancy is most pronounced for projects procured through pure 
for-profit auctions (i.e., auctions where all the competitors are for-profits). Compensation 
for additional project expenses and personnel costs through contractual amendments, as 
well as deductions, contribute to this difference, amounting to respectively 37 and 26 
percent of the initially agreed estimate.
As panel B of Table 3 shows, pure nonprofit auctions in the study (i.e., auctions with 
nonprofit competitors only) exhibited a lower intensity of competition relative to mixed 
and pure for-profit auctions. E.g., the average number of competitors in a pure nonprofit 
auction was below the overall average. However, overall, as emphasized in the previous 
subsection, the three market segments were remarkably unconcentrated (see e.g. the 
Herfindahl indices).
For each project, I collected information from DFID’s paper archives and electronic data­
base system on the selection criteria and weights assigned to each dimension, each bid’s 
financial offer, and performance on each of the selection criteria used, and each project’s 
sector and discipline type. There exists considerable heterogeneity in the size of the deci­
sion weights used to evaluate each bid. At the same time, the overall ranking of criteria is 
often the same: quality of personnel and methodology are typically assigned the highest 
weights, whereas procurement management and the commercial assessment are typically 
assigned the lowest weights.
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I also photocopied the TOR of each project and had two independent judges rate these 
project descriptions on half a dozen dimensions, ranging from the precision with which 
the tasks are specified to the public goods nature of the project to the relative significance 
of labour inputs to the project’s realization.19 This has allowed me to construct estimates 
of otherwise hard to observe variables, but which play an important role in our theoretical 
analysis. It has also allowed me to describe the actual aid service with much detail, which 
I exploit to guard against omitted variable bias due to simultaneity.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the decision weights and TOR ratings for each 
auction category. It tells us that along many of these dimensions, the average competitive 
contract in each auction category look fairly similar. Exceptions include the weights 
assigned to the commercial asssessment and country experience criterion, the means of 
which do differ significantly between pure for-profit auctions and the other two auction 
types. Similarly, the mean value of a project’s public goods nature in pure forprofit 
auctions is statistically different from those in pure nonprofit and mixed auctions.20
Finally, it is noteworthy to non-govemmental organizations evidently perform a wide 
array of functions under contract. The competitive service contracts relate to a broad set 
of sectors (ranging from education to construction), as well as draw on a diverse range of 
discipline expertise (ranging from feasibility studies to project coordination). Services in 
the areas of business and finance, and health, population and social development together 
account for the majority (68  percent) of all contracts.
2 .4  E m pirical A n a lysis
Propositions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 provide the basis of my empirical tests. They yield three 
testable empirical predictions: First, nonprofits will tend to compete for aid projects where 
there exists high returns to non-contractible quality innovations, government finds strict 
adherence to the initial “Terms of Reference” relatively less important and/or nonprofits 
reap substantial intrinsic gains from project realization (b(e) and 0 / p —Prediction). Fur­
thermore, the initial offers made by nonprofits will, on average, adhere less to the project’s 
“Terms of Reference” than the initial bids submitted by for-profits (£—Prediction). Fi­
nally, the government’s ex post transaction costs when contracting with a for-profit will
19For more details about the definition of these variables, please refer to the A ppendix B: D ata Appendix  
and Appendix: Figure 1.
20Formally, we cannot reject the null that the means of the weight assigned to m ethodology for any two 
auction categories are the same. Also, the average weights assigned to the commercial asssessm ent and 
country experience criterion in pure for-profit auctions are both significantly dissimilar to  those in pure 
nonprofit or mixed auctions.
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be substantially higher than when contracting with a nonprofit (t-Prediction).
I examine whether patterns of nonprofit and for-profit auction entry are consistent with 
my model. That is, can my model uniquely explain differential patterns of specialization 
between nonprofits and for-profits? Next, I investigate empirically the relationship be­
tween organizational form, that is, nonprofit (or for-profit) status, and contractual form.
2 .4 .1  A u c t io n  E n try  D ec is io n s
The model predicts that nonprofits and for-profits will each specialize in a limited and 
distinct set of aid service contracts. Proposition 2.3 and 2.4 imply that not only cost 
advantages but also other differentiation advantages -  i.e., competitive advantages based 
on differences in commitment of higher non-contractible effort investments, willingness to 
execute the buyer’s desired project design and intrinsic valuation of a project’s outcomes- 
should play a prominent role in a nonprofit’s and for-profit’s choice of specialization. Ev­
idently, since nonprofits are unable to obtain equity capital,21 they are expectedly at a 
competitive cost disadvantage when the service contract at hand is big (that is, of high 
monetary value). But Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 also uniquely point to several other impor­
tant factors that affect whether a nonprofit (or for-profit) is at a competitive advantage 
given a project contract under focus. For instance, the fact that a nonprofit will ceteris 
paribus exert higher e (recall Proposition 2.3) should give a nonprofit a competitive ad­
vantage when e or b(e), the returns to e, are relatively more important. Therefore, when 
a project has a strong public goods component, I expect relatively more nonprofit bids.22 
Similarly, the fact that a nonprofit, notably her employees and volunteers, (tend to) in­
trinsically care about a project’s outcomes should put a nonprofit at a competitive edge 
when e.g. labour input plays a major role in the project’s outcomes.23 However, a non­
profit’s specific mission or identity can also be a weakness, particulary when government 
knows precisely what he wants. When government finds it important that the contractor
21 See e.g. Hansmann (1996). Frumkin and Andre-Clark (2000) identify the financial constraints that 
many nonprofits face as a significant obstacle to  participation in welfare reform contracting. US welfare 
reform performance contracts often withold part of the firm’s fee until a client has been placed in a job 
or has retained a job  for some months. If a contractor receives all or part o f its fees only m onths after 
placing a recipient, it must find a way to pay the costs of its services while it w aits for those fees to  arrive. 
Nonprofits typically experience difficulty in raising the capital to  m eet these expenses -For one, because 
nonprofits are ownerless organizations and cannot sell shares, initial public offerings are not an option. 
Aid contracts are typically of the cost-reimbursable type, which similarly requires the contractor to  be 
able to advance any project expenses.
22To illustrate, if  the project has a clear public goods com ponent, then any non-contractible quality 
investm ents will benefit society at large.
23E.g., if the project demands a high labour input, then this arguably raises a nonprofit’s intrinsic 
project valuation through an enhanced sense of autonomy or self-determ ination in the project delivery 
process (Deci, 1999).
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closely adheres to his instructions, for-profits possess a natural competitive advantage; 
for-profit status is a credible commitment to executing a buyer’s ideal project strategy 
(recall Proposition 2.4).
To test these predictions empirically, I estimate the following basic equation:
Vij  =  ^ =  Otj +  X ' j +  £ i j ,  (6)
where 7r^ - denotes the probability that the auction for project i falls in the ji-th category, 
with j  indexed as 1 if the auction is a ‘pure nonprofit auction’, 2 if ‘mixed’ and 3 if 
a ‘pure for-profit auction, and aj is a constant for j  = 1 , 2 . x; is a vector of project- 
and TOR-specific variables that proxy for the distinct sources of advantage identified 
in Propostion 4 and illustrated in the previous paragraph. Its elements are ex ante 
observable characteristics, i.e., known to the firms when deciding whether to compete for 
a contract. Specifically, x; includes controls for the project’s discipline and sector type, 
as well as a measure of the project’s public goods nature, of the significance of labour 
inputs to the project’s outcomes, of contract size, and of “Adherence Significance”24, eij 
is the project-level error term. The vector of coefficients f3j are the parameters of primary 
interest.
In addition to the basic specification in equation (6 ), I also estimate a specification adding 
year fixed-effects. The year fixed-effects control for any variation in auction entry deci­
sions within each auction category that is due to macro-economic shocks that uniformly 
impacted bidding decisions within a given category in any given year.
The first two columns of Table 5 represents the regression as suggested by the basic model. 
The regression analyses yields three important results. First, consistent with the (more 
traditional) cost advantage argument, increases in contract size decrease the odds of a pure 
nonprofit auction (relative to a pure for-profit auction), and benchmarked against projects 
in commerce and tourism, services in the energy, construction and extractive industries 
are statistically significant negative predictors of the odds of a pure nonprofit auction. To 
illustrate, if I were to increase contract size by £100,000, the multinomial log-odds of a 
pure nonprofit auction relative to a pure for-profit auction would be expected to decrease 
by around 0.2 while holding all other variables in the model constant. Second, the greater 
the project’s public goods nature and relative importance of the labour inputs the more 
likely it is that only nonprofits compete. Further, the results show that the multinomial
24The variable “Adherence Significance” is a measure of the buyer’s perceived benefits from close agree­
m ent w ith the contractor on the issue of project design im plementation. The variable is constructed as the 
rating of the T O R ’s precision multiplied by the weight assigned to the adherence to TO R-dim ension. So 
the greater the value of the “Adherence Significance” , the more I expect that only for-profits will com pete.
CHAPTER 2. CONTRACTING FOR AID 70
logit for education-related projects relative to projects in commerce and tourism is sig­
nificantly higher for pure nonprofit auctions relative to pure for-profit auctions given the 
variables in the model are held constant. Finally, I establish that “Adherence Signifi­
cance” significantly raises the odds of a pure for-profit auction. These three results are 
robust to the inclusion of year fixed-effects.25
Incidentally, notice that the aid service contracts for which both nonprofits and for-profits 
compete combine elements of nonprofit and for-profit competitive advantage as identified 
in Proposition 2.4. In size and public goods nature, they have not been found to be 
statistically different from projects that elicit for-profit bids only. On the other hand, 
with respect to adherence and labour input significance, they appear more similar to the 
type of projects that attract nonprofit bids only.
Finally, an outstanding, unexplored issue that relates to this subsection’s focus on auction 
entry decisions is whether the untying of aid has in fact changed aid supply composition, 
firm strategy and competition. Since 70 percent of the contract awards in my sample 
were issued before aid untying (i.e., before April 2001), the data does not allow me to 
conclusively evaluate such impacts of aid untying. Nevertheless, several interesting pat­
terns emerge. The results in Table 6 suggest that aid untying, in its initial phase, has 
propelled more distinct organizations to compete, though failed to provoke an immedi­
ate rise in competition intensity. Furthermore, following the untying of aid, for-profits 
in particular have strengthened their presence in the competitive aid market. Thus, 
the initial three-year period after the untying of aid witnessed a shift in the composi­
tion of tendering agency types, for-profits substituting for nonprofits. For-profits thereby 
maintained, or even slightly increased, dominance in sectors traditionally associated with 
for-profit activity, such as commerce, energy and transport (see Table 7). Simultaneously, 
they substantially increased their share of bids for projects in domains typically linked 
with nonprofit activity, such as health, population, development and education. Finally, 
whereas the group of for-profits has strengthened its presence in auctions for relatively 
small volume contracts, nonprofits started entering auctions for very large volume con­
tracts following the untying of aid. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that nonprofits 
thereby ventured into ‘traditionally for-profit’ areas of expertise, such as commerce, and 
financial and business services.26
25The coefficients of the year dummies (though not reported in Table VI) are highly significant and 
negative for the mixed auction category only. This suggests that the downward trend in the frequency of 
mixed auctions relative to  pure for-profit auctions. However, it might also be a consequence o f the way 
we selected our contracts: since contracts procured via mixed auctions last on average the longest (nearly 
two years), the chances that they were selected into our database in later years logically falls.
25A s an aside, I also empirically examined whether repeat or experienced (for-profit) bidders are more
sophisticated contenders, that is, whether they tend to com pete when few others do and hence when the 
chances of winning are great. However, the evidence lends no support to this hypothesis.
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2 .4 .2  C o n tr a c tu a l F orm
2.4.2.1 T he In itia lly  A greed C ontract
Proposition 2.4 highlights that the initial offers for S could systematically differ across 
for-profit and nonprofit bids. This implies that even the initially agreed contracts with 
nonprofits versus for-profits will not tend to coincide. The model predicts that relative 
to nonprofit offers, initial offers by forprofits will ceteris paribus better comply with the 
buyer’s wishes -i.e., the buyer’s instructions or “terms of reference.”
To test this prediction empirically, I run a simple OLS regression for contractors c bidding 
for project i of the following form:
Y{c =  a  -f- f3Nc +  x^7 +  ui 4- e,*c (7)
where Yic is the bid’s percentage score on the “adherence to the TOR”-dimension, a  is a 
constant, N c is a binary variable, which indicates the nonprofit status of the contractor, 
x; is a vector of ex ante known project-specific characteristics, Vi are project fixed effects 
to control for unobservable project-specific characteristics, and E{C is the bid-level error 
term .27 The nonprofit coefficient /3 is the parameter of primary interest.
I also estimate (3, adding the weight attached to the adherence score in the overall score 
rule as an extra control. This allows me to verify that the correlation between non­
profit and adherence score is not driven by the fact that adherence simply matters less in 
those auctions wherein nonprofits compete and that nonprofits therefore put in less effort 
to score high on that dimension. If with the adherence weight included the estimated 
13 remains negative and statistically significant, then this would support my conjecture 
that nonprofits on average adhere to the TOR because they value taking control over 
project design relatively more. Finally, I add as covariates the two TOR-specific charac­
teristics, namely TOR-precision and the extent to which monitoring/evaluation provisos 
are included in the TOR because these factors are potentially correlated with both the 
adherence score and nonprofit ‘auction entry/participation’.
Table 8 summarizes the results. I find that nonprofits score on average 3.5 percentage 
points below for-profits on the adherence dimension given all the other predictor variables 
in the basic model are held constant. The regressions presented in columns (2) and (3) 
show that this estimated effect is robust to the inclusion of additional covariates.
2'As  in marriage markets, it is plausible that the m atching of the buyer w ith one contractor (and 
not with its rivaling candidates) will affect the bidders’ subsequent auction entry decisions. Therefore, 
equation (7) will be estim ated w ith robust standard errors clustered by bidder.
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Finally, as an aside, I compare the initial offers in terms of the transfers (T) demanded 
across nonprofit and for-profit firms. The nonprofit sector is widely perceived as requiring 
workers to take pay cuts for the privilege of meaningful work (see e.g. Francois, 2000). In 
competitive scoring auctions for aid services, such a wage penalty should allow nonprofits 
to make lower priced bids for an identical consultancy opportunity. A major shortcoming 
of existing empirical work is that if unobserved heterogeneity in consultant talent or 
service quality is correlated with organizational form, then they cannot separate the 
effect of marginal talent or quality on pay differentials from any effect resulting more 
directly from differences in objectives, independent of differences in consultant ability or 
service quality (see e.g. Ballou and Weisbrod, 2003; Malani and Choi, 2004). Fortunately, 
the availability of data on ‘quality of personnel’ and ‘quality of the bid’ enables me to 
separately identify these three effects on bid prices.
To test for the existence of a nonprofit wage penalty, I run a simple OLS regression for 
all contractors c bidding for project i in mixed auctions only of the following form:
Cic =  ot +  {3NC +  x^ c7 4- i/i +  £ic (8)
where Cic is one of three proposed transfer measures, a  is a constant, N c is like before 
a binary variable, which indicates the nonprofit status of the contractor, x*c is a vector 
whose elements proxy for the bid’s quality -specifically, the percentage score of the bid 
on respectively the “Quality of Personnel” and “Methodology” dimensions, 1 are project 
fixed effects to control for unobservable project-specific characteristics, and £{c is the bid- 
level error term. The nonprofit coefficient /? is again the parameter of primary interest.
Table 9 reports the results for three different proposed cost measures: proposed total costs 
per day input, proposed personnel costs per day input, and proposed project expenses 
per day input. I find support for a nonprofit wage penalty. For instance, the column (2) 
estimate suggests that nonprofit status is associated with reduction in average proposed 
per day personnel costs of £74.28 Furthermore, the results suggest that neither “Quality 
of Personnel” nor “Methodology” is consistently, significantly correlated with any of the 
three proposed cost measures. This implies that a higher price does not necessarily reflect 
higher quality services; in fact, despite their on average higher price, for-profit bids do 
not appear to promise better ‘value for money.’
28 N ote, however, that the evidenced differential in proposed personnel fees is in fact only suggestive of 
the existence of a wage penalty. W ith the data at hand, I cannot rule out the possibility that in fact an 
employee at a for-profit earns a similar salary as his equivalent at a nonprofit, and that the cost differential 
is caused by a difference in overhead costs.
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2.4 .2 .2  T he R enegotia ted  C ontract
Lastly, the model predicts that contracting with a for-profit will involve substantially 
larger ex post or renegotiated transfer payments (relative to contracting with a non­
profit) but no loss of buyer control over issues of project design. Renegotiated extra 
transfer payments and ex post loss of control represent, as identified in Proposition 2.2, 
are the main two types of renegotation costs that a buyer faces.29
To test this prediction empirically, I run the following basic OLS regression for each 
contract i:
Ri =  a  +  (3Ni 4* x^7 +  (9)
where Ri is a measure of renegotiation costs, a  is a constant, N{ is a dummy variable 
for when the contractor is a nonprofit or a for-profit, is a vector whose elements are 
characteristics of the initial contractually agreed financial agreement. Once again, the 
nonprofit coefficient ft is the parameter of primary interest.
Again, to guard against omitted variable bias due to endogeneity, I sequentially expand the 
set of covariates. I add as a covariate a dummy variable for when the services procured are 
in social fields, like education, health, population and social development or renewable 
resources. I also include a measure of contractual incompleteness as an explanatory 
variable.
Table 10 summarizes the results. The first three columns present the regression results 
with the cost overruns as a share of the initially agreed costs with respect to personnel 
fees as the dependent variable. First, we find that nonprofit status exhibits a significant 
negative correlation with renegotiated (extra) personnel fees as a share of initially agreed 
personnel fees. Adding the dummy variable for whether the services are in the social 
sector lowers both the economic magnitude and statistical significance of our coefficient 
of interest.30 Nevertheless, the coefficient remains statistically significant. Indeed, col­
umn (3) estimate reveals that personnel fee overruns as a fraction of the initially agreed 
personnel fees when the contractor is a nonprofit is around 17 percent lower than when 
the contractor is a for-profit.
Second, the results show that total renegotiated personnnel fees as a share of the initially 
agreed personnel fees are substantially lower -specifically, on average 12 percent lower-
29Unfortunately, I do not have any data that would allow me to test whether the renegotiation offer of 
nonprofits involved a new design that fits better w ith the nonprofits’ ideals.
30This suggests that our concerns w ith the potential (here negative) om itted variable bias are appropriate 
or valid. To see why this is the case, recall that these social services raise the odds o f a pure nonprofit 
auction and observe that a project’s social character is significantly negatively correlated w ith the size of 
renegotiated personnel fees.
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when the project is a social service relative to all other project types. Third, if we were 
to increase the project duration by a 100 days, the average renegotiated personnel fees 
as a share of initially agreed personnel fees is expected to increase by approximately 5 
percent. Finally, the coefficient on our measure of TOR precision is as expected negative, 
yet statistically insignificant.
Columns (4)-(6 ) report similar regression results but now with renegotiated project ex­
penses as a share of initially agreed project expense payments as the dependent variable. 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficient on nonprofit remains large and statistically signif­
icant: The results reveal that contracting with nonprofits is associated with a reduction 
of about 30 percent in the ratio of cost overruns with respect to project expenses over ini­
tially agreed project expense transfers. The findings also suggest that longer term projects 
are associated with higher cost overruns for project expenses as a share of initially agreed 
project expense transfers. Finally, TOR precision is again a negative, yet statistically 
significant predictor of the relative size of cost overruns regarding project expenses.
I also estimated equation (9) for the restricted sample of projects procured through mixed 
auctions only. This subset of projects are arguably better comparable, and hence the es­
timated coefficients in (9) are less likely to be contaminated by selection effects. The 
findings in Table 11 corroborate those presented in Table 10, in fact showing that the 
difference in the relative size of renegotiation costs between nonprofit and for-profit con­
tractors becomes more pronounced when considering the subsample.
To summarize, I find support for the model’s three main testable predictions; in other 
words, the data are consistent with the proposition that there exists a significant rela­
tionship between a firm’s organizational form and its bidding and contracting behaviour. 
This suggests that the real contracting risks government faces when procuring aid services 
from private enterprises systematically vary with the firms’ organizational form.
2.5  C onclu sion
I have provided a tractable model of competitive bidding for inherently incomplete aid 
service contracts with two types of contestants -for-profits who simply maximize profits 
and nonprofits with a distinct mission, who care about the project’s outcomes and the 
ways these outcomes came about. I have shown that ex post renegotiation costs as well 
as initial price offers will be higher when the contractor is a for-profit; at the same 
time, by contracting with a for-profit, government essentially secures her (agenda-setting) 
control over the design of the contracted-for service. When contracting with a nonprofit,
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government effectively ensures a higher level of non-observable quality investment into 
the project, but risks losing control over the project’s design. I have thus revealed that 
organizational form has implications well beyond patterns of specialization; organizational 
form effectively impacts the nature of the contract itself with government.
I have also described in detail the bids for aid contracts by nonprofits and for-profits and 
the contracts between government and nonprofits and for-profits. I have compared the 
actual bids and contracts to the predicted ones in my model. I have found that nonprofits 
typically competed for aid projects with a strong public goods component and with high 
returns to intrinsic motivation of personnel, as one would expect from my theory. Also, 
nonprofits adhered less to the projects’ terms of reference than did the for-profit bids, and 
for-profits were more likely to request additional funds to complete their projects (due to 
cost-overruns and the like) after the contract had been signed. My theory does well in 
explaining these empirical results.
My findings reveal several important weaknesses in the standard design of aid procurement 
auctions and contracts. Firstly, the very large ex post renegotiation costs with for-profit 
contractors [running up to, on average, 30% of the originally agreed price!] suggest two 
non-trivial issues, (i) reputational concerns as a disciplinary mechanism are apparently 
at best weak, and (ii) for-profit contractors have apparently weak incentives to undertake 
cost-reducing efforts. To remedy the first problem, DFID could build a database that 
systematically documents or tracks the ex post renegotiation decisions of (especially, but 
not only) for-profit contractors, and use this information when evaluating new bids. In 
response to the second issue, DFID could make use of a different contract design (see e.g. 
incentive pay contracts or fixed price contracts) that credibly shifts responsibility for cost- 
overruns to the contractor. Other efficient means to redress these concerns include e.g. 
unbundling the services or incorporating the idea of the collective contracting mechanism 
(Huysentruyt, 2008)! A second concern relates to my finding that the level of competition 
intensity in those auctions where only nonprofits competed was relatively lower. This 
suggests a need to reduce the entry barriers to compete for aid service contracts (in 
particular) for nonprofits. Free training on how to produce a tender, as an example, could 
help to raise average competition intensity. Thirdly, the evidence indicates that r  (or the 
level of precision with which the TOR of a project is defined) does not systematically 
(strategically) vary across auction type category. However, it can be easily proven that 
endogenizing r  (i.e., setting r  strategically) could allow government to reap additional 
efficiency gains.31
One outstanding, important topic for future research is to map out the implications of
31 Please refer to Appendix A: Endogenizing Contract Precision for a more detailed discussion on the 
possible role of TO R  precision as a strategic choice variable.
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organizational differences in contracting behaviour for aid effectiveness. By linking data 
on service delivery performance (based on project evaluations) to the data set used in this 
paper, I hope to be able to make some progress in this direction. Also, as competitive 
tendering processes proceed apace, estimating the effects of certain types of nonprofits 
and for-profits -local and foreign, religious and secular, small and large- on contractual 
outcomes represents an important area for future research. Again, I defer such analyses 
to future work.
A ppendix A: M athem atical A ppendix
Contract precision -  If fin > \ig, then a marginal rise in r  unambiguously diminishes 
the likelihood that a pure for-profit auction occurs. Else, the net effect is ambiguous. To 
see why, observe that the derivative of the RHS in (4) and (5) with respect to r  equals:
Recall Proposition 3, which says that de f /dr  is positive. In expression (2a), we also 
established that bf(e*j) = 1 /r  so that 1 — bf(e^) > 0. Thus, a marginal increase in contract 
imprecision raises the righthand-side value in (4) and (5). Now, if in addition, (in 
then a marginal increase in contract imprecision decrease the lefthand-side value of (4). 
Then, clearly the more imprecise the contract’s specifications, the more likely it is that 
only nonprofits will compete. If both pg > pn, then the net effect of a marginal rise in r  
on the chances that a pure for-profit/nonprofit auction occurs is ambiguous.
Endogenizing contract precision - Let us examine how a buyer would optimally set r  if 
she could influence r  through her choice of effort to make the project’s instructions more 
precise. Firstly, I need to introduce some notation. Let T  be a measure of the project’s 
complexity, namely the number of states of nature that can occur ex post, and let 7r* > 0 be 
the probability that state t G {1, ..-,T} occurs. Each state of nature must be anticipated 
ex ante to completely design the project, and assume that the cost of specifying a state 
of nature is k > 0 regardless of the state of nature. Also assume that ivt > nt+i for all t 
€ { l,...,? 7—1}. These two assumptions imply that from a cost-benefit analysis it is better 
to first specify a design for state 1, then for state 2, and so on. Keeping 0g$ fixed, a project 
is characterized by the pair (T, - Consider a buyer who wishes to write down a
contract for project T  to guarantee that the project is well specified with probability at 
least (1 — r)  € [0,1]. The cost of contractual completeness can be expressed as:
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C (1 — r, T) =  min Sk  
s
> (1 - t )
l
C (r, T) is smooth, increasing and convex in (1 — r)  and T, and exhibits increasing differ­
ences in (1 — r, T). With probability (1 — r) the original contract accurately describes the 
project, and there is no need for contractual renegotiation. With probability r , however, 
contractual modifications are neccessary to complete the project.
Now, I turn to the buyer’s ‘contract design’ decision, and will show that the optimal level 
r  changes with the contractor’s type. Consider first the case when the buyer expects to 
contract with a nonprofit Suppose that the nonprofit initially sets Sn = g. Before issuing 
a call for tenders, the buyer must decide the level (1 — r* ), which maximizes his expected 
indirect utility:
Ogg +  Qnn ~  Tflg -  (1 -  r ) f l n +  2b{e*n) -  Cn~ e*n ~ C (  1 -  T*n , T).
Thus, the optimal contract precision, 1 — r* , solves:
_ d C ( l  — r* , T)  , ,
^  9 ( 1  — t )  ' ^
At the optimum, the marginal benefit of exerting effort to improve the contract’s com­
pleteness must equal the marginal cost of that effort. The greater the difference between 
f ig  and f i nJ the greater the optimal level of contract design precision.
In situations where the buyer expects the nonprofit to propose 5n = n , she should set 
1 — t* =  0. Then, to make the contract more precise is solely costly; it leaves the buyer’s 
expected gross project benefits unaffected.
Next, I turn to the case when the buyer expects to contract with a for-profit. Again, the 
buyer will choose 1 — Tj, which maximizes his expected indirect utility:
egg + b ( e } ) - c f - e } - C ( l - r } , T ) .
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The optimal contract precision, 1 — r*p solves:
, ,de*f d C { l - r * f ,T)
Replacing h'(e^) with 1/ t  ^ (Condition (2a)), and rearranging terms yields:
T f  ~  ~ d C ( i - T * , T ) / d ( i - T )
d e * j / d r
Condition (c) can only be satisfied for r j  —► 1. This suggests that the optimal level of 
contractual precision when contracting with a for-profit agency is close to zero. This 
extreme result, however, rests on one crucial assumption, namely that the pure for-profit 
market is perfectly competitive, so that the bidder derives zero profits in equilibrium.
In sum, government may benefit from choosing TOR precision more strategically, i.e., 
in a way that is likely to enhance its anticipated utility from contracting out aid. Two 
possible sets of policy directions readily present themselves based on the ease with which 
government can predict which type(s) of contractor will compete. First, if procurement 
agents can readily predict who will compete for a certain aid service contract with high 
confidence, then they may well benefit from setting TOR precision according to the fol­
lowing rule: If they anticipate that only for-profits will compete for a specific project, 
then they may gain from setting TOR precision as a function of the relative benefits 
of providing incentives and minimizing renegotiation risks. If they anticipate that only 
nonprofits will make offers with 8n = g, then the optimal level of TOR precision is such 
that the marginal cost of making the TOR more precise equals (pg — pn) . Finally, if they 
expect only nonprofits to compete with 8n — n, then they may their best strategy may 
well be to expend no costly efforts to raise TOR precision.
Second, if procurement agents cannot anticipate the type(s) of agents most likely to com­
pete for a given aid service contract, then it is much more ambiguous what the optimal 
level of TOR precision might be. Instead, government may potentially benefit from im­
posing a restriction on the type of agent eligible to compete. Limiting auction entry would 
allow procurement agents to again pick the cost-effective level of TOR precision. To judge 
whether such a measure is warranted, procurement agents must also consider the size of 
potential efficiency losses due to say a reduction in competition intensity.32
61 Indeed, econom ists typically advocate the (resource allocative) efficiency potential of com petitive  
markets (see e.g. Schumpeter, 1934). To counter such efficiency losses, the procurement agent may seek 
to sim ultaneously intensify com petition say by staging workshops to  help candidate contractors tender for 
contracts or by offering financial support to help cover the cost of preparing a bid.
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A ppendix  B: D a ta  A ppendix
The data used in this paper comes from a unique dataset gathered by myself with 
the help of DFID’s Procurement Department. I constructed a sample frame of competi­
tively procured aid contracts let by the UK’s Department for International Development. 
Specifically, I started with a list of all the competitively procured and fully completed 
projects, chronologically ranked according to the date of initiation (that is, the date when 
the initial contract was signed). Moving down this list (which has the most recently ini­
tiated and completed contracts at the top), I selected every contract until the targeted 
sample size of about 450 was reached.
The fact that all contracts included in my sample had to be completed was a requirement 
by DFID because of confidentiality concerns. Consequently, of all contracts initiated after 
2002, those of shorter duration are over-represented. Overall, contracts of longer duration 
are thus likely to be under-represented in my sample. However, to the extent that those 
longer term projects are disproportionately implemented by for-profits, this artifact of 
the selection process, if anything, strengthens my main results -for instance, it implies 
that my estimate of the differential in cost overruns between nonprofits and for-profits, if 
anything, is in fact even higher.
I collated data from four different data sources:
Data on ten d ers  and D F ID ’s te n d e r assessm ents come from DFID’s paper archives. 
I manually copied the names of each contender, details about the price offers made, the 
specific evaluation criteria and the weights assigned to each dimension, and the scores 
each bid received (if available). Though the actual scoring rule used is standard -simply 
the weighted average of the scores for each of the dimensions- the actual weights and the 
criteria used varied from contract to contract. I was able to find the details about the 
evaluation criteria and weights used for most of the contracts in our sample (roughly for 
80% of the cases). Unfortunately, the project files were much less complete about the 
actual scores that each candidate received. For each dimension, the weights and actual 
scores are expressed in percentage terms (i.e., lie between 0 and 100).
C o n trac t finance variables are from DFID’s own computerized information system. 
The variable descriptions are as follows:
1 . Contract duration is the total number of days between the date of project activation 
and project completion.
2. Extra days input equals the number of extra person days input that was needed to 
complete the project. It is the difference between final and initially agreed person
CHAPTER 2. CONTRACTING FOR AID 80
days input.
3. Price of the winning bid is the total price offer, expressed in Pounds Sterling, made 
by the supplier who won the contract. We use this as a measure of project size.
4. Initially agreed total payments is the financial limit, expressed in Pounds Sterling, 
set in the initial contract.
5. Final total payments is the total sum of transfers, expressed in Pounds Sterling, 
made throughout project implementation (computed upon project completion).
6 . Total cost overruns wrt to fees (project expenses) as a share of the initially agreed 
fees (project expenses) is the ratio of the overrun for personnel fees (project ex­
penses) over initially agreed total payment for personnel fees. The overrun for 
personnel fees (project expenses) only is the discrepancy between final and initially 
agreed personnel fees (project expenses). According to DFID’s procurement regu­
lations, total payments must be broken down in the two components, personnel fees 
and project expenses.
P ro ject-specific  d a ta  are also from DFID’s own computerized information system. 
Overall, there are 7 and 9 potential categories for, respectively, a project’s discipline 
and sector type. Specifically, the 7 discipline types listed in declining order of fre­
quency/popularity are: Miscellaneous; Management teams; Appraisal and monitoring; 
Other studies; Project coordination; Training and Feasibility Study. The 9 sector type 
categories are, listed from most to least frequent in the data set: Financial and business 
services; Health population and social development; Renewable natural resources; Com­
merce and tourism; Education; Construction; Energy and Extractive Industries. The 
social services dummy takes a value one when the project’s sector type is Education, 
Renewable natural resources, or Health, population and social development.
Legal s ta tu s  d a ta  is drawn from resources on the internet, as of October 2004. “Non­
profit” is a dummy variable which equals one for a nonprofit contractor.
TO R-specific d a ta  come from two independent judges who rated each project’s TOR 
on a scale from 1 to 5 along six, distinct dimensions: complexity, precision, monitoring 
and evaluation provisos, leadership, labour input and public goods nature. Appendix: 
Tablel shows the framework that the judges used when rating each TOR. I estimated 
the interrater reliability using three distinct approaches (Stemler, 2004): I computed a 
consensus estimate of 85% (allowing the two judges to differ by no more than one point on 
the rating scale). For each of the categories (complexity, precision, etc.), I also computed 
the Spearman rank correlation and Cronberg alpha’s coefficients to evaluate whether each
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judge applied the rating scale consistently. The estimates suggest a fair amount of intra­
rater consistency. Finally, I computed a measurement estimate of interrater reliability 
using principal components analysis for each category: The percentage of variance ex­
plainable by the first principal component was always high (70% and above), which gives 
some indication that the judges are rating a common construct. Based on these results, 
I use the average scores from the two judges throughout the analysis.
H erfindah l Indices (H I): I computed two types of Herfindahl indices. Herfindahl Index 
1 for auction category j  equals the sum of the squared market shares of all the firms in 
market j. Herfindahl Index 2 for auction category j  equals the sum of squared contract 
shares of all the firms in market j.
A ppendix  C: D etails ab o u t D F ID ’s C o n trac tin g  Process
As with most procurement in the public sector, value for money is the core principle un­
derlying DFID’s procurement, and is enhanced -so the rhetoric goes- by encouraging com­
petition through appropriately competitive and nondiscriminatory procurement processes. 
To ensure consistency of application of procurement principles across departments and 
offices, DFID has established mandatory procedures for procurements depending on the 
value and nature of the services being purchased.33
Appendix: Figure 1 schematically depicts the initial steps in DFID’s contracting process. 
To get a flavour of the mechanics underlying DFID’s procurement instructions, consider 
the following example. A member of DFID’s staff based in Russia wishes to contract-out 
the coordination of a project on revitalizating insolvent farms. Suppose the services are 
worth over £93,738. Initially, he/she must work out a contracting strategy, including 
contract duration and whether he/she wishes to use a fixed-price or cost-reimbursable 
contract.34 Then, he/she must fill out an Authority to Engage form. Herewith, she pro­
vides DFID’s Procurement Department (henceforth, PrD) details about the services, final 
TOR, estimated total value of the contract, criteria for the PrD to use to perform an ini­
tial sift through the expressions of interest if needed, and tender assessment criteria. Once 
project or programme approval is obtained, the consultancy opportunity is announced on 
DFID’s website and advertised in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU). 
Henceforth, all correspondence with potential bidders is routed thought the PrD, who 
ensures all bidders receive the same information. The timescale from publishing a notice 
to deadline for tenders can be relatively short - however, for an open procedure (i.e.,
33 A distinct set o f guidelines apply to  the procurement o f goods. D iscussion o f these guidelines, however, 
falls outside the remit of this paper as this study is centered on understanding the contractual environment 
for the delivery of aid service s.
34Fixed-price contracts for aid services are hardly ever used.
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where any elegible organization can compete), DFID must allow at least 52 days between 
sending the contract to OJEU and deadline for tenders. Finally, a team of professional 
advisors (usually members of DFID’s staff, including the person based in Russia who ini­
tiated the contracting process) carries out bid evaluation within two weeks of bids being 
returned in accordance with the initially defined tender assessment criteria, and tells the 
PrD how all the bidders were evaluated. In the vast majority of cases, the final contract 
stipulates a fixed set of contractual terms and conditions, and a financial limit. Once 
contracts are signed, the consultant can kick-off the project.
DFID’s procurement practices have acquired two new elements in recent years. There is a 
new focus on devolution of procurement management. A rising number of staff in DFID’s 
overeas offices is receiving intensive training to manage the contracting process locally. 
Trained local contracts officers are authorized to arrange the contracting procedure on 
their own, provided that the services are worth less than £93,739. Also, as DFID increases 
its spending on Budget Support35, it is challenged to meet growing need for instruments 
that help excell procurement management.
A pp en d ix  D: A uxiliary Im plication o f  th e  T heory
Appendix Table 2 investigates a further prediction of the model. The theoretical argu­
ments predict that nonprofits and for-profits will tend to make different initial bids. One 
implication of Proposition 4 is that if both firm types compete, then the winner is on 
average less likely to have made the cheapest offer compared to when only one firm type 
competes.36
To test this prediction empirically, I estimate the following probit model for each contract 
i awarded through auction type j:
Pr ob(Cij = 1) =  a  +  /? • / ( j  = 2) +  7 n,- +  x'-^ +  £%j
where Cij is a dummy variable for when the winner/contractor was also the cheapest 
bidder, I ( j  = 2 ) is a dummy variable for when the auction is mixed, rii is the number 
of competitors, x  ^ is a vector whose elements include contract size, discipline and sector-
3o Budget Support is a form of programmatic aid in which funds are provided in support of a government 
programme that focuses on growth and poverty reduction, and transforming institutions, especially bud­
getary. These funds are provided to a partner government to  spend using its own financial managem ent 
and accountability system s.
36To see why this must be the case, suppose that condition (4) holds with equality, the buyer is thus 
indifferent between the two bids, and hence randomly accepts one. Then, if r  (0gg — /zfl) <  (> )(1  — 
r )6 (e /)  — b(en ), then T„ <  (> )T /.  Similarly, suppose that condition (5) holds w ith equality, and both  
agent types com pete. Then, if r 6 gg — fig <  (> )(1  — r )6 (e /)  —b(en), then Tn <  (> )T / .  T hese results imply 
that for the mixed auctions, it is comparatively less likely that the winning bid is also the cheapest bid.
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specific dummies and £ij is the project level error term. The coefficient of primary interest 
is p.
Appendix: Table 2 reports the results. We find that irrespective of the number of com­
petitors, the winner in mixed auctions is nearly thirty percentage points less likely to have 
offered the cheapest price bid relative to the winner in pure auctions holding the other 
variables constant.
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Chapter 3
Collective Grant Contracts
3.1 In trod u ction
Over the past few years, markets for grant finance have proliferated and become increas­
ingly thick, with an ever larger number of potential grant recipients interacting with a 
growing number of grant-making institutions, notably foundations and philanthropists.1 
Despite this, remarkably few, practical mechanisms have at the same time evolved to 
help grant-making institutions overcome both the congestion that thickness can bring 
and the inherent screening difficulties that thickness can aggravate. These markets are 
virtually all organized via competitive calls for individual project proposals. The Ford 
Foundation, as an example, ranked amongst the top 5 U.S. foundations by giving, each 
year reviews about 44,000 individual project proposals, of which no more than 5% receive 
support. The central issue in such markets is twofold: the bottlenecks slow down the 
speed with which potential grant recipients and grant-making organizations can inter­
act. When grant-seekers or grant-makers are faced with this congestion, they may react 
in ways that damage other properties of the market, e.g. if they try to gain time and 
effectuate a transaction before a call for proposals has been publicly announced. And, 
the bottlenecks impart extra pressure on the screening devices currently used by grant- 
makers. A grant-making institution has a difficult time distinguishing between inherently
lrThe total number of US grant-making foundations alone nearly tripled since 1985, and their combined 
assets rose from $102.06 billion to $550.6 billion. Estim ated giving by US grant-making foundations 
reached a record high of $36.4 billion in 2005 -nearly 6 tim es as much as in 1985 (Foundation Centre, 
2007). Philanthropy thrived not alone in the US, but worldwide. Charitable giving in 2006 am ounted to no 
less than $285 billion globally. Concurrently, the nonprofit sector has likewise expanded in recent decades. 
Between 1989 and 2000, the number of organizations in the US registered as 501(c)(3) organizations 
increased by over 75% to 819,000 (Boris and Steuerle, 2006). A t the current pace o f growth, 11 new 
foundations and 119 nonprofits are created every day in the US.
90
CHAPTER 3. COLLECTIVE G RANT CONTRACTS 91
“good” and “bad” grantees in its pool of grant applicants; if it could, the grant-maker 
would promise a relatively small up-front payment to the applicant with a bad project 
and a relatively bigger up-front transfer to the one with a good project. With growing 
numbers of proposals to sift through, the use of transparent methods (like scoring rules) to 
evaluate individual proposals also becomes a lot costlier. In this chapter, I will argue that 
the way markets for grant finance are organized significantly affects market outcomes, 
and we will show how small changes in the design of the grant contracting rules can have 
substantial consequences.
I study a new grant contracting method, a so-called collective grant contracting mech­
anism, that departs from the status quo grant-making practices in two material ways. 
The new method requires candidate grantees to form a group of a prespecified size and 
submit one collective grant proposal, pooling together individual requests. The collec­
tive grant contract specifies a series of distinct and critical individual achievements, i.e. 
significant stages in each project’s development process, and conditions an individual’s 
future stage grant payments not only on prior defined individual results but also on the 
achievements of the other group partners. Assuming that grant applicants have some 
information about each other’s project (whereas the grant-maker has no such informa­
tion), I show that this joint liability transfer will induce positive assortative matching, 
and raise the average quality of the organizations or projects who apply. The collective 
grant contracting can be viewed as a simple mechanism that exploits ‘local information’ 
to alleviate grant market failures caused by asymmetric information. Furthermore, I con­
tend that the collective grant contract will significantly reduce transactions costs, that is, 
the administrative burden of allocating grants.
Scholars have in recent years devoted considerable attention to specialized lending insti­
tutions that use unconventional methods like group-lending to lend successfully to the 
poor (see e.g. Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Ghatak, 1999; Armendariz de Aghion and 
Gollier, 2000; Laffont and N’Guessan, 2000; Laffont, 2002; Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2002; Sadoulet, 2005). Much can be learned from the history of these methods 
to improve the design of grant-making institutions. Two important contractual features 
of group-lending and collective grant-making are indeed the same: the existence of joint 
liability and the selection of group members by, respectively, borrowers and nonprofits 
themselves. Notice, however, grant-making is very different from money lending. Grants 
are never repaid, and hence the notion of collateral does not apply to the context of 
grants. In grant-making, a factor analogous to interest rates is arguably the value of up­
front grant payment that is unconditional upon project success, whereby relatively larger 
up-front transfers will tend to attract lower-quality applicants. Contrary to group lending 
institutions, grant-making institutions are typically nonprofit entities, and therefore the
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size of profits is not a meaningful measure of grant-makers’ success. Thus, compared to 
group lending institutions, grant-making agencies not only decide different values (para­
meters), but also optimise a different value function.
The idea for collective grant contracting is also motivated by the long established example 
of the Coventry ‘gang system’ which was a contracting method for work successfully used 
in early British industrial history. Under this system, management at e.g. the Standard 
Motor Company in Coventry and several coal mines in Durham, contracted a specific 
amount of work to small teams of labourers, and thereby abdicated control over the 
production process as well as the individual wage payment to the worker-groups (see e.g. 
Melman, 1958; Rayton, 1972). The “collective contracts” sought e.g. to make “workers 
more production conscious and cooperative” (Gropius, 1968). Essentially, joint liability 
or responsibility for the work affected the gang formation, induced workers to influence 
the way other members behaved on the shopfloor, and helped management avoid costly 
monitoring. Around 1950, Standard Motor Company was paying the highest wages in the 
automobile industry and at the same time operating manufacturing plants that were, by 
all odds, among the most efficient in the industry (Melman, 1958). Notice that popular 
concerns like poor nonprofit selection and too little nonprofit coordination facing grant- 
making institutions today closely resemble the concerns that led to the rise of the gang 
system in Great Britain in the nineteen-twenties.
This chaper makes a contribution to the market design literature (see e.g. Roth, 2002; 
Kittsteiner and Ockenfels, 2006). I seek to bring knowledge of general economic principles 
to bear on a practical question of microeconomic engineering: how to design an appropri­
ate mechanism for grant-making that alleviates problems of adverse selection. The role 
of theory here is in developing intuition and identifying trade-offs in design choices by 
isolating the adverse selection effect. This mechanism design approach does quite well. 
It is hoped that the present chapter will stimulate others to carry the analysis into other 
areas of grant-making.
No previous literature has, to my knowledge, studied the problem of grant-making under 
asymmetric information. The bulk of the economic literature on grant-making has focused 
on understanding the motives of givers (see e.g. Andreoni, 2006),2 the impact of the tax 
deduction on charitable giving (see e.g. Randolph, 1995; Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter,
2 One model of this is that the public benefits of the nonprofit or charity enter directly in the giver’s 
utility function, that is, charity is a privately provided public good (see e.g. Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; 
and Bergstrom, Blum e and Varian, 1986). However, econom ists have felt more comfortable assum ing that, 
in addition to  caring about the total supply of nonprofit or charity, people also experience direct private 
utility from the act of giving. W hile there are numerous m odels and justifications for such an assumption, 
they have often been gathered under the general term of warm-glow giving (see e.g. Andreoni, 1989, 
1990).
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2 0 0 2 ),3 and the crowd-out effects of government grant-making on individual giving (see 
e.g. Payne, 1998).4 A recent literature attempts to understand the details of fundraising 
strategies that arise in competitions for private donations -that is, how charities choose 
fundraising strategies, and how givers respond to these choices (see e.g Andreoni, 1998; 
Vesterlund, 2003; Frumkin and Kim, 2000; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002). Instead, this 
chapter revolves around the grant-making strategy adopted by grant-makers and how 
nonprofits (or charities) respond.
Finally, this chapter is also related to a literature on information problems in credit 
markets (see e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hubbard, 1998). The possibility that hidden 
types give rise to socially excessive lending has been demonstrated by de Meza and Webb 
(1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (1990). Instead of assuming that heterogeneity concerns 
risk, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), in these papers entrepreneurs differ in their instrinsic 
quality. Consequently, the marginal entrant is also the least profitable to the banks, so 
the pooling interest rate is below that rate that this entrepreneur would be charged under 
full information. My analysis is the first to advance a similar argument in the context of 
grant-making.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I derive 
the “excessive entry” result under individual grant contracting and show that overop­
timism aggravates this problem. The third section examines the alternative, collective 
grant contracting mechanism and emphasizes additional strengths as well as problems 
with its implementation. I also discuss two concrete settings where the collective grant 
contracting mechanism presents a particularly compelling proposition. Finally, I draw 
some conclusions. In the Appendix, I contrast the optimal individual contractual terms 
with the optimal collective contractual terms given perfect and imperfect information, 
respectively.
3Dozens o f studies of this question have been undertaken. M ost studies employ cross-sectional data, 
either from surveys about giving or form tax returns. These studies are summarized by Clotfelter (1985), 
Steinberg (1990), and Andreoni (2006). Prior to 1995, a consensus had formed that the incom e elasticity  
was below one, typically in the range of 0.4 to  0.8, and that the price elasticity was below -1, generally in 
the range -1.1 to  -1.3, thus meeting the gold standard. T his consensus was upset by an im portant study of 
Randolph (1995). His analysis suggests that cross-sectional studies conflate short and long run elasticities 
and thus mislead policy analysts.
4There are many studies on crowding out, and m ost show that crowding out is quite small, often  
near zero, and som etim e even negative (Kingma, 1989, Okten and Weisbrod. 2000, Khanna, Posnett and 
Sandler, 1995, Manzoor and Straub, 2005, and Hungerman, 2005). Payne (1998), however, noted that 
the government officials who approve the grants are elected by the sam e people who make donations to  
charities. Hence, positive feelings toward a charity will be represented in the preferences of both givers 
and the government. This positive relation between public and private donations m eans that som e of the  
prior estim ates could be biased against finding crowding out.
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3.2  T h e B asic  M od el o f  an In d iv id u a l G rant C ontract
In this section, I identify the information effect that leads to too many individual grant 
requests in a simple, stripped-down adverse selection model. Consider a collection of risk- 
neutral, heterogeneous nonprofits each of whom is endowed with a public good project. All 
projects require the same first-stage (initial) and second-stage (follow-up) outlay c1 and 
c2, respectively.5 The benefits from nonprofit i ’s project are the random variable B .  All 
projects yield the same benefits, B s if successful (or fully implemented) or B  f  if failed (or 
terminated after the first period), with B s > B f  > 0. These benefits cannot be modified, 
so there is no moral hazard. Nonprofits value the project’s (social) benefits B ,  that is, they 
intrinsically care about their project’s outcome. What distinguishes nonprofits is their 
ability to successfully complete a project, that is, their probability of success P i ( B s ) G 
[0,1]. A nonprofit’s type is unobservable to the grant-maker, however, this information 
is observable to other nonprofits.6 If i and j  are two grantseeking nonprofits, then if 
>  P j { B s ), nonprofit i is said to have a “better project” than nonprofit j .
Nonprofits have the same initial resources, W i  =  W  for all i, which is entirely invested 
either in their project or in a safe asset.7 W  <  c1, so that if a project is undertaken, 
additional finance is required. Finance is raised through grants. The infusion of grant 
finance is staged (see e.g. milestone grantgiving in Frumkin, 2001). Funding for the first 
project phase is granted up front. Funding for the second phase of the project, however, 
is forthcoming only if the first phase of the project was successful. Denote the first- 
and second-period individual grants as, respectively, g1,1 and g1'2. If the nonprofit is 
risk-neutral, it wishes to maximize expected project benefits given by
=  P i ( B 3) ( B 3 +  g1’2 -  C2) +  (1 -  P i ( B 3) )  B >  -  c 1 +  g1-1 -  W  (1)
The nonprofit will seek grant funding to undertake the project if E ttI  > (1 +  p ) W , where
5This indeed captures the essence of how most individual grant contracts today are structured. To 
illustrate, consider the following excerpt from the US Departm ent of Education Discretionary Grant Pro­
gram s’ regulation: “Program staff use the information in the performance report in com bination with the 
project’s fiscal and management performance data to  determ ine subsequent funding decisions. T he annual 
performance report should also specify any changes that need to be m ade to the project for the upcoming 
funding period. A grantee cannot get a continuation award if it hasn’t filed all the reports required for the 
grant. Before a continuation award can be issued, program staff review the information in the performance 
report and the grant’s financial and project management activities to determine if a grantee has made 
substantial progress in reaching the project’s objectives and that expenditures correspond to  the project’s 
plans and tim elines. If these requirements are met, program staff issue a continuation award.”
6This asym m etry of information is a key assumption, which the collective grant-making mechanism  
effectively exploits.
7The safe asset can also be interpreted as a safe ‘project’, a project that has already been tested  and 
developed and where roll-out requires few additional resources beyond a fixed cost investment.
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p is the safe rate of interest. From (1) it follows that the magnitude of
Ewj -  (1 +  p)W  > 0 (2)
will be smaller, the smaller the value of p i ( B s ) .  From (2), there is a cut-off success 
probability below which grants are not requested. Call this threshold value or success 
rate of the marginal applicant, found by solving (2 ) with equality,
. _ ( 2  + p)W  + c1 - g c ’1 - B f  
Pi (Bs - B f  + gc -2 -  c2) ' 1 '
I find that the success rate of the marginal applicant p* increases with the first- and 
second-stage project costs c1 and c2, the amount of own funds invested W, and decreases 
with the first- and second-stage funding g1,1 and g1,2, B f  and the difference between B s 
and B ?, that is, the difference in expected returns between a project that succeeds and 
one that fails.
The characterization of p* (Equation 3) reveals several additional possible mechanisms 
that can deal with asymmetric information about applicant quality. Though considered 
to be fixed and exogenous in my exposition, in reality grant-making institutions often do 
impose a minimum level of own finance, W . Evidently, the larger the share of initial costs 
borne by the nonprofit, the higher the quality of the marginal applicant. This seems to be 
an important mechanism (see e.g. the requirement to match the grant funding) .8 Also, 
grant-making institutions often prefer to delay grant payment until intermediary perfor­
mance has been evaluated favourably. This means promising a smaller up-front payment 
g1,1, and, as can be seen here, essentially causing an upwards shift in the threshold value 
p*. Again, this seems to be an important screening mechanism in practice, at times even 
taken to the extreme with gCjl close to zero.9
Denote the average success probability of the grant applicants p, so p > p* and 
p (B s — B f  +  g1,2) > p* (B s — B f  +  g1,2) . The marginal grant applicant is indifferent 
to entry but generates an expected loss of (p — p*) (B s — B? +  g1,2). Under public infor­
mation, second-period funding would be tailored to the nonprofit’s type, so the marginal 
grantee under public information would now face a lower second period grant and they 
would not apply for a grant. The marginal grantees expelled from the market have projects 
with expected net benefits (p — p*) (B s — B f  -1- g1,2) below the opportunity cost of the 
funds used. It is in this sense that the market equilibrium is characterized by excessive
8 Many European Funding Programmes require grant recipients to  match the grant w ith  resources from 
elsewhere. The European Structural Funds, for exam ple, meet a proportion of the cost of any project: 
the remainder has to  be found from national resources.
9N ote setting gc 'x close to zero will only be feasible when the nonprofit sufficiently values the project’s 
returns even when it has failed, B L
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grant applying.
If applicants are prone to overoptimism, the problem is exacerbated. Suppose that the 
true probabilities of success are given by p but are believed by the nonprofits to be higher. 
Then, for any given {g1’1^ 1,2), the marginal applicant will be of even lower quality than 
under realism and hence p will also be lower. Overoptimism thus results in even more 
entry and lower average grant applicant quality.
3 .3  T h e  C o llectiv e  G rant C ontract: A n  A ltern a tiv e  M ech­
an ism
In this section, I examine one possible new mechanism through which grant-making foun­
dations can improve efficiency based on the self-selection of grant applicant groups.and 
the effect on the pool of grant applicants. A collective grant contract involves asking 
applicants (nonprofits) to form groups of a certain size, and stipulating a future ‘joint 
liability’ transfer. As in individual milestone grants, if a grantee’s project fails in the 
first stage, then she receives no second stage grant funding. But if a grantee’s project is 
successful in the first stage, then second stage funding is granted only when the projects 
of her partners were likewise successful in the first stage. Thus, unlike individual grant 
contracts, second-stage, or more generally future grant infusions are contingent on the 
project success of a pre-specified set of other nonprofits.
3 .3 .1  E q u ilib r iu m  in  th e  G rou p  F o rm a tio n  G a m e
First I show that for any given collective grant contract {g0,1, gC'2), grant applicants will 
always choose partners of the same type.10 That is, the equilibrium in the group formation 
game will satisfy the optimal sorting property, namely nonprofits not in the same group 
could not form a group without making at least one of them worse off. I thus establish 
the following important property of collective grant contracts:
P ro p o sitio n  3.1 Collective grant contracts will lead to positive assortative matching in 
the formation of groups.
10Recall, types are readily observable to fellow grant applicants. T hat is, I assume that grant applicants 
have som e information about the likelihood of success of each other’s projects that the grant-maker notably  
hasn’t got.
CHAPTER 3. COLLECTIVE G RANT CONTRACTS 97
Proof: The expected payoff of a nonprofit of type i when her partner is type j  from a 
collective grant contract is:
E-k% = P,(B ‘)Pj(B‘) {B‘ + gc -2 -  c2) +  (1 -  Pi(B‘)Pj(Bs)) B* — c1 + gc•' -  W  (4)
The difference in the expected payoff of a nonprofit of type p i ( B s ) of having a partner 
who has probabilty of success P j { B s ) instead of P k { B s ) is
Ett% -  E*g = Pi(Bs) [P:(B S) -  P 'k(B°)} ( b s -  B> +  gC'2 -  c2)  (5)
Suppose p ' j ( B s ) >  p ’k ( B s ) .  In choosing between two potential partners with different 
probabilities of success p - { B s ) and p k ( B s ) ,  any applicant will be willing to pay a strictly 
positive amount to have the partner whose probability of success is P j ( B s ). But the 
maximum amount a nonprofit of type P i ( B s ) is willing to pay to have a partner of type 
p ' j ( B s ) over p k ( B s ) is increasing in her own probability of success.■
The intuition is as follows: because nonprofits with a higher success probability place 
the highest value on having a partner with a high probability of success, they bid the 
most for these nonprofits. As a result, grant applicants of the same ability are matched 
together, just as partners of similar quality are matched together in Becker’s model of 
marriage markets or in Ghatak’s model of group lending (Becker, 1973; Ghatak, 1999). 
The underlying force driving the positive assortative matching result is also similar in 
these models: the types of agents are complementary in their (expected) payoff functions. 
Finally, the positive assortative matching result is distribution free, that is, the type 
distribution will affect the equilibrium payoffs, but there will always be positive assortative 
matching regardless of the distribution of types.11
3 .3 .2  A v e r a g e  Q u a lity  o f  th e  A p p lica n ts
In the previous subsection I established that faced with any collective grant contract 
(9C,li9C’2) nonprofits will choose partners of the same type. Here I derive the success 
probability of the marginal grant applicant (that is, the applicant who is indifferent to 
entry). Suppose a grant-making foundation offers a finite set of collective grant contracts. 
Nonprofits who wish to apply for any one of these grants (gC,1,gC'2) select a partner and 
submit a grant request. The success rate of the marginal grant applicant i is
. .  =  (2 +  p ) W  +  c1 - g c '1 - B f  
P* P, (BS) (B3 -  Bf  +  / ' 2 -  c2) ' 1 ’
11 This im plies that the degree of joint liability can be used as a screening instrument to  induce grantseek- 
ers to  self select grants that differ in term s of individual and joint liability.
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Hence, we have:
P roposition  3.2 The average quality of the grant applicants is ceteris paribus higher 
with collective grant contracts than with individual grant contracts.
Proof: Since P j { B s ) e  (0,1), p** > p^M
Thus, the success and efficiency of grant contracts are higher under collective grant con­
tracts as compared to individual grant contracts because the former exploit a useful 
resource that the latter do not: the information nonprofits have about each other.
3 .4  D iscu ssio n
The previous two sections made explicit the argument that hidden types may be associated 
with excessive individual grant requesting, and demonstrated how a collective contracting 
mechanism can essentially alleviate grant market failures due to adverse selection. In this 
section, I draw out several additional strengths that a collective contracting mechanism 
can produce. I also emphasize practical problems that can arise in its implementations, 
and finally elaborate on two concrete grant contracting settings, where experimentation 
with a collective grant contracting mechanism seems particulary compelling.
3 .4 .1  A d d it io n a l B e n e fits  w ith  C o lle c t iv e  G ra n t C o n tr a cts  
Peer P ressure and M utual A ssistan ce Ex Post
It is a common worry that by pitting nonprofits in competition with other nonprofits, 
the grant-making process will destroy networks of mutuality and their contributions to 
social welfare (Goodin, 2003). Collective grant contracts presents a way for grant-makers 
to reconcile competitive pressures with incentives to collaborate, enabling grant-makers 
to capture efficiency gains from both competition ex ante (between nonprofits for limited 
grant finance) and mutual assistance ex post (amongst nonprofits in a same group). While 
the other group members are not forced explicitly to help each other in hard times, 
they have an incentive to do so if they wish to continue receiving future grant transfers. 
Furthermore, the joint liability component can induce grantees to put peer pressure on 
delinquent group members, which can in turn improves the effectiveness of grant finance.
Transactions C osts
Screening potential grant recipients is a costly process for a grant-making institution.
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At the same time, nonprofits from the same locality or active in the same sector areas 
typically have some information about each other’s projects. And so the collective grant 
contract deliberately induces grant applicants to select their group members in a way that 
exploits this information. Recall that the collective grant contract shifts the probability of 
success of the marginal applicant upwards relative to individual grant contracts. Suppose 
that nonprofit talent (or success likelihood) follows a normal Laplace-Gaussian distrib­
ution. Then, under the collective contract regime, the number of nonprofits who solicit 
grant support will be comparatively smaller. Furthermore, by contracting with groups 
of nonprofits instead of nonprofits individually, the collective grant contract affords a 
grant-making institution an extra cut in administrative costs.
R eputation  Effects
Because of the many grant-making institutions and the fact that they seldom exchange in­
formation about their experiences with their grant recipients, there is a general worry (not 
specific to collective grant contracts) that reputational concerns and grant denial threats 
act only as weak disciplinary mechanisms. Intuitively, nothing prevents a nonprofit after 
a poor performance with one grant-maker to apply for grant finance elsewhere. Indeed, 
this is often the case. Still, under the collective grant contract, such poor performing 
nonprofits will find it increasingly difficult to join a group. Essentially, the collective 
grant contract mechanism can help to squeeze such poor performing nonprofits out of the 
market.
3 .4 .2  P r o b le m s w ith  th e  Im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  C o lle c t iv e  G ra n t C o n tr a c ts  
Social T ies
The role that social ties play in the group formation process is a priori ambiguous. On 
the one hand, social ties can facilitate the flow of information the other nonprofits’ types, 
that is, allow nonprofits to form accurate beliefs about each others’ talent. On the other 
hand, social ties can also stand in the way of the actual, effective use of this information. 
This is e.g. the case when a nonprofit selects another nonprofit into her group because 
of friendship considerations, and not on the basis of merit or talent (that is, information 
about her project type). In such circumstances, social ties become an obstacle in the group 
formation process. Positive assortative matching of nonprofits is no longer guaranteed. 
Furthermore, social ties can also weaken peer pressure ex post, that is, if nonprofits feel 
discomfort or find it difficult to credibly penalize or pressurize one another to perform 
well.
Search or M atching Frictions
If nonprofits have no ex ante information about the other nonprofits’ types, and search
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costs are prohibilitively costly, then potential applicants may be forced to pair randomly. 
Consequently, the positive assortative matching result will then no longer prevail.
T im ing o f  th e  P rojects
With collective grant contracts, the timing of major milestones for each individual project 
in a group should roughly coincide. Fortunately, this is often implied by the grant-maker’s 
focus on projects of a certain, ex ante specified size (of a certain duration and of involving 
a certain type of activity).
Contract R enegotiation
One major shortcoming of a collective grant contract is that the mechanism is, in the­
ory, not renegotiation-proof. To illustrate, consider a situation where a collective grant 
contract has been awarded to a pair of nonprofits. At the end of stage 1, only one of the 
two nonprofits has been successful. Then, according to the initial contractual terms, the 
two nonprofits will not receive any additional grant finance to fund the second stage of 
their projects. However, the successful nonprofit and the grant-maker at that point have 
an incentive to renegotiate the original contract and ensure that the successful project 
continues. The grant-maker (principal) would wish to propose a new, Pareto-improving 
second-period contract to the successful nonprofit (agent) only. Anticipating this, non­
profits may then, rightly so, disregard the threat of collective punishment -that is, the 
threat of receiving no further grant finance when at least one of the group members ‘de­
faults’. In practice, one way for the grant-maker to alleviate such problems (and to avoid 
this unravelling of joint responsibility) is to stick with the initial contractual terms, and 
instead encourage the successful nonprofit to submit another grant request (to finance the 
second project phase) but now in a different group configuration.
3 .4 .3  T w o  P r o m isin g  A rea s  for th e  A p p lic a tio n  o f  C o lle c t iv e  G ra n t C on ­
tr a c ts
International D evelopm ent G rant-m aking12
Estimated giving by U.S. foundations13 for international purposes reached a record $3.8 
billion in 2005 (Renz and Atienza, 2006). This increase represented a nearly 12 percent 
inflation-adjusted gain over 2002—far surpassing the 2 percent rise in overall giving in
12I have presented the idea of collective grant contracts at SIDA, Swedish International Developm ent 
Agency. We are now exploring the possibility to p ilot-test the mechanism.
13 A grant-making foundation is a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization w ith  its own funds (usually 
from a single source, either an individual, a family or a corporation) and program managed by its own 
trustees and directors, established to maintain or aid educational, social, charitable, religious or other 
activities serving the common welfare, primarily by making grants to other nonprofit organizations (Renz, 
1997).
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the same period. This trend is likely to persist and, perhaps, even intensify. At the same 
time, new, ultra-rich donors who largely drive this trend are increasingly moving to treat 
their grants and donations just as any other financial investment. But now, instead of 
maximizing the return on investment, their goal is to maximize the social return, i.e. 
the benefit given to receivers of the charitable services they help finance. This implies 
a new mindset that is now more and more also being adopted by governmental grant- 
makers.14 These two trends are particularly compatible with the idea of a collective grant 
contracting mechanism since the mechanism strives to raise the efficiency of grant-making 
by e.g. improving the selection of grant recipients.
I briefly mention three additional reasons for why the context of international aid grant- 
making seems particularly fit to take-up collective grant contracting. Firstly, many grant- 
making agencies are remote from everyday field experiences, and hence face significant 
costs to learn more about the true quality of local or foreign grantseeking candidates. 
Secondly, there is a widely shared concern that aid development workers time and again 
fail to coordinate their activities, duplicating each others’ services. The group selection 
process induced by the collective grant contracting mechanism can alleviate this problem: 
grantseekers have an incentive to contact each other, find out about each others’ work, 
etc. Finally, since aid has been untied in many donor countries, demand for grant finance 
administered by bilateral donors has recently witnessed an explosive growth. This has a 
priori aggravated the adverse selection problem.
G rantm aking and Supporting N ew  O rganizations15
Philanthropists and grant-making institutions are widely perceived to be particularly good 
at supporting innovative ideas and experimenting with novel entrepreneurial responses to 
market failures.16 However, there is abundant evidence that they often favour initiatives 
put forth by nonprofits whom they know well and with a proven track record. Evidently,
14In FY 2000, USAID  awarded $1 billion in grants to nongovernemental organizations. Grants accounted  
for 25% of all USAID obligations to nongovernmental organizations.
15I am currently in negotiation with a major bank in Belgium to  help them develop a new and practical 
financial service targeted at nonprofits and social entrepreneurs, which is based on the collective grant 
contracting mechanism. There is abundant evidence that many talented nonprofit and social entrepreneurs 
fail to  scale-up their ventures because they are often excluded from access to  capital markets, relying 
instead on restrictive, uncertain public funds. From a bank’s point of view, two major problem s with  
the market of loans to nonprofit and social entrepreneurs as currently designed or conceived stand out: 
individual transactions costs are high and risks screening is difficult. The new collective contracting 
mechanism, would require nonprofit and social entrepreneurs to form groups of a certain size, and would 
stipulate a ‘joint liability’ loan or financial input.
16Some examples: W hen the Scottish physician Alexander Flem ing discovered that mould seem ed to kill 
bacteria, he needed money to develop and refine the first dose of penicillin that patients could safely take. 
Neither his government nor private industry would give him the funds. In the late 1930s, Flem ing received 
funding from John D. Rockefeller. Ashoka, founded by Bill Drayton, started with an annual budget of 
$50,000 which has now grown to nearly $30 million in 2006. Ashoka named, created and pioneered the 
global field of social entrepreneurship. It established programs in over 60 countries and supports the work 
of over 1800 Fellows.
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such an ‘incumbent bias,’ raises entry barriers for new, innovative nonprofits. The collec­
tive grant contracting mechanism can be readily adapted to help grantmaking foundations 
deal with this contradiction.
For instance, a grant-maker could further mandate that at least one of the group members 
has never received grant funding before. This additional clause would reflect a clear com­
mitment to invest in new ideas. In settings where competitive tendering for public sector 
grant finance has been compromised and the allocation of grant funds too politicized, this 
modification of the collective grant contracting method could instigate a positive change.
3 .5  C onclu sion
In this chapter, I have presented a new grant contracting mechanism that alleviates grant 
market failures due to adverse selection. The main design innovation is that under a collec­
tive grant contracting regime grant-making institutions contract with groups of nonprofits 
instead of nonprofits individually, and make future-stage grant payments conditional not 
only individual success but also on the intermediary achievements of fellow group partners. 
Collective grant contracts thus exploit a useful resource that individual grant contracts do 
not, namely the information nonprofits have about each other. They also induce nonprof­
its in a same group to help each other in difficult times, and lower the transactions costs 
of contracting. Still, in certain circumstances, the collective grant contracts will fail to 
fully achieve the efficiency gains based on the self-selection of grant applicant groups.and 
the effect on the pool of grant applicants; for instance, when social ties interfere with the 
positive assortative matching property of the group formation process.
The theoretical arguments in this chapter can also explain why grant-making institutions 
commonly delay the actual disbursement of the grant transfer, stipulate milestones, or 
require own-finances or match funding. Another appealing feature of the collective grant 
contracting mechanism is that the mechanism can easily be modified to meet additional 
concerns, as I illustrated with the example of grant-making for new, innovative organiza­
tions.
One related, interesting question for future research is how to adapt the collective grant 
contracting mechanism to a setting where nonprofits differ not only in quality but also in 
project payoffs. A grant-making institution could then envisageably stipulate the level of 
riskiness of the portfolio of nonprofit projects that it wish to ‘invest in’. Another fruitful 
area for future research is to explore how the optimal design of a collective contracting 
mechanism plays out in a setting with moral hazard. A grant-making institution could
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then envisageably add-on say cross-reporting requirements. I defer such analyses to future 
work.
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A ppendix
I study a simple, static model of grant-making under adverse selection. Consider a sin­
gle, risk-neutral grant-making institution (the principal) who privately supports projects 
with a public goods character. The grant-making institution genuinely values the out­
comes of the projects she funds.17 Furthermore, to induce good performance, she stages 
the payment of the grant. She pays a sum g1 up-front, and the rest g2 upon project 
completion, provided a satisfactory, intermediary project outcome.
Suppose that there is a collection of risk-neutral, heterogeneous nonprofits each of whom 
is endowed with a public good project. All projects require the same first-stage (initial) 
and second-stage (follow-up) outlay c1 and c2, respectively. The benefits from nonprofit 
z’s project are the random variable B. All projects yield the same benefits, B s if successful 
(or fully implemented) or B^ if failed (or terminated after the first period), with B s > 
B* > 0.18 These benefits cannot be modified, so there is no moral hazard. Agents 
supply labour to the project inelastically. Nonprofits value the project benefits B, that 
is, they intrinsically care about their project’s outcome. W hat distinguishes nonprofits 
is their ability to successfully complete a project, that is, their probability of success 
Pi{Bs) £ {L, H}. To simplify the analysis, I thus make the type space discrete rather than 
continuous.19 A nonprofit’s type is private information. If i and j  are two grantseeking 
nonprofits, then if Pi{Bs) > Pj (Bs), nonprofit i is said to have a “better project” than 
nonprofit j .  Nonprofits have the same initial resources, Wi = W  for all z, which is entirely 
invested either in their project or in a safe asset at interest rate p. W  < c1, so that if 
a project is undertaken, additional finance is required. And so, finance is raised through 
grants.
Let us derive the optimal contractual terms under individual grant contracting. To begin 
with, suppose that the grant-maker is perfectly informed about the nonprofit’s character­
istics. The grant-maker can then treat each type of nonprofit separately and offer her a
• • I  l  J 2type-specific individual contract, that is (gi ’ ,gi ’ ). The grant-maker will try to maximize 
her payoff subject to inducing the nonprofit to accept the proposed individual contract.
1' To keep the model tractable and simple, we do not include a “warm-glow” component in the principal’s 
utility function. Provided the utility from the act of giving is the sam e under individual and collective 
grant-making, none of our main insights would change if we had included “warm glow” utility.
18 Suppose there were two types of projects: high-risk high-payoff and low-risk low-payoff projects. How 
would this play out in the current setting w ith asym metric information is an interesting question though  
beyond the scope of this paper.
19In a previous version of this chapter, I considered the two-dimensional screening problem. There, 
nonprofits not only differ in quality but also in ‘m ission’, that is, the way they value the social benefit of 
their project (H uysentruyt, 2006).
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The grant-maker will solve:
M ax P i (B ‘ -  g'i) + (1 -  pi) B f  -  g\\ (7a)
s.t. p i ( B s + g?-<?) + ( l - p i ) B f  + g ] - c l - W > ( \  + p ) W  V i e { L , H }  (76)
gj > c 1 + (2 + p ) W - ( l - p i) B f  V i e { L , H }  (7c)
The first and second set of constraints represent, respectively, the individual-rationality 
and limited liability constraints of the nonprofits. The limited liability assumption implies 
that in the event of project failure, the nonprofit cannot be obliged to pay for any costs 
net of non-pecuniary project benefits. The solution to this problem will be the menu of 
contracts (g*1 ,1 , g*1,2) such that (7b) and (7c) hold with equality. The menu of first-best, 
optimal contracts promise a type-specific up-front payment g*1,1 = c1 +  W  — (1 — pi) B f  
and a common second stage transfer g*1,2 = c2 — B s.
Intuitively, without adverse selection, the grant-maker finds it optimal to maximize total 
surplus and then set the grant payment so as to appropriate the full surplus and leave 
no rent to the nonprofits above (1 +  p) W. The nonprofit with a lower probability of 
success (i.e., the smaller pi) receives a smaller up-front grant payment and hence overall 
grant. Notice also that higher required own finance, W, must be compensated with 
higher up-front payment. Also, the grant-making institution can effectively exploit a 
nonprofit’s utility from its own project’s outcome (albeit in the event of failure) to lower 
gj. In fact, the grant-making institution pays the nonprofit strictly less than c1 +  c2 when 
(B» +  B f )  >  PiB f  +  (2 + p)W.
If the grant-making institution cannot observe the type of the nonprofit, she will offer 
the same contract to everybody. Interestingly, descriptions of grant-making practices also 
suggest that menus of contracs are not used. Notice that the solution to the grant-maker’s 
optimization problem must now additionally satisfy the nonprofits’ incentive compatibility 
constraints:
Pi (B s +  g2 -  c2)+(1 -  pi) B f +g] > pj (B s +  g) -  c2) +(1 -  pj) B f +g) Vi, j  e { L , H } , i ^  j.
The unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium with g1,2 = c2 — B s and g1,1 =  c1 -f 
(2 +  p) W  — (1 — p h ) B f . Now, low quality nonprofits are able to earn an informational 
rent.
Let us next consider the case of collective grant contracting whereby nonprofits are re­
quired to form groups of two. With complete information, the grant-making institution
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sets her collective contracts to solve the following optimization problem:
M ax  
9} ,9?
PiPj {Bs ~ 9i) +  (1 - PiPj) B f  -  g\ 1 (8a)
s.t. PiPj (B s +  g2 -  c2) +  (1 — PiPj) B f  +  g] -  c1 -  W  > (1 +  p) W  Vi e {L , f/} (86)
> c1 +  (2 +  p) W  -  (1 -PiPj )  B f  V i e { L , H }  (8c)
Recall that now the second-stage grant transfer is only forthcoming when both nonprofits 
succeed. The grant-making institution can treat each pair of applicants (i , j )  separately. 
The grant-maker will offer a menu of first-best collective contracts (g*?’1, 9 i f '2) with once 
again, a pair-specific up-front payment gjj — c1 +  (2 +  p) W  — (1 — PiPj) B f  and common 
fixed, second stage transfer g2 = c2 — B s. The higher the talent of a nonprofit and his 
partner, the bigger the up-front grant transfer.
Finally, with incomplete information about nonprofits’ types, the grant-making institu­
tion can no longer readily discriminate between the two types. She will set the collective 
contractual terms as follows: g0,1 = c1 +  (2 +  p) W  — (l — p2H) B f  and g0,2 = c2 — B s. 
A comparison between individual and collective grant transfers readily shows that the 
collective grant transfers are smaller. This suggests that not only will the collective con­
tracts increase the average quality of applicants, they also allow grant-making institutions 
to lower the overall size of the grant.
Bibliography
[1] Andreoni, J. (1988), “Privately Provided Public-Goods in a Large Economy: The 
Limits of Altruism,” Journal of Public Economics, 83: 57-73.
[2] Andreoni J. (1989), “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ri­
cardian Equivalence,” Journal of Political Economy, 97: 1447-58.
[3] Andreoni, J. (1990), “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of 
Warm-Glow Giving,” Economic Journal, 100: 464-77.
[4] Andreoni J. (1998), “Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising,” Journal of Po­
litical Economy, 106: 1186-213.
[5] Andreoni, J. (2006), “Philanthropy,” in Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism 
, S-C. Kolm and J. M. Ythier (eds), Amsterdam: North Holland.
[6] Andreoni, J, (2007), “Charitable Giving,” Mimeo prepared for The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics.
[7] Armendariz de Aghion, B. and C. Collier (2000), “Peer Group Formation in an Adverse 
Selection,” Economic Journal, 110 (July): 632-643.
[8 ] Armendariz de Aghion, B. and J. Morduch (2004), “Microfinance: Where do we 
stand?” in Financial Development and Economic Growth: Explaining the Links, Good- 
hart, C. (ed), Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
[9] Armstrong, M. and J-C. Rochet (1999), “Multi-dimensional screening: A user’s 
guide,” European Economic Review, 43: 959-979.
[10] Armstrong, M. and D. E. M. Sappington (2003), “Toward a Unified Treatment of 
Adverse Selection Problems,” Mimeo, Nuffield College and University of Florida.
[11] Auten, G., H. Sieg, C. T. Clotfelter (2002), “Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: 
An Analysis of Panel Data,” American Economic Review, 92: 371-82.
107
BIBLIOGRAPHY 108
[12] Bakija, J. M., W. G. Gale, and J. B. Slemrod (2003), “Charitable Bequests and 
Taxes on Inheritances and Estates: Aggregate Evidence From Across States and Time,” 
American Economic Review, 93(2), 366-70.
[13] Becker, G. S. (1973), “The Theory of Marriage: Part I,” Journal of Political Econ­
omy, 81(4): 813-846.
[14] Bergstrom, T. C., L. E. Blume, and H. R. Varian (1986), “On the Private Provision 
of Public Goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 29: 25-49.
[15] Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1990), “Financial Fragility and Economic Perfor­
mance,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105: 87-114.
[16] Bond, P. (2002), “Joint Liability among Bank Borrowers,” Mime, Northwestern Uni­
versity.
[17] Clotfelter, C.T. (1985), Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving, Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press.
[18] de Meza, D. and D. Webb (2000), “Does Credit Rationing Imply Insufficient Lend­
ing?” Journal of Public Economics, 78: 215-234.
[19] de Meza, D. (2002), “Overlending?” Economic Journal, 112: F17-F31.
[20] Demski, J. S. and D. Sappington (1984), “Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple 
Agents,” Journal of Economic Theory, 33: 152-171.
[21] Frumkin, P. and M. Kim (2000), “Strategic Positioning and the Financing of Non­
profit Organizations: Is Efficiency Rewarded in the Contributions Marketplace?,” The 
Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organzations and The Kennedy School of Government 
Working Paper, No. 2.
[22] Frumkin, P. (2001), “Balancing Public Accountability and Nonprofit Autonomy: 
Milestone Contracting in Oklahoma,” The Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organzations 
and The Kennedy School of Government Working Paper, No. 6 .
[23] Goodin, R. (2003), “Democratic Accountability: The Third Sector and All,” Pa­
per presented at the Conference on Crisis of Governance: The Nonprofit/Non- 
Governmental Sector.
[24] Ghatak, M. (1999), “Group Lending, Local Information and Peer Selection,” Journal 
of Development Economics, 60: 27-50.
[25] Ghatak, M. (2000), “Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending 
and the Peer Selection Effect,” Economic Journal, 110: 601-631.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 109
[26] Ghatak, M. and T. W. Guinnane (1999), “The Economics of Lending with Joint 
Liability: Theory and Practice,” Journal of Development Economics, 60: 195-228.
[27] Hubbard, R. G. (1998), “Capital Market Imperfections and Investment,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, 36: 193-225.
[28] Hungerman, D. M (2005), “Are Church and State Substitutes? Evidence From the 
1996 Welfare Reform,” Journal of Public Economics, 89(11-12): 2245-67.
[29] Huysentruyt, M. (2006), “Grant-giving and the Collective Contract Idea,” Mimeo, 
London School of Economics.
[30] Kingma, B.R. (1989), “An Accurate Measurement of the Crowd-out Effect, Income 
Eeffect, and Price Effect for Charitable Contributions,” Journal of Political Economy 
97, 1197-1207.
[31] Kittsteiner, T. and A. Ockenfels (2006), “Market Design: A Selective Review,” 
Zeitschrift fur Betriebswirtschaft, Special Issue on Governance Innovations and Strate­
gies 5: 121-143
[32] List, J.A. and D. Lucking-Reiley, (2002), “The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds 
on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 110: 215-33.
[33] Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort (1997), “Collusion under Asymmetric Information,” 
Econometrica, 65: 875-911.
[34] Laffont, J.-J. and T. N’Guessan (2000), “Group Lending with Adverse Selection,” 
European Economic Review, 44: 773-784.
[35] Laffont, J.-J. (2000), “Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection,” Mimeo, 
University of Toulouse.
[36] Manzoor, S. and J. Straub (2005), “The Robustness of Kingma’s Crowd-out Esti­
mate: Evidence from New Data on Contributions to Public Radio,” Public Choice, 123, 
463-76.
[37] Maskin, E. (2002), “On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts,” Eu­
ropean Economic Review, 46: 725-733.
[38] Melman, S. (1958), Decision-making and Productivity, Oxford: Blackwell.
[39] Moore, J. (1992), “Implementation in Environments with Complete Information,” 
in Advances in Economic Theory, J.J Laffont (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 110
[40] Okten, C. and B. A. Weisbrod (2000),. “Determinants of donations markets,” Journal 
of Public Economics, 75: 255-72.
[41] Palfrey, T. (1992), “Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equi­
librium Problem in Mechanism Design,” in Advances in Economic Theory, J.J Laffont 
(ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[42] Payne, A.A. (1998), “Does the Government Crowd-out Private Donations? New 
Evidence from a Sample of Non-profit Firms,” Journal of Public Economics, 69: 323- 
45.
[43] Randolph, W.C. (1995), “Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of 
Charitable Contributions,” Journal of Political Economy, 103: 709-38.
[44] Rayton, S. (1972), “Shop Floor Democracy in Action: A personal account of the 
Coventry Gang System,” Nottingham.
[45] Renz, L. and J. Atienza (2006), “International Grantmaking Update: A Snapshot of 
US Trends,” Report, Foundation Center.
[46] Riordan, M. H. and D. Sappington (1988), “Optimal Contracts with Public ex post 
Information,” Journal of Economic Theory, 45: 189-1999.
[47] Roberts, R.D. (1984), “A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 92: 136-48.
[48] Roth, A. E. (2002), “The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, 
and Computation as Tools for Design Economics,” Econometrica, 70 (4): 1341-1378.
[49] Sadoulet, L. (2005), “Microcredit Repayment Insurance: Better for the Poor, Better 
for the Institution,” in Credit Markets for the Poor, Bolton, P. and H. Rosenthal (eds), 
New York: Russel Sage.
[50] Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information,” American Economic Review, 71: 393-410.
[51] Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss (1983), “Incentive Effects of Termination: Applications 
to the Credit and Labor Markets,” American Economic Review, 73: 912-927.
[52] Vesterlund, L. (2003), “The Informational Value of Sequential Fundraising,” Journal 
of Public Economics, 87: 627-657.
[53] Warr, P.G. (1982), “Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity,” Journal of 
Public Economics, 19: 131-38.
Figures
and
Tables
Chapter 1
Fig. I . The linear city.
Monprofit 2
Nonprofit I
Refuse
.T
IWj rf-c,), 
Wz <*,*, 0), Accept 
ix2\  Tfi )
Refuse 
{Xj,  T2' 1
[Wt ix2',0>, lWjtvf.0),
W2 \x{ , T {  -c2\  W2 (4 ,Q i
W * i x 2\  7 % ’ ) J  ^ ( 4 ) ]
[Utility’o f Nonprofit I,
Ut ility o f Nonprofit 2,
Utility of the Public Age/in']
Fig. 2. Contractual game in extensive form.
w2nn m
W{ (1/2,
Fig. 3. Pareto frontier.
TABLE 1
IDENTITIES OF THE TOP 25 ENTERPRISES
Firm ID Enterprise Name Initially Agreed Payments
Market
Share Nonprofit
179 PricewaterhouseCoopers £11,062,533 8.51% 0
40 Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administration LTD £7,616,208 5.86% 0
6 Agricultural Development and Advisory Services £6,445,024 4.96% 0
123 KPMG £5,910,667 4.55% 0
20 British Council £4,173,592 3.21% 1
60 Enterplan International LTD £4,160,390 3.20% 0
29 Centre for International Development and £3,922,196 3.02% 1Training
62 Environmental Resources Management LTD £3,522,865 2.71% 0
107 International Mining Consultants £3,120,171 2.40% 0
171 Oxford Policy Management LTD £2,998,864 2.31% 0
137 Maxwell Stamp Associates PLC £2,613,533 2.01% 0
15 Bannock Consulting £2,592,771 1.99% 0
3 Adam Smith Institute £2,496,315 1.92% 1
89 HLSP Consulting LTD £2,029,027 1.56% 0
181 Public Administration International £1,824,785 1.40% 0
188 School of Public Policy (University of £1,690,024 1.30% 1Birmingham)
135 Marine Resources Assessment Group £1,681,082 1.29% 0
74 Futures Group Europe LTD £1,663,306 1.28% 0
90 HTS Consultants (Formerly Hunting Technical Services LTD) £1,559,970 1.20% 0
167 Options Consultancy Services LTD £1,496,232 1.15% 0
97 Institute for Health Sector Development £1,446,781 1.11% 0
73 FRR LTD (Formerly -  Fountain Renewable Resources Limited) £1,432,038 1.10% 0
86 High Point Rendel £1,421,225 1.09% 0
129 Liverpool Associates in Tropical Health £1,359,739 1.05% 1
19 Birks Sinclair & Associates £1,327,877 1.02% 0
TOTAL: £79,567,215 61% 5
Notes: There were a total of 459 distinct enterprises bidding for the contracts in my sample. The firms listed above are 
the top 25 firms, ranked according to their market share, i.e. the share of total contract pounds awarded.
TABLE 2
BIDDING ACTIVITIES OF THE TOP 25 ENTERPRISES
Firm ID No. of 
Wins
Initially Agreed 
Payments
Final Total 
Payments
No. of 
Bids
Participation
Rate
179 24 £11,062,533 £20,822,252 57 4.66%
40 12 £7,616,208 £10,893,687 39 3.19%
6 2 £6,445,024 £7,936,061 2 0.16%
123 18 £5,910,667 £7,806,498 45 3.68%
20 11 £4,173,592 £4,233,689 25 2.05%
60 7 £4,160,390 £4,346,405 11 0.90%
29 1 £3,922,196 £3,922,196 3 0.25%
62 10 £3,522,865 £4,433,777 15 1.23%
107 6 £3,120,171 £4,828,675 12 0.98%
171 21 £2,998,864 £4,417,897 35 2.86%
137 6 £2,613,533 £3,127,432 19 1.55%
15 13 £2,592,771 £5,196,664 33 2.70%
3 8 £2,496,315 £3,823,132 22 1.80%
89 3 £2,029,027 £2,998,446 9 0.74%
181 6 £1,824,785 £3,314,869 13 1.06%
188 3 £1,690,024 £1,874,135 4 0.33%
135 1 £1,681,082 £1,759,351 1 0.08%
74 1 £1,663,306 £2,682,727 2 0.16%
90 2 £1,559,970 £1,559,450 19 1.55%
167 4 £1,496,232 £1,533,567 7 0.57%
97 3 £1,446,781 £1,446,756 5 0.41%
73 1 £1,432,038 £2,335,081 3 0.25%
86 4 £1,421,225 £2,170,994 4 0.33%
129 4 £1,359,739 £1,503,923 6 0.49%
19 5 £1,327,877 £3,559,609 11 0.90%
TOTAL: 176 £79,567,215 £112,527,273 402 32.90%
Notes: Participation rate of enterprise /' represents the share of all bids made by enterprise /. 
Together, the top 25 firms won nearly 40% of the contracts in my study; their bids accounted 
for 32.9% of all bids.
TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF PROJECT SIZE, DURATION AND COMPETITION INTENSITY BY AUCTION
CATEGORY
Pure
Nonprofit
Auctions
Mixed
Auctions
Pure
Forprofit
Auctions
Overall
N=77 N=164 N=217 N=458
Panel A: Project Size and Duration
Initially Agreed Final Payments 165,456 350,338 309,697 295,829
(228563) (569713) (522047) (501476)
Final Total Payments 201,416 449,940 410,995 384,600
(276777) (755641) (678305) (656062)
Total Payments Overrun 0.257 0.291 0.358 0.319
(0.570) (0.88) (0.866) (0.824)
Overrun for Personnel Fees Only 0.223 0.245 0.286 0.262
(0.602) (0.896) (0.704) (0.751)
Overrun for Expenses Only 0.341 0.224 0.481 0.374
(0.960) (1.038) (2.374) (1.824)
Duration 612 685 596 626
(451) (596) (419) (438)
Extra Days Input 25 58 38 42
(69) (247) (134) (203)
Panel B: Measures of Competition Intensity
Number of Competing Bidders 1.427 3.479 2.647 2.683
(0.738) (1.202) (1.412) (1.427)
Number of Competing Bidders when More 
than 1 2.400 3.479 3.290 3.302
(0.646) (1.202) (1.136) (1.166)
Share of Distinct Contestants who Bidded 
only Once 0.823 0.714 0.624 0.686
{N=85} {N=238} {N=221} {N=459}
Herfindahl Index 1 (Total Initially Agreed 
Final Payments) 0.075 0.038 0.047 0.051
Herfindahl Index 2 (No. Contracts) 0.029 0.020 0.023 0.023
Notes: Standard deviations of the m eans are shown in parentheses. The Data Appendix describes the construction 
and sources of the variables in detail. The data are for all the contracts competitively procured between 1998 and 
2003 by DFID. I have a total of 458 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data (on 
which, s e e  the Data Appendix). For the share of distinct bidders who only bid once, the total number of distinct active 
bidders per auction category is shown in accolades under each respective share value.
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF SELECTION WEIGHTS AND TOR RATINGS BY AUCTION CATEGORY
Pure Nonprofit 
Auctions 
N=77
Mixed
Auctions
N=164
Pure Forprofit 
Auctions 
N=217
Overall
N=458
Panel A: Weights Assigned to Evaluation Criteria
Quality of Personnel 26.6 28.01 29.45 28.56
(7.61) (10.24) (10.92) (10.38)
[N=364]
Methodology 23.43 21.69 22.51 22.37
(12.04) (7.58) (9.12) (9.12)
[N=344]
Adherence to TORs/Job Description 13.43 13.00 15.04 14.11
(5.83) (5.5) (8.46) (7.26)
[N=284]
Experience of Similar Work 17.10 19.02 18.27 18.46
(7.61) (8.20) (9.83) (8.94)
[N=384]
Experience in Particular Region 15.14 14.57 12.74 13.75
(7.77) (6.05) (5.39) (6.07)
[N=280]
Procurement Management 8.33 8.08 8.25 8.21
(4.08) (3.25) (4.06) (3.72)
[N=39J
Commercial Assessment 10.75 11.43 12.19 11.78
(2.9)
Panel B: Ratings Based on TORs/Project Descriptions
(3.18) (4.32) (3.83)
Complexity 2.06 2.19 2.03 2.08
(0.94) (0.91) (0.88) (0.90)
[N=396J
Precision 2.79 2.80 2.92 2.86
(0.79) (0.71) (0.80) (0.78)
[N=396]
Public Goods Nature 2.97 2.87 2.59 2.73
(0.88) (0.95) (0.87) (0.91)
[N=396]
Leadership 2.40 2.67 2.39 2.48
(0.93) (0.98) (0.85) (0.90)
[N=395J
Monitoring and Evaluation 2.94 2.86 2.88 2.87
(0.93) (0.98) (0.93) (0.95)
[N=395]
Labour Input 4.86 4.80 4.72 4.77
(0.31) (0.45) (0.56) (0.5)
[N=395]
Notes: Standard deviations of the means are shown in parentheses. The Data Appendix describes the construction 
and sources of the variables. The data are for all the contracts competitively procured between 1998 and 2003 by 
DFID. I have a total of 458 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data (on which, 
se e  the Data Appendix). The total number of observations for each selection weight is shown in brackets in the final 
column. Notably, not all six criteria were used in each auction. For instance, the procurement management record 
dimension was rarely used, whereas quality of personnel was used in all auctions with non-missing data.
TABLE 5
AUCTION ENTRY DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
Pure Nonprofit Versus 
Pure Forprofit Auctions 
(1)
Mixed Versus Pure 
Forprofit Auctions 
(2)
Pure Nonprofit Versus 
Pure Forprofit Auctions 
(3)
Mixed Versus Pure 
Forprofit Auctions 
(4)
Price of the Winning Bid -2,29e-06
[1.12e-06]**
-1.15e-07
[2.99e-07]
-2.38e-06
[1e-06]**
-2.13e-07
[3.14e-07]
Construction -36.6101
[2.255486]***
-40.5369
[1.590289]***
-29.4888
[2.806038]***
-34.1962
[1.744462]***
Energy -40.4075 
[ 1.280426]***
-42.1704
[0.7870594]***
-35.18
[1.44089]***
-36.3927
[0.8208402]***
Extractive Industries -39.8548
[1.414674]***
0.367894
[1.369836]
-34.0175
[1.428538]***
0.290859
[1.347473]
Education 3.293021
[1.254546]**
1.217205
[1.036257]
3.140436
[1.44089]**
1.014984
[1.087416]
Rating of Public Goods 
Component 0.431433
[0.2116351]**
-0.11456
[0.218213]
0.51967
[0.2360879]**
-0.07765
[0.2239296]
Rating of the Significance of 
Labour Inputs 1.078488
[0.4901264]**
0.56172
[0.2836394]**
1.21081
[0.5255259]**
0.63571
[0.3059245]**
Adherence Significance -0.02156
[0.010851]**
-0.01871
[0.0066789]***
-0.02314
[0.0116087]**
-0.01691
[0.0068773]**
Year Effects NO NO YES YES
Number of Observations 
Pseudo R2
272
0.12
272
0.17
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by bidder are reported in brackets. The Data Appendix describes the construction and sources of the variables. The data are 
for all the contracts competitively procured between 1998 and 2003 by DFID. We have a total of 458 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing 
data. The category “Pure for-profit Competitions” is the comparison group. Regressions include all discipline and sector dummies, with "Commerce (Wholesale and Retail Trade) 
and Tourism" and "Training", respectively, a s omitted sector and discipline type -  however, the table only reports the estimated coefficients of sector and discipline variables that 
were statistically significant for one of the two auction types. The rating variables are expressed on a scale from one to five. The price of the winning bid is in pounds sterling, and 
captures the monetary value of the project. The regressions also include a measure of the number of monitoring and evaluation provisos in the TOR. The estimated coefficient of 
this variable, however, was insignificant, and for the sake of clarity is not reported here.
* Significant at the 10-percent level; ** Significant at the 5-percent level; *** Significant at the 1-percent level.
TABLE 6
COMPETITION INTENSITY AND SUPPLY MARKET COMPOSITION BEFORE AND AFTER AID
UNTYING
Bottom Quartile of All 
Projects Mid 50% of All Projects
Top Quartile of All 
Projects
Before Aid After Aid Before Aid After Aid Before Aid After Aid
Untying Untying Untying Untying Untying Untying
(N=89) (N=24) (N=135) (N=91) (N=99) (N=19)
Ratio of total number
of distinct contenders 
over total number of 1.60 1.96 1.46 1.60 1.30 2.50
contracts awarded
Average number of 
bids per auction 2.29 2.33 2.68 2.73 3.01 2.85
Share of nonprofit 
bids 0.43 0.36 0.38 0.25 0.27 0.20
Notes: The Data Appendix describes the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all the contracts 
competitively procured between 1998 and 2003 by DFID. I have a total of 458 possible observations. Deviations from 
this are accounted for by missing data (on which, s e e  the Data Appendix). Contracts in the bottom and top quartile 
were worth, respectively, le ss  than £58,151 and more than £363,290.
TABLE 7
FOR-PROFIT STRATEGY AND AID UNTYING
Share of for-profit bids
Sector o f Project Auctioned-off
Before Aid Untying After Aid Untying
Commerce 0.73 0.82
Construction 0.96 1.00
Renewable Resources 0.78 0.77
Energy 0.87 1.00
Transport 0.79 0.91
Financial and Business Services 0.80 0.81
Extractive Industries 0.86 0.50
Health, Population ancf Development 0.60 0.72
Education 0.44 0.50
Notes: Each row entry represents the share of all bids made by for-profits for projects of sector type / before
and after aid untying.
TABLE 8
ADHERENCE SCORE OF THE INITIAL OFFER AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
Adherence Score in Percentage Terms
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
Nonprofit -3.49503 -3.49503 -3.49503
[1.94109]* [1.94109]* [1.94109]*
Rating of Public Goods Component -5.91904 -5.41317 0.105
[3.98953] [4.23121] [6.54011]
Rating of Project Complexity 9.42668 8.49481 -0.92955
[4.47322]** [3.95855]** [3.03913]
Rating of the Significance of Labour Inputs 8.01858 7.8189 2.02031
[5.40875] [5.37434] [2.48543]
Rating of Leadership Component -0.28666 -0.75259 -0.62635
[2.23661] [1.97928] [1.37902]
Rating of TOR Precision -0.07479
[2.24423]
Rating of the Monitoring and Evaluation Measures 6.45748
specified in the TOR [4.84960]
Weight Assigned to the Adherence Criterion 0.19569 0.16311
[0.12227] [0.10691]
Project Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Constant 34.65824 35.86967 46.97681
[45.67789] [45.05015] [12.92341]***
Number of Observations 615 615 615
R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.49
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The Data Appendix describes the construction and 
sources of the variables. The data are for all bids in auctions where adherence is used as one of the 
evaluation criteria. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. Regressions include discipline and 
sector dummies. The rating variables are expressed on a scale from one to five. The adherence weight 
variable is a number in theory between 1 and 100, but in reality, predominantly between 5 and 30.
* Significant at the 10-percent level; ** Significant at the 5-percent level; *** Significant at the 1-percent level.
TABLE 9
PRICE OF THE INITIAL OFFER AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
Independent Variables
Total Costs per Day Input Personnel Costs per Day Input Project Expenses per Day Input
(1) (2) (3)
Nonprofit -76.56897 -74.00018 -2.39066
[30.14975]** [17.69920]*** [20.62979]
Quality of Personnel Score
(%) 3.18843 1.60328 2.18528
[2.12320] [1.07347] [1.66851]
Methodology Score (%) -2.50255 -2.16552 -0.72538
[1.70112] [0.88451]** [1.18641]
Project Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Constant 185.11575 154.9575 57.4157
[84.57172]** [44.03674]*** [65.86143]
Observations 311 310 310
R-squared 0.65 0.69 0.57
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The Data Appendix describes the construction and sources of the variable. The 
data are for all bids in mixed auctions only. I have a total of 530 possible observations, which is the overall number of bids made in mixed 
auctions. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data.
* Significant at the 10-percent level; ** Significant at the 5-percent level; *** Significant at the 1-percent level.
TABLE 10
RENEGOTIATING COSTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
Independent Variables
Total Cost Overruns wrt Fees as a Share of Initially Agreed
Fees
Total Cost Overruns wrt Project Expenses as a Share of 
Initially Agreed Project Expenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nonprofit -0.19264 -0.16478 -0.16662 -0.33171 -0.31189 -0.31804
[0.06666]*** [0.06716]** [0.0676]** [0.15624]** [0.17227]* [0.17385]*
Initially Agreed Maximal Total Transfer -4.19e-07 -4.24e-07 -4.05e-07 -7.96e-07 -8.00e-07 -7.38e-07
[1.89e-07]** [1.86e-07]** [1.86e-07]** [5.30e-07] [5.26e-07] [5.15e-07]
Ratio of Initially Agreed Maximal Project -0.02283 -0.01451 -0.01597 -0.154 -0.14882 -0.15257
Expenses over Personnel Fees [0.017827] [0.01696] [0.01686] [0.07601]* [0.07707]* [0.07835]*
Contract Duration 0.00054 0.00056 0.00056 0.00096 0.00098 0.00095
[0.00013]*** [0.00014]*** [0.00014]*** [0.00033]*** [0.00031]*** [0.0003]***
Social Service -0.12088 -0.12075 -0.08117 -0.06813
[0.07206]* [0.07269]* [0.19604] [0.1974]
Rating of TOR Precision -0.05555 -0.16819
[0.04622] [0.14029]
Constant 0.11317 0.14066 0.29973 0.24256 0.25969 0.74133
[0.04129]*** [0.04753]*** [0.13712]** [0.12455]* [0.14286]* [0.37493]**
Number of Observations 385 385 385 358 358 358
Adj R2 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.06
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The Data Appendix describes the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all the contracts competitively 
procured between 1998 and 2003 by DFID. We have a total of 458 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. Nonprofit is a dummy variable for 
when the contractor is a nonprofit or a for-profit. Initially agreed maximal total transfer is expressed in terms of Pounds Sterling. Ratio of initially agreed maximal project expenses  
over personnel fees captures the relative importance of project expenses. Contract duration is expressed in terms of days-inputs. Social service is a dummy variable for when the 
activities contracted for are in the fields of education, health, population and social development or renewable resources. Rating of the TOR precision is expressed on a scale from 
one (meaning ‘very imprecise’) to five (meaning ‘very precise').
* Significant at the 10-percent level; ** Significant at the 5-percent level; *** Significant at the 1-percent level.
TABLE 11
RENEGOTIATING COSTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
Independent Variables
Total Cost Overruns wrt Fees as a Share of Initially Agreed
Fees
Total Cost Overruns wrt Project Expenses as a Share of 
Initially Agreed Project Expenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nonprofit -0.27945 -0.29495 -0.29939 -0.37563 -0.36322 -0.34872
[0.14051]** [0.14975]** [0.12308]** [0.16733]** [0.19353]* [0.18475]*
Initially Agreed Maximal Total Transfer -7.21 e-07 -7.14e-07 -4.93e-07 -1.99e-07 -2,03e-07 -1.40e-07
[3.60e-07]** [3.59e-07]** [2.88e-07]* [4.06e-07] [4.02e-07] [3.80e-07]
Ratio of Initially Agreed Maximal Project -0.22745 -0.23756 -0.10933 -0.24262 -0.233 -0.21407
Expenses over Personnel Fees [0.15261] [0.15997] [0.12469] [0.14775]* [0.15663] [0,15282]
Contract Duration 0.00097 0.00096 0.0007 0.00062 0.00063 0.00061
[0.00029]*** [0.00029]*** [0.00024]*** [0.00028]** [0.00027]** [0.00026]**
Social Service -0.05839 -0.04524 -0.05303 -0.04775
[0.15738] [0.15166] [0.22162] [0.22463]
Rating of TOR Precision -0.08459 -0.1391
[0.08467] [0.12145]
Constant 0.11170 0.09836 0.39423 0.28049 0.29352 0.66503
[0.11125] [0.12278] [0.25023] [0.1213]* [0.12740]* [0.35459]*
Number of Observations 135 135 135 144 144 144
Adj R2 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The Data Appendix describes the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all the contracts competitively 
procured between 1998 and 2003 by DFID, for mixed auctions only. We have a total of 164 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. Nonprofit 
is a dummy variable for when the contractor is a nonprofit or a for-profit. Initially agreed maximal total transfer is expressed in terms of Pounds Sterling. Ratio of initially agreed 
maximal project expenses over personnel fees captures the relative importance of project expenses. Contract duration is expressed in terms of days-inputs. Social service is a 
dummy variable for when the activities contracted for are in the fields of education, health, population and social development or renewable resources. Rating of the TOR precision is 
expressed on a scale from one (meaning 'very imprecise’) to five (meaning ‘very precise’).
* Significant at the 10-percent level; ** Significant at the 5-percent level; *** Significant at the 1-percent level.
FIGURE 1
OVERVIEW OF THE INITIAL STEPS IN DFID’S CONTRACTING PROCESS
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contracting strategy.
ii) Work out whether the 
consultant must design an 
activity (then not be involved in 
implementation) or design and 
implement it.
iii) Fill out Authority to Engage 
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approval.
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worth ovoer £93,738 advertise 
in the Official Journal of the 
European Union (OJEU).
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must design an activity (then not 
be involved in implementation) or 
design and implement it.
iii) Fill out Authority to Engage Form 
and give to PrD.
Then, PrD decides what to do next. If 
the ‘client’ does not wish to make 
use of an existing resource centre 
or enabling agreement, the PrD wil 
typically decide to stage a 
competitive auction unless this 
would involve disproportionate 
costs relative to the value of the 
contract.
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i) Draft TORs.
ii) Obtain project approval.
iii) Consider with your local 
contracts officer whether the 
contract is best placed under 
local or English law, and select 
appropriate contract form.
iv) Consider with your local 
contracts officer the need for 
competition.
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APPENDIX: TABLE 1
FRAMEWORK FOR RATING THE CONTRACTS’ "TERMS OF REFERENCES"
Characteristic 1 2 3 4 5
Complexity 1 skill/expertise, 1 task 2 tasks (such as, 
advice+training), 
interrelated
3 tasks (like advice+ 
research+ implementing 
something) all interrelated
3 tasks not all interrelated 4+ tasks not all interrelated
Precision Specified in very, very 
vague terms, just bullet 
pointing some issues with 
no further detail
Still quite vague, but better 
structured (for example, by 
phases) and some more 
content to the tasks
Very comprehensive list of 
tasks that need to be 
implemented, but no details 
of how, or does not say 
specifically who to 
meet/contact
Well defined, very 
comprehensive, and states 
clearly what needs to be 
done; but also adds 
comments on how, 
process, points to focus on
Extremely detailed, both in 
terms of content and 
style/process; more 
specification on contents
Public Goods 
Component
Technical, including 
internal management 
reforms, in a sector with no 
clear public goods 
component at all (private 
sector)
Technical, including 
internal management 
reforms, but in a sector with 
some public goods element 
or in a sector that produces 
a public good directly
The services only directly 
affect a specific public 
sector agency (say, a 
particular Ministerial Dept), 
but some of the service 
provided have a clear 
public goods element
The services will impact not 
just a small group of 
professionals, but the 
public sector as a whole 
(such as, tax reforms)
The services entail the 
provision of pure public 
goods. The services 
achieve many 
spillover/externality effects.
Monitoring and 
Evaluation
No mention of any 
monitoring or evaluation 
arrangements.
Submit one report or a final 
report upon project 
completion.
Submit two reports, but 
there is no phasing (that is 
to say, good first report is a 
prerequisite to continue on 
to the second phase)
Submit two reports but 
project continuation 
depends on the evaluation 
of the first report, or submit 
two reports without phasing 
but also submit many 
intermediary reports
All of the previous plus 
specific monitoring 
provisions and/or specific 
provisions for evaluation.
Leadership The contractor must 
interact with DFID staff 
only.
The contractor will interact 
with local elite (such as 
ministries, government 
depts) and possibly DFID 
staff
The contractor must 
interact with elites of the 
aid recipient country but 
also middle-rung people, or 
at most 2 different types of 
actors or DFID and 1 local 
(non-elite) actor.
The contractor must 
interact with 3 different 
actors or 2 local actors
The contractor must 
interact with 4 different 
types actors, including the 
direct beneficiaries of her 
services.
Labour Input Virtually all of the services 
(over 90%) has to do with 
the procurement of 
materials, very little labour 
input - predominantly 
physical inputs
Physical inputs play a 
slightly more important role 
than labour input.
The services are labour 
intensive, but include the 
instalment/provision of 
specific infrastructure 
(which will continue to exist 
once the project is 
completed)
The service delivery 
requires mainly labour input 
with some use of 
ICT/computers
The only input that matters 
is people's expertise
APPENDIX: TABLE 2
FURTHER IMPLICATION OF THE THEORY
Dependent Variable: Winner is Cheapest Bidder
Independent Variables (1) (2)
Mixed Auction -0.27 -0.27696
[0.16699]* [0.16664]*
Number of Competitors -0.71467 -0.7066
[0.06274]*** [0.06364]***
Price of the Winning Bid -1.51e-07
[1.50e-07]
Sector and Discipline Dummies YES YES
Constant 1.81467 1.81286
[0.30220]*** [0.30023]***
Number of Observations 446 446
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.32
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The Data Appendix describes the construction and 
sources of the variables. The data are for all the contracts competitively procured between 1998 and 2003 by 
DFID. W e have a total of 458 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. 
Mixed auction is a dummy variable for when the auction is a mixed auction; the other two auction types (pure 
nonprofit and pure for-profit competitions) comprise the benchmark group. Price of the winning is expressed  
in Pounds Sterling, and captures the contract’s size or volume.
* Significant at the 10-percent level; ** Significant at the 5-percent level; *** Significant at the 1-percent level.
